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It was a Thursday in late April 2016. And like most Thursdays since complet-
ing the main part of fieldwork in late 2014, I checked both websites that I’ve 
been researching for the last four years. I just did not feel comfortable about 
completely losing track of the fields, and their easy accessibility was just too 
seductive to not return to them, at least for a few moments each week. So I did 
as I almost always did that day: clicked on the two symbols in my browser’s 
bookmark bar to load both websites in adjacent tabs and then opened the 
Excel document in which I keep track of any interesting actions and changes. 
Starting with the Icelandic website Betri Reykjavík, I copied and pasted 
titles and links to the three new ideas that users had set in during the last few 
days. One user suggested installing a play area for dogs between BSÍ, the cen-
tral bus station and the recreational park area of Hljómskálagarðinn (cf. Tho-
roddsen). Another user urged the construction of an underpass for pedestrians 
and cyclists under Borgarvegur street in the Grafarvogur neighbourhood (cf. 
Sigurðardóttir). The third idea raised awareness of the fire hazard caused by 
arson in mailboxes overflowing with newspapers and thus suggested terminat-
ing delivery of the free dailies (cf. Hjálmarsson). I also checked the numbers 
of ideas “officially in progress”, “officially successful› and “officially failed” 
and noticed that nothing has changed in any of the three categories in the last 
week. I also check the categories of ideas “trending”, “top read”, and “top 
voted”. The idea about moving the domestic airport out of the city centre has 
been heading the “trending” list for 20 months; joined there by constructing 
a golf course in the Fossvogsdalur neighbourhood for the last eight months. 
Those ideas are amongst the most contested on Betri Reykjavík, for almost 
exactly as many users voted for as against them.1 So it’s no surprise that the 
idea of moving the airport is also at the top of the most read ideas; together 
with a suggestion to rename one of the pubs Bravó and Húrra in the city cen-
1 While 133 users voted for moving the airport, 132 voted against it (cf. Sigurðsson).
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tre to prevent confusion between the two (cf. Andrés Ingi) and the proposal to 
allow free parking for small cars in the city centre (cf. Ástgeirsson). The first 
two ideas have been the most read for the last eight months. This week the 
ideas that received the most votes were a suggestion to install bicycle pumps 
throughout the city (cf. Aradottir Pind), fees for the use of studded tires on 
cars (cf. Þengilsson), and the cleaning of cycling paths to avoid accidents (cf. 
Ágústsdóttir).
Closing this tab and opening the LiquidFriesland tab, I am shocked. My 
browser tells me that there is no website available under that URL. I retry by 
clicking on the symbol in the bookmark bar without success. Next, I go to the 
website of the district of Friesland directly and try to access LiquidFriesland 
that way. I have no luck, instead I stumble over a press release, stating that 
LiquidFriesland was terminated at the end of April. I cannot believe it! What I 
had often nervously joked about has come true: one of my two fields has gone 
offline. What does that mean for my research? Should I look for a new field 
and start all over? Should I just stop pursuing my PhD? 
These initial emotional reactions occurred naturally. However, things quickly 
shifted back into perspective: of course, the dissolution of a research field shapes 
both research and analysis. But never does it automatically lead to the end of its 
investigation. In other words, LiquidFriesland going offline was to be regarded 
as just another observation of the field, and was to be analysed and understood 
as such. 
Furthermore, this incident perfectly illustrates what is perhaps the main chal-
lenge of research in, on and about the Internet: it changes quickly. Over the past 
two decades, Information and Communications Technologies – or ICTs – have 
arguably permeated most parts of people’s everyday lives across the globe. Work-
ing, learning, shopping, dating, and training are just a few activities that are now 
also and increasingly happening online. Websites and applications remain beta 
versions forever and change nearly daily to better suit the demands of their users. 
Ever decreasing in size, digital devices have found the way from data centres over 
workplaces into the home, and increasingly frequently, into people’s pockets and 
hands.
However, it is not only leisure activities likes those mentioned above which 
are also increasingly taking place in digital space. ICTs are also posing a tremen-
dous challenge to traditional media, predominantly through the runaway success 
of Social Media and, with it, the dissolution of the information monopoly once 
held by professional journalists and news outlets. At the same time, civil and po-
litical activities as diverse as voting, signing petitions, and taking part in boycotts 
are now increasingly being done online. ICTs also hold unique opportunities for 
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citizens to have a more direct influence on political decision-making processes by 
suggesting ideas on how to improve everyday life in their area. That is the case in 
the research fields Betri Reykjavík in Iceland’s capital, and LiquidFriesland in the 
district of Friesland in northern Germany. 
There are several things we need to understand better about these develop-
ments. First, we need to better understand how ICTs influence citizens’ informa-
tion collection regarding political news. The ways in which people completely 
shift their information collecting to online outlets (both of traditional and Social 
Media), or in which they combine online and offline media, or in which they 
completely ignore ICTs in information collecting, has consequences for citizens’ 
information practices. Here information is to be seen as a prerequisite to politi-
cal participation. Investigating people’s information practices allows us to reason 
about citizens’ general dispositions toward political participation as well as the 
likelihood that they will engage in online modes of participation. 
Second, we do not know enough about how ICTs influence citizens’ reper-
toires of political participation modes. Knowing whether citizens’ repertoires of 
political participation modes broaden because of ICTs would help to more closely 
assess if ICTs really only facilitate “slacktivism” (cf. Serup Christensen, ‘Political 
Activities on the Internet’) or if online participation modes make it possible to 
take part politically in new, meaningful and flexible ways. 
Third, changes in citizens’ political participation practices around ICTs have 
not been comprehensively researched. Do people participate more frequently be-
cause of the opportunities provided by ICTs? Do ICTs facilitate the integration of 
political participation into citizens’ everyday lives, including for those who were 
previously not involved for whatever reason? Do citizens perceive changes in 
their own political efficacy, both internally and externally? Whatever the case, if 
we do not develop further understanding on how ICTs affect citizens’ participatory 
practices, we will not only be able to project both the state of digital democracy in 
Germany and Iceland today, but will also be better able to utilise the potential of 
ICTs to mobilise citizens to participate politically over the longer term.
Fourth, by looking at how citizens use and make sense of online participation 
tools like Betri Reykjavík or LiquidFriesland, we can gain valuable insights about 
this mode of online political participation. With such knowledge, we could devel-
op guidelines for both politicians and administration, as well as programmers on 
how to design and implement effective citizen/user-friendly online participation 
tools. This is also the reason why investigating the interfaces, that is the commu-
nication and interaction between the three prime actor groups – users/citizens, 
programmers, and politicians and administrators – in online participation tools 
like Betri Reykjavik and LiquidFriesland is worthwhile. It is only by learning 
more about the conflicts, irritations, and good moments in interactions between 
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those actors that we can further develop online participation tools that fit citizens’ 
needs and that they therefore see as worth incorporating into their everyday lives.
Studies by political scientists or communication scholars on political partici-
pation often lack the micro-perspective on those that actually take part, those that 
choose to participate in one way or another, those that mix-and-match modes of 
participation right through the artificial boundaries of offline and online worlds, 
always true to their everyday lives. The micro-perspective offered by Cultural 
Anthropology does indeed have important and insightful contributions to make to 
the study of political participation. Focusing on the actual participants, listening 
to their stories, their descriptions and their reasonings promises to open a hitherto 
strongly under-researched dimension, that of participants’ diverse motives for and 
perspectives on political participation: “[e]thnographic research on virtual worlds 
provides a perspective no other approach to technology and society can offer: it 
can demonstrate imbrications of technology, culture, and selfhood with significant 
and enduring social consequences” (Boellstorff et al. 195).
This book makes a further contribution by taking a comparative approach to 
investigate two online participation tools, the Icelandic Betri Reykjavík and the 
German LiquidFriesland. By adopting a mix of both face-to-face and online eth-
nographic methods to learn about, speak to and understand users, programmers, 
and politicians and administrators connected to the tool, I set out to determine the 
tools’ relevance both to political decision-making processes and people’s every-
day lives. By referring back to data I collected about Betri Reykjavík in 2011–12, 
and by checking the fields and remaining in contact with interlocutors after the 
main fieldwork phase ended in 2014, it has been possible to observe cyclical 
changes and challenges the fields have had to face over a period of several years. 
As I broached in the vignette at the beginning of this introduction, one research 
field, LiquidFriesland, was even investigated over its complete lifecycle – from 
launch to deletion. 
This study has its roots in two main areas of academic research: political par-
ticipation, and Internet and Politics. Online participation tools like Betri Reykjavík 
and LiquidFriesland question established classifications of participation modes 
and definitions of political participation. In that way, I argue that online participa-
tion tools do have a strengthening effect on direct, participatory and deliberative 
strands of democracy, thus chipping away at the hegemonic aspirations of repre-
sentative democracies established both in Iceland and Germany. 
Seen from both a technological and a societal perspective, ICTs – and first 
and foremost the Internet –have forever altered the ways in which people com-
municate, interact, and generally take part in life. So-called Social Media gen-
erally “offer numerous benefits, including the abilities to carefully craft a public 
or semi-public self-image, broaden and maintain our social connections, enhance 
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our relationships, increase access to social capital, and have fun” (Baym, ‘Social 
Networks’ 400). Instead of characterising those changes in information and partic-
ipation practices as either good or bad, this book suggests a more nuanced analysis 
of the ways in which Social Media differ from other media. Moreover, it examines 
the evident suitability of Social Media to accommodate political practices, as well 
as motivating and engaging people in political participation.
Regarding the outline of the book, a chapter on the state of research follows 
this introduction. It focuses on research in the areas of political participation and 
on the intersection of the Internet and politics. The research fields LiquidFriesland 
and Betri Reykjavík are then discussed in detail. Following that, the methods em-
ployed in this study – participant observation, interviews, and focus groups – are 
presented and contextualised. The last chapter of the book is concerned with the 
study’s results and their discussion. Here, the focus is on political participation 
repertoires today, the enabling versus the simulation of (online) participation, 
political participation in times of crisis and times of affluence, and the role of 
geographical proximity in (online) political participation. The “insertions” in the 
book, “Doing Ethnography I-III”, aim to condense the meta-commentary and my 
reflections regarding the respective chapters to follow: research fields, methodol-
ogy, and results and discussion.

2 State of Research
In this chapter, I look at the two main research areas that this book draws on and 
contributes to: political participation, and the Internet and politics. As there are 
comparatively few cultural anthropologists working in either area, this chapter 
outlines the potential contribution that an anthropological gaze can make.1 The 
cultural anthropological perspective differs here to political or media studies 
perspectives insofar as it sees the everyday of the users/actors as central, and is 
therefore only indirectly interested in media-technological artefacts themselves 
(cf. Schönberger 202).
1 Of course, that is not to say that politics or digitalisation are not objects of their own 
anthropological research tradition. There have, for example, been three recent antho-
logies on anthropological research in political fields (Fenske; Adam and Vonderau; 
Rolshoven and Schneider). The study of questions relating to gender (for example in 
the DFG-research group Recht – Geschlecht – Kollektivität: Prozesse der Normie-
rung, Kategorisierung und Solidarisierung led by Beate Binder at Humboldt-Univer-
sity Berlin), protests (e.g. Schönberger and Sutter, Kommt herunter, reiht euch ein), 
and policies (e.g. the DFG-research group Participative development of rural regions. 
Everyday cultural negotiations of the European Union’s LEADER program led by 
Ove Sutter at Bonn University) are research areas with long and on-going traditions 
in the discipline. In regards to digitalisation, the German Association of Cultural An-
thropology and Folklore Studies’ (dgv) “Digitization in Everyday Life” section in par-
ticular has been an incubator for diverse anthropological approaches to digitalisation. 
Its publications have included Koch’s anthology Digitisation. Theories and Concepts 
for Empirical Cultural Research (2017).
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2.1 Update Loading? – (Re)defining Political Participation
Political participation is the central issue of democracy.2 As such, this chapter 
summarises research on political participation in three parts. Firstly, it provides 
an historical overview of the foci of traditional political participation research, 
that is the recording and classification of various modes of participation as well 
as the examination of favourable conditions for political participation. Secondly, 
it shows how new modes of participation coming out of the political and societal 
changes of the last century have forced scholars to update hegemonic, conserva-
tive definitions of political participation. Thirdly, it examines how definitions of 
political participation are central to democratic theory discourse, and in doing so, 
shows how online participation tools such as Betri Reykjavík and LiquidFriesland 
challenge the status quo, representative democracy.
2.1.1 Foci of Traditional Research on Political Participation 
Since its beginnings in the 1940s, political participation research has tended to 
focus on two key areas: the recording and classification of the various modes 
of political participation, and the examination of participation and the conditions 
which facilitate it (cf. Soßdorf 77). In the following paragraphs, I look at both 
areas in detail.
The recording and classifying modes of political participation dates back to 
the beginnings of research in this area. At the outset, research centered on voting 
behaviour and elections. The focus on election-centred modes of political partic-
ipation such as contacting politicians or political parties, as well as engaging in 
election campaigns, continued into the early 1960s. However, as various societal 
and political changes unfolded, the spectrum of modes of political participation 
began to expand enormously. From the late 1960s onwards, other modes of po-
litical participation had moved to the forefront. Protests, demonstrations, sit-ins, 
and boycotts were only a few of the modes that developed during the heyday of 
2 Since both research fields, Betri Reykjavík and LiquidFriesland, are identified as ve-
nues of political participation directed at influencing concrete local political decision-
making processes (see chapter 4, Research Fields), the research focus here is on po-
litical participation. While there are relatively few cultural anthropologists working in 
the field of political participation, it is part of a substantially larger body of literature 
on the concept of participation in general, and in which there are a number of (social) 
anthropologists working (e.g. Cornwall). However, the research area of political par-
ticipation, including the literature predominantly authored by political scientists, is 
best suited to the research questions at hand. 
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the civil rights and student movements, as well as the New Social Movements of 
the 1970s. With a postmaterialist change of values in the 1990s, modes of civic 
engagement and voluntary work have also increasingly become understood as 
political participation (cf. Norris; Putnam; cf. Verba, Schlozman, et al.). More 
recently, van Deth has argued that the newest developments predict the continued 
dissolution of boundaries both between societal spheres; and of differentiation 
between the different roles which these spheres designate for citizens (cf. ‘Ver-
gleichende Politikwissenschaft’ 172). 
Since the beginnings of research in this area, it has been customary to further 
characterise and categorise the different modes of political participation along bi-
nary lines: constituted/non-constituted, legal/illegal, legitimate/illegitimate, and 
conventional/unconventional. Naturally, authors dealing with the categorisation 
of modes of political participation did not consult all of them simultaneously 
and equally. These binary classifications have long been the standard tool-kit for 
scholars researching political participation and remain so today, with most repro-
ducing these classifications in an unquestioned and uncontested manner in their 
work (cf. Haunss 34). 
In the following, I will outline how these classifications developed concep-
tually, before suggesting that they should, in fact, be treated with caution. While 
accepting that classifications and taxonomies always work with simplified and 
unrealistic ideal types (cf. Schmidt-Hertha and Tippelt 25), one must nevertheless 
be wary of the normative potential of classifying modes of political participation 
along those lines. In this case, questions of agency and authority in particular have 
to be considered. Or, in other words: who has the agency and the authority to de-
cide what is a legitimate form of participation, and what is not? 
It is nevertheless rewarding to take a brief look at these binary categorisations, 
especially as they have the longest tradition in this area of research. The question 
of legality and illegality appears to be relatively undisputed, at least within dem-
ocratic societies. In most cases, acts and modes are participation can be classified 
according to a country’s laws. The same can said of constituted/non-constituted 
modes, especially as few modes of political participation are actually established 
in law, one being the right to vote. Kaase argues that the costs and consequences 
for participating in constituted ways are especially low, since a binding rule estab-
lishes the context of participation for all participants (cf. 147). 
Defining the legitimacy/illegitimacy of political participation is more prob-
lematic. In my opinion, due to its’ extreme subjectivity, legitimacy is the most 
diffuse and problematic of these binary criteria. As (il)legitimacy appears to be the 
aggregated expression of attitudes of individual citizens toward a specific mode 
of participation (cf. Kaase 148), logically one should never be able to speak of (il)
legitimacy as an established criteria; rather, there should be as many versions of 
20 | Political Participation in the Digital Age
(il)legitimacy as people making up their minds about each, single specific act of 
political participation. Nevertheless, it is unusual to read of multiple legitimacies 
from people with different point of views. Rather, one is usually presented with a 
few dominant voices that exert power and interpretational sovereignty by either 
deeming an act of political participation legitimate or illegitimate. This can have 
far-reaching consequences for the groups of actors involved. For example, inse-
cure and timid participants at a demonstration may withdraw from participating 
in similar events after a politician publicly deems it illegitimate. It becomes clear 
then that framing or classifying modes of political participation as (il)legitimate 
raises a number of problems and questions around agency, authority, and interpre-
tational sovereignty.
By introducing the binary of conventional and unconventional political partic-
ipation, Barnes and Kaase aim to combine the legal constitutional and legitima-
cy dimensions. For the authors, conventional modes of political participation are 
centred around established institutionalised elements of the political system that 
appear established, without being institutionalised themselves (cf. Kaase 148). In 
contrast, they define unconventional participation as “behavior that does not cor-
respond to norms of laws and custom that regulate political participation under a 
particular regime” (as cited in de Nève and Olteanu 15). Soon after the release of 
the work, Barnes and Kaase were criticised for failing to adequately operationalise 
the unconventional dimension. Not only did the unconventional dimension mix 
political activities with differing degrees of ‘legitimacy’, but also with differing 
legal statuses (cf. Kaase 148).
Indeed, the question of convention is context-dependent and changeable, since 
cultural, political, societal and social processes are decisive in the public percep-
tion of a participatory mode (cf. de Nève and Olteanu 15). In that way, many acts 
of participation that may have once been viewed as unconventional become con-
ventional over time (cf. Hoecker 10; cf. Fuchs as cited in de Nève and Olteanu 15). 
Thus, the relevance and analytical gain of categorising acts of political participa-
tion according to their (un)conventionality has been increasingly questioned (cf. 
Hoecker 10; cf. Haunss 35). Although de Nève and Olteanu’s updated definition 
of unconventional participation is interesting, it does not appear to offer enough 
to justify categorising participation into conventional and unconventional modes.
Overall, the analytical gain offered by all four prominent categorises of polit-
ical participation is questionable. Classifying acts as (il)legitimate and (un)con-
ventional raises complicated entanglements regarding questions of agency, au-
thority, and interpretational sovereignty. Indeed, the characterisation of political 
acts along all these dichotomies appears especially hopeless in the light of today’s 
rapid expansion of the repertoire of political participation modes (see upcoming 
subchapter). Nevertheless, it is important to understand and contextualise typol-
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ogies and categories as the central approach to (political) participation research 
across a number of disciplines, including social anthropology (e.g. Cornwall). My 
findings and analysis will show that these categorisations of political participation 
remain deeply entrenched in the views of politicians and administration, program-
mers, and citizens (prospective users).
The second key area of political participation, the examination of favourable 
conditions for political participation, is far more contested than that of recording 
and classifications of political participation. Over the years, scholars have devel-
oped various models with differing degrees of empirical cogency and theoretical 
strengths. For the sake of concision, only the in my eyes most promising model to 
date, Verba et al.’s Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM) is explained here. 
CVM draws together and refines two other approaches, the Socio-Economic 
Standard Modell (SES) and Rational-Choice-Theory (RC) (cf. Verba, Schlozman, 
et al. 525). Verba et al. point out that resources like education, income, and social 
status (the core assumption of the SES-model) cannot alone explain levels of po-
litical participation. Not only do the authors expand the definition of socio-eco-
nomic resources to include time and civic skills (communicative and organisation-
al competences), but they also add two other variables, motivation and network 
(cf. 267ff.). 
The motivation variable is made up of four concepts, each of which has been 
widely investigated within political participation research: political interest, po-
litical information (in the sense of knowledge), political efficacy, and political 
identification. First, political interest is the central factor within the motivation 
variable. Countless empirical studies have found that “[c]itizens who are inter-
ested in politics – who follow politics, who care about what happens, who are 
concerned with who wins and who loses – are more politically active” (Verba, 
Schlozman, et al. 345). Second, political information describes the knowledge of 
everyday political events, structural or institutional contexts, as well as political 
actors (cf. Soßdorf 82). Third, “the sense of political efficacy”, which was first 
investigated by Campbell et al. in the 1950s, is defined as “the feeling that individ-
ual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process“ 
(Campbell 187). Campbell et al. found that citizens who judge themselves to be 
politically competent and see the political system as open to the individual exer-
tion of influence are more likely participate politically (cf. 189). Other researchers 
further developed Campbell et al.’s unidimensional concept of political efficacy 
to differentiate between internal and external efficacy (cf. Chamberlain 2f.). Here, 
“external efficacy” refers to the belief that the political elites and the political sys-
tem are responsible and responsive (cf. Stark 77), and “internal efficacy” describes 
the belief in one’s own ability to influence political matters. While the various 
influences of the Internet on political participation will be dealt with elsewhere, 
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it is interesting to note here that both Serup Christensen (cf. ‘Slacktivism’ 15) 
and Colombo et al. (in an investigation of 15 countries) (cf. as cited in Escher, 
‘Mobilisierung’ 461), found that Internet use increases both political interest and 
internal political efficacy. Fourth, understanding political identification as a kind 
of path dependency, Verba et al. investigated the strength of ties with a particular 
policy (cf. Soßdorf 82). Combining both the resource and the motivation variable, 
they state that “interest, information, efficacy, and partisan intensity provide the 
desire, knowledge, and self-assurance that impel people to be engaged in politics. 
But time, money, and skills provide the wherewithal without which engagement 
is meaningless” (354).
Verba et al. attribute slightly less importance to the facilitating effects of the net-
work variable on political participation. In this context, a “network” refers to work 
surroundings, various forms of clubs and associations, and religious groups as both 
“training grounds for civil skills” and as “a site for political recruitment” (369). 
Drawing together all three variables – resources, mobilisation, and networks –, 
allows the researcher to reach detailed conclusions about the favourability of 
conditions for political participation in various settings. This will be shown at 
various occasions throughout this book. Nevertheless, causal links between 
these factors can never be unambiguously determined, as Brady et al point out: 
“[p]olitical interest and political efficacy, for example, certainly facilitate political 
activity, but activity presumably enhances interest and efficacy as well” (271). 
2.1.2  New Modes – New Definition?  
Defining Political Participation Through the Ages
A rapid growth in the modes of political participation has been detectable since 
research began in the 1940s.3 The number of prevalent modes has naturally influ-
enced work on defining participation throughout the decades. Nevertheless, Verba 
et al.’s definition of political participation, which remains the standard definition 
today, lists only seven different modes (cf. 51ff.). By the 1990s, however, scholars 
like Parry et al. had begun to list more than 20 different modes (cf. 39ff.). In 2014, 
van Deth points out that “the list of modes of political participation is long and 
3 Charles Tilly coined the term repertoire to describe the “variable ensemble of perfor-
mances” with different targeted outcomes from which social movements pick and mix 
(3). It also appears to be a suitable term to describe the possibilities for the actions of 
individuals, which is the focus in this book. Repertoires evolve historically, both over 
the period that a social movement exists and within the biography of an individual, and 
they contain a variety of different modes of participation (cf. Schönberger and Sutter, 
‘Protesthandeln’ 24). 
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gets longer almost daily”, (‘Map’ 349) . According to van Deth, recognising a par-
ticipation mode has become increasingly difficult these days because of the rapid 
expansion of diverse political activities all around the world (cf. ibid.). Because 
of this, an update to the definition of political participation appears imperative. 
There is a number of reasons for the development of modes of political par-
ticipation. In this section, I will provide a brief overview and possible reasons 
for the “waves” of expansion in the repertoire of political participation in the US 
and Europe, as well as a brief historic overview of research in this area. Polit-
ical participation research initially developed out of the study of voting behav-
iour, especially in the light of suffrage, which meant the inclusion of ever-growing 
segments of society – including women, minorities, and younger people. In the 
1950s, research began to focus on engagement within unions, political parties, 
and other associations, but these groups were still predominantly investigated for 
their effects on voting behaviour (cf. Stark 43).4 Campbell et al. were the first to 
take other activities, albeit still revolving around the election as the prime mode of 
political participation (such as taking part in campaign rallies, donating money to 
candidates, or campaigning), into consideration (cf. 28ff.). At the end of the 1950s, 
Lane started to break away from the concentration on elections and investigated 
political participation modes such as approaching politicians, membership in polit-
ical organisations, and taking part in political discussions (cf. as cited in Stark 46).
Although the modes of participation that scholars investigated continued to 
grow and resisted any long-term categorisation, the definition of political par-
ticipation has remained surprisingly static and uncontested since Verba et al.’s 
original work was published. In different articles from the 1960s, scholars did 
make some minor alterations and did slightly expand their definition, but by and 
large, political participation was and is still seen today as “those legal activities 
by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection 
of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take” (Verba, Nie, et al. 46).5 
However, there are a number of problems with this insistence on a traditional defi-
4 Markus Steinbrecher points out that many early modes of political participation al-
ready existed but were not taken seriously by most researchers because, at least in the 
public eye, they had not been properly institutionalised (cf. as cited in Stark 44). This 
suggests another fascinating research question, albeit one outside the scope of this the-
sis. Namely, an investigation of the reasons, structures, and contexts that bring scholars 
to include a certain mode of participation in their work, while excluding others, and by 
that significantly contributing to the framing of non-institutionalised modes of political 
participation as minor and of less importance, or as illegitimate.
5 In his article “Is it Time to Update the Definition of Political Participation”, British 
political scientist Stuart Fox meticulously illustrates the short conceptual distance from 
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nition of political participation and attempts by scholars like Jan van Deth, who 
have dared to conceptualise an updated definition of political participation, have 
been especially fruitful. 
When using a definition that has become cast in stone for over 50 years, re-
searchers may face an imminent danger – that they (subconsciously) analyse the 
results of empirical investigations in a biased and restricted way in order to fit 
them into the predominant theoretical concept. Moreover, it can mean that re-
searchers are blind to or have a blinkered view of developments that challenge 
these established concepts (cf. Theocharis and Deth 160).6 No doubt the research-
er will fit in with the scientific mainstream by sticking to established theory, but 
this will also limit the ability to generate new insights – surely the main aim of 
scientific and scholarly investigations. 
An analytical blindness is evident in the minimal impact that the major societal 
and technological developments of the last 50 years have had on the definition of 
political participation. Those developments have fundamentally shaped the ways in 
which people see the world, see democracy, see policy(-making) and decision-mak-
ing, and most importantly, take part (politically) within it. It is hard to believe that 
these changes have rarely even merited a footnote to Almond and Verba’s 1960s 
“gospel” of participation. Van Deth points out that “(t)he continuous expansion 
of the modes of participation has confronted many researchers with the dilemma 
of using either a dated conceptualization excluding many new modes of political 
participation or stretching their concepts to cover almost everything” (‘Map’ 351). 
This becomes especially problematic once one recognises that “[i]f the definition 
and meaning of democratic engagement is constantly redefined, researchers cannot 
stick to measures and taxonomies of political participation that proved their useful-
ness decades ago: the conclusion we draw about the quality of democracy depend 
on our definition of democratic engagement” (Theocharis and Deth 159).
These observations inevitably hint at the need for a new, more flexible defini-
tion of political participation that includes the newer modes of participation that 
Almond and Verba (1963) to later texts by other authors on political participation in 
the United Kingdom.
6 This conservative approach towards a research area is exemplified by Hooghe’s re-
view of Jan van Deth’s suggestion for updating the definition of political participation. 
Hooghe identifies some elements that van Deth discusses regarding defining any action 
as political participation as “indeed quite unproblematic” simply because they were al-
ready included in Verba et al.’s classical definition (339, my italics). To Hooghe, these 
elements would not need further thinking, because Almond and Verba had considered 
them decades ago. In contrast, he is highly critical of every element that van Deth adds 
in order to update Almond and Verba’s definition to today’s circumstances.
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have evolved over the last few decades, but which still draws distinct boundaries. 
I agree with van Deth that the meaningfulness of stretching the original definition 
to accommodate new modes of participation has been long exhausted. Instead, it 
is time to leave behind “the conventional approach of presenting nominal defi-
nitions to solve conceptual problems” (‘Map’ 349). While Almond and Verba’s 
ground-breaking 1960’s definition will remain a corner-stone of political partici-
pation research, it is time for a fresh perspective on the diverse ways in which peo-
ple participate today. Van Deth’s operational map of political participation is one 
of the few attempts at updating this definition, and while it is not beyond question, 
it does provide an intriguing start to the conversation.7
Van Deth has developed a minimal operational definition of political partic-
ipation which is comprised of four rules. Researchers can then “run” any given 
phenomena through the rules in order to determine if the activity should be de-
fined as a mode of political participation (cf. ‘Map’ 354ff.):
• “Rule 1: Do we deal with behaviour?” (354)
• “Rule 2: Is the activity voluntary?” (354)
• “Rule 3: Is the activity done by citizens?” (354f.)
• “Rule 4: Is the activity located in the sphere of government/state/politics?” (356)
As van Deth points out “[t]hese four decision rules already suffice to reach a mini-
malist definition of political participation. […] [A]ll amateurish, voluntary activities 
located in the sphere of government/state/politics are specimen of political partici-
pation as defined by this minimalist definition” (‘Map’ 356). If the activity does not 
take place in the sphere of government/state/politics (rule 4), but fulfils one of the 
three following additional rules, it should as well be defined as participation:
• “ Rule 5: Is the activity targeted at the sphere of government/state/politics?” 
(357)
• “ Rule 6: Is the activity aimed at solving collective or community problems?” 
(358)
• “ Rule 7: Is the activity used to express political aims and intentions of partici-
pants?” (359)
Consequently, “[a]ny activity that fulfils the first three rules – activity, voluntary, 
citizen – but is neither located in the political arena nor aimed at political actors or 
7 The conversational nature is enhanced through the rather innovative publishing format 
in which van Deth’s thoughts were first published. Hooghe and Hosch-Dayican sub-
sequently criticise the article, and in a rejoinder, van Deth replies to their criticisms.
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collective problems can be depicted as a form of political participation if it is used to 
express political aims and intentions by the participants” (359). Indeed, van Deth’s 
definitory questions allow the researcher a much clearer understanding of the activ-
ity one set out to study. It may be challenging or unusual in the political sciences to 
work without a concise, nominal definition. However, in light off the ever expanding 
and ever-changing repertoire of modes of political participation, the traditional ways 
of categorising and characterising political participation have ceased to be meaning-
ful, and van Deth’s operational approach may be exactly what is needed. 
2.1.3  Political Participation –  
the Centre of Democratic Theory Discourse
“Participation is at the heart of democracy” said Verba et al. in 1995 (129). Orig-
inally, this remark aimed at conveying the authors’ convictions about the impor-
tance of the extensive integration of citizens and a vibrant repertoire of political 
participation modes within democracy. Slightly out of its original context, here 
the statement serves to frame the discussion on the role of political participation 
within democratic theories in order to illustrate the ways in which online partici-
pation tools such as Betri Reykjavík and LiquidFriesland challenge the status quo 
of representative democracy. In the following, I will show how participation is 
the central point of difference between democratic theories. Democratic theories 
accounting for the relevance of political participation appear to differ in a variety 
of ways; not only in the weight they place on political participation in general for 
example, but also their inclusivity of more novel modes of participation, especial-
ly more recent, creative, and Internet-based forms of participation, as well as the 
different roles democratic theories envision for citizens.
There are as many as six major democratic theories competing within my research 
fields: representative-liberal democracy, participative democracy, deliberative 
democracy, direct democracy, liquid democracy, and digital democracy. All of 
them have influenced the creation, implementation, establishment and (ongoing) 
maintenance of the two participation tools studied. In this section, I focus on how 
these theories understand the importance of participation role within democracy. 
In doing so, it becomes again clear that political participation is a highly contested 
research area. In the analysis of my research findings (Results and Discussion), 
this awareness may serve to understand various processes, events, and decisions 
taken in both research fields.
In broad terms, the understanding of the role of participation within democracy 
differs in two perspectives. First, the instrumental understanding of participation 
sees democracy as a formal method for the formation of government. Second, the 
normative understanding of participation sees democracy as a lifestyle and way 
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of governing (cf. Hoecker). The instrumental understanding of participation is 
embedded in so-called empirical or realistic democratic theory. These euphemistic 
terms hint at this view’s core criticism of normative and liberal democratic 
theories – as idealistic and as over-emphasizing the role of citizen participation 
in democracy. Instead, representatives of the instrumental understanding of 
participation see democracy as a mere method to achieve the formation of a 
government and safeguard efficient governability. 
One of the, if not the, most prominent instrumentalist theorists was Joseph 
A. Schumpeter. To him, democracy was not the rule of the people, but the rule 
of politicians with the consent of the people (cf. Hoecker 4). That is, Schumpeter 
reduced the role of the citizen to voter. Moreover, the function of voting is not 
for the citizens to declare their interests, but to create and legitimate a strong and 
assertive government able to make decisions. Moreover, Schumpeter stressed that 
democracy as such does not imply any ideal values: neither citizen-responsibility 
nor extensive participation are part of democracy per se. In fact, Schumpeter took 
the idea of responsible citizens for fiction. Instead, he characterised citizens as 
having low senses of reality and responsibility, and as only capable of incoher-
ent volition (cf. Lösch 18). Similarly, father of the widely-cited Rational Choice 
Theory, Downs argues that citizens are first and foremost self-interested and not 
interested in the common good. Downs thinks that issues related to society are 
only addressed as the by-products of people’s actions, namely at that point that 
they coincide with private ambitions (cf. 193ff.). 
Although Schumpeter and Down’s works were first published (over) 50 years 
ago, the instrumental approach to participation persists both in theory and practice 
almost unaltered to the present day. Indeed, it is at the core of representative de-
mocracy as the predominant form of democracy across the globe, and as such the 
official form of government in both research fields in this thesis. The understand-
ing of democracy as analogue to the market, as merely a competition between 
rival (party political) elites with citizens voting every four years, and otherwise 
pursuing their individual goals as more or less rational consumers appears to be 
reality today.
In contrast, the normative understanding sees participation as more than a meth-
od for establishing legitimacy, more than a means to an end. It stresses the intrinsic 
value of political participation and sees democracy as a process concerning society 
as a whole: democracy as a way of life (cf. Lösch 22f.). In this understanding, de-
mocracy extends beyond the political sphere and aims to facilitate socio-political 
participation in as many fields of society as possible. As a logical consequence, 
this approach sees democracy as transitive and flexible, as a work in constant pro-
gress (cf. Hoecker 6). Amongst the democratic theories that build on a normative 
understanding of participation are participative, deliberative, and direct democratic 
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theories. These approaches all try to work against the economisation of the political 
sphere; and by stressing that there would be no political community without par-
ticipation and no political participation without community, they seek to counter 
supposed tendencies towards individualism and self-interestedness. On a national 
level, forms of democracy other than direct democracy will presumably remain sup-
plements to representative democracy (cf. Lösch 23). However, this does not mean 
that they cannot be extensively developed and be given special importance at a state 
level. Indeed, at local and municipal levels, direct and participatory democratic ele-
ments are becoming increasingly popular in many countries.8 
The most prominent proponent of the theory of participative democracy, Benja-
min Barber, suggests a “strong democracy” which centres on the freedom of citizens 
to participate politically and on direct democratic self-government (cf. 209ff.). Barber 
suggests concrete reforms are needed to implement this project: as the base for com-
munity-building discussion processes he stresses the expansion of communication 
technologies, diverse offers of political information and political education, and the 
establishment of a general citizens’ service: on the municipal level, local neighbour-
hood assemblies should gradually take over legislative competences, with municipal 
positions to be filled by lot combined with financial incentives (cf. Barber 291).
Of the theories I look at here, participative democracy theory appears to have 
the most optimistic image of citizens. Indeed, Barber is convinced that citizens 
are naturally capable of more and better participation, whereas other participative 
democracy theorists suggest that citizens will quickly acquire those competences 
once integrated into information and learning processes. As Schmidt points out, 
this theory of transformation into a responsible citizen resembles a modern varia-
tion of Rousseau’s education programme, transforming the “Bourgeois” into “Ci-
toyens” through a process of participation, deliberation, and public decision-mak-
ing (cf. ‘Beteiligungszentrierte Demokratietheorien’ 241). 
The new architecture of the public space as proposed by Barber would require 
a redistribution of agency and power, meaning an extensive change in conven-
tional understandings of the roles of those governing and those governed in rep-
resentative democracies (cf. Rosenzweig and Eith 12). Through his concept of 
participatory culture, media scholar Henry Jenkins has introduced ideas around 
participative democracy into cultural analysis. For Jenkins and Mizuko Itō, a par-
ticipatory culture is “one which embraces the values of diversity and democracy 
through every aspect of our interactions with each other – one which assumes that 
we are capable of making decisions, collectively and individually, and that we 
8 See Kersting for an extensive report on the state of direct democracy in Germany 
across all levels of polity (cf. ‘Direkte Demokratie’).
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should have the capacity to express ourselves through a broad range of different 
forms and practices” (2).9
A variety of participative democracy is deliberative democracy. Deliberative 
democracy theorists see the formation process of political opinion and will as the 
most important aspect of democracy. In contrast to majoritarian democracy which 
legitimates decisions through votes, deliberative democracy stresses consensus: 
“an ideal deliberation aims to reach a rationally motivated consensus thanks to 
reasons that are persuasive to all” (della Porta, ‘Deliberative Democracy’ 62).10 
However, deliberative democracy’s focus on public opinion formation is criticised 
by theorists of participative democracy because it is limited to the informal area of 
politics, and therefore does not include any direct and practical democratic deci-
sion-making competences on behalf of the citizens (cf. Rosenzweig and Eith 12). 
Direct democracy is a variant of participatory democracy which has been im-
plemented as a form of government. Of course, the frequency, weight and rele-
vance of direct democratic elements within political decision-making processes 
varies greatly from electorate to electorate. The most prominent example of direct 
democracy is Switzerland, which offers citizens more occasions for direct partici-
pation than any other country in the world (cf. M. G. Schmidt, ‘Direktdemokratie’ 
339).11 In direct democracy, citizen participation plays the central role through 
9 However, Jenkins is also convinced that “while participatory politics does raise hope 
for fostering a more democratic culture, it cannot in and of itself overcome struc-
tural inequalities that have historically blocked many from participating in civic and 
political life” (161). Danah boyd points out that especially in times of digital culture, 
the rhetoric surrounding social media often highlights that technology is an equal op-
portunity platform; ‘everyone’ supposedly has the ability to have their voice heard. 
I think that this is seriously deceptive. I would argue that true participation requires 
many qualities: agency, the ability to understand a social situation well enough to en-
gage constructively, the skills to contribute effectively, connections with others to help 
build an audience, emotional resilience to handle negative feedback, and enough social 
status to speak without consequences. The barrier to participation is not the technology 
but the kinds of privilege that are often ignored in meritocratic discourse. I do think 
that technology has opened up new doors to some people – and especially those who 
are marginalized but self-empowered […] – but it’s important to recognize the ways in 
which it also reinforces other forms of inequalities that make it harder for some people 
to engage. (in Jenkins and Itō 21)
10 See James Fishkin’s work for more in-depth research on the implementation of de-
liberation within political decision-making processes (When the people speak). 
11 See Schmidt (‘Direktdemokratie’ 339ff.) for a detailed account and ranking of direct 
democratic elements in democratic states across the globe. 
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referenda, initiatives and petitions. Whereas representative democracy appears 
centred on people and parties, direct democracy focuses on decisions regarding 
subject matter (cf. Kersting, ‘Direkte Demokratie’ 308). 
The electronically implemented liquid democracy relies heavily on deliber-
ative democracy theory. The developers of LiquidFriesland, one of the research 
fields of this study, understand liquid democracy as “a democratic system in which 
most issues are decided (or strongly suggested to representatives) by direct ref-
erendum. Considering nobody has enough time and knowledge for every issue, 
votes can be delegated by topic. Delegations are transitive and can be revoked or 
changed at any time. Liquid Democracy is sometimes referred to as ‘Delegated’ 
or ‘Proxy Voting’” (Interaktive Demokratie e. V. 5).
The spread of the Internet did not only enable liquid democracy, but also 
brought fresh impetus for the implementation of other participative democratic 
theories, such as “digital democracy” or “e-democracy”. German political scien-
tist Gary Schaal argues that, from a democratic theoretical perspective, the inno-
vative potential of the Internet (in particular) is unexhausted and under-theorised 
(cf. 299). Whereas some scholars broadly understand digital democracy “as the 
increasing opportunities for political participation online” (Rose as cited in della 
Porta, ‘E-Democracy’ 87), others, like Schaal himself, define it as a democrat-
ic theory for which the inclusion of computers within the actual political deci-
sion-making process is constituent (cf. 281).12
The potential of digital democracy has been widely celebrated by scholars, 
activists, and programmers alilke. Linden has summarised these celebratory 
discourses as the five promises of digital democracy (cf. sec.3):
• The promise of equality: digital democracy seems to (at least partially) cancel 
out the (hierarchical) difference between those governing and those governed. 
• The promise of participation: digital democracy makes the impression that 
everybody can participate anytime from everywhere.
• The promise of information: the Internet enables the availability of all relevant 
information for everyone.
• The promise of responsibility: technological advancements enable the commu-
nicative reconnection between representatives and those represented. 
• The promise of rationality: digital democracy produces rational, best solutions 
that everybody supports through reasoned insight.
12 With his blog entry “A Typology of Electronic Democracy”, German political scientist 
Martin Hagen for an excellent round-up of the dynamics of the discourse on electronic 
democracy, including explanations of the various concepts behind it (n.pag.).
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Throughout the book, the degree to which these promises of digital democracy are 
fulfilled will be illustrated with insights from the research fields.
Finally, I would argue that, first and foremost, the technology available today 
makes the modernisation of representative forms of democracy possible. While 
the expanded forms of online-deliberation or direct democracy still face massive 
technological and design challenges (cf. Zittel as cited in Escher, ‘Mobilisierung’ 
451)13, the spread of information and communication technologies does have pal-
pable effects on political participation. Those effects will be the focus of the next 
chapter.
2.2 Internet and Politics
Over the last two decades, the Internet has not only transformed the ways in which 
people inform themselves and communicate with each other, but has also offered 
the potential to enrich existing political systems through new forms of democracy, 
as debates around digital and liquid democracy have illustrated (cf. Plaum 148). The 
hopes connected to electronic information and communication technologies were 
high.14 In this chapter, the focus is on the depiction of ICTs’ effects on political 
participation within the literature, which appears highly dependent on the authors’ 
respective understandings of democracy, and with it, of agency. Subsequently, I fo-
cus on the special case of Social Media, looking at how the rapid increase in the use 
of Social Media for political purposes over the last decade has, both from a techno-
logical and a societal perspective, changed information and participation practices.
Instead of categorising these developments in information and participation 
practices as either good or bad which I see as an unproductive venture, this chap-
ter provides a more nuanced analysis of the ways in which Social Media differs 
from other media. Social Media evidently has accommodated political participa-
tion modes. In studying this nexus, this book is explicitly positioned within the 
anthropological research tradition sketched out by Gertraud Koch: 
13 One should not forget that “the Internet has also reinforced the abilities of governments 
to control information and assert their power in more centralized manners”, as Roy 
points out (84).
14 According to Escher, one can arrange these hopes into three categories: the improve-
ment of governmental functions and services often discussed under the keyword e-go-
vernment, the strengthening of representative democracy in the form of e-participation 
or online participation, and the enablement of direct democracy (cf. ‘Beteiligung via 
Internet’ 132).
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Wer in der Europäischen Ethnologie, Empirischen Kulturwissenschaft, Kulturanthro-
pologie und Volkskunde über Technik und Medien forscht, der bewegt sich in einer 
Forschungstradition, die wesentlich von Hermann Bausinger in seiner 1961 erschiene-
nen Habilitationsschrift „Volkskultur in der technischen Welt“ angestoßen wurde. Die 
Schrift war in ihrer Zeit Aufruf und Anstoß zugleich und begründete eine paradigma-
tische Neuorientierung der Volkskunde in ihrer Betrachtung von Technik, die bis da-
hin in einem antimodernistischen Reflex vielfach als Gegenpol zum Lebendigen und 
Kulturellen begriffen worden war. Bausinger hingegen zeigt, wie die Technik längst 
integraler Bestandteil der Alltagskultur […] ist […]. (‘Empirische Kulturanalyse’ 179)
Those in anthropology who are researching technology and media follow a tradition 
that was substantially initiated by Hermann Bausinger’s 1961 habilitation “Volkskultur 
in der technischen Welt” (English title Folk culture in a world of technology). Both 
appeal and impetus, the paper was at the core of a paradigmatic shift in the discipline’s 
view on technology which in an anti-modernist reflex has often been understood as the 
opposite of the living and the cultural. By contrast, Bausinger shows the ways in which 
technology has long been an integral part of everyday culture.
Those scholars who warn against simply dismissing online modes of participation 
typically do so by pointing to statistical evidence of the modes’ actual effects. Ho-
wever, I believe that it is also important to look at online participation modes – in 
fact at all acts and forms of political participation –, from a different perspective, 
one that is lacking in most political science and communication studies work: the 
micro-perspective. This means looking from the perspective of those who actually 
take part, those who chose to participate in one way or another, those who mix 
and match modes of participation right through the artificial boundaries of the 
offline and online worlds and who, in doing so, always remain true to their every-
day lives and experiences. Too often the reasonings and motivations of citizens as 
competent and self-determined actors become lost within stiff formalised survey 
questionnaires and research designs and the constant, stringent attempts of quan-
titative researchers to develop large-scale, comparable, representative research 
results. Bimber points out that “[t]he problem is not only conceptual but empiri-
cal” as many surveys “are election-centric, emphasizing tradition [sic] institution-
oriented participation” (122). In focusing on the actual participants, listening to 
their stories, their descriptions and their reasonings, the cultural anthropological 
approach opens a hitherto strongly under-researched dimension, not only of par-
ticipants’ diverse motives for and perspectives on political participation, but also 
on their use of (Social) Media.
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2.2.1  Simply Slacktivism?!15 –  
A Fresh Look at ICTs’ Effects on Political Participation
This sub-chapter will concentrate on the impact of the Internet on political partici-
pation as one crucial element of democracies. It will trace the hopes and fears that 
were initially connected to the Internet’s spread into the political sphere, concluding 
that while the impact of the Internet on political participation has turned out to be 
more elusive and nuanced than obvious and extensive, it also cannot be contested.
Elections have been regarded with increasing categorical significance since 
literature on political participation began in the 1940s. Elections are not only 
regarded as extraordinarily significant in political practice and research, but also 
in the public perception. As constituted modes of participation, elections fulfil 
essential functions in representative democracies, such as the establishment 
and stabilisation of polity and the recruitment of political and civil personnel. 
Nevertheless, de Nève and Olteanu point out that this emphasis on elections is 
problematic, arguing that the power of citizens should not be reduced to their 
power as the electorate, as this neglects their other claims to power and say. 
Moreover, they argue, elections alone do not create an intact and high-quality 
democracy (cf. 19). 
Indeed, the strategic heightening of electoral participation as a category results 
in a devaluation of online modes of participation. These are often characterised as a 
sort of second tier mode of participation, with actors often dismissed as “detached 
from formal politics and therefore do not aim to influence political outcomes, that 
they choose easily accessible digital forms of engagement over more effective 
traditional activities, and that they lack central political competences necessary 
to comprehend the functioning of the political system” (Serup Christensen, 
‘Slacktivism’ 1). Online political activities are often criticized for only serving 
to increase the feel-good factor for participants. These prejudices against online 
participation modes cumulate in the generalised stigmatisation of online forms of 
participation as clicktivism or slacktivism (see Baringhorst et al.). These scholars 
do not consider a single click on facebook’s like-button or on Sign Here! under a 
petition at Change.org as significant personal contributions by citizens. Indeed, 
although “‘Participating’ in Facebook is not the same as participating in a Free 
Software project, to say nothing of participating in the democratic governance of 
a state” (Jenkins 36), such acts of online participation are not as insignificant as is 
often understood (cf. Baringhorst, ‘Internet und Protest’ 105).
15 The question “Simply Slacktivism?” is taken from Serup Christensen’s 2012 article on 
the Internet and political participation in Finland. 
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The Internet has the potential to change the terms of political participation to 
a degree beyond that of any other societal or technological development since the 
beginning of participation research. As Mossberger et al note: “[t]he Internet’s 
interactivity, diversity, flexibility, speed, convenience, low cost, and information 
capacity potentially allow the public to become more knowledgeable about 
politics and government [...]” (52). The opportunities opened up by the Internet 
result in high hopes for the political mobilisation and participation of citizens (e.g. 
cf. Escher, ‘Beteiligung via Internet’ 136). As such, the connection between the 
Internet and politics has become a key area of research (cf. Escher, ‘Mobilisierung’ 
454; cf. Theocharis 235), especially among political scientists and communication 
studies scholars.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the growth and development of the Internet, 
scholarly understandings of its role in and impact on democracy and political 
participation has changed over the last two decades. As Linaa Jensen remarks, “[i]
n early theoretical works the Internet was often regarded as something ‘out there’, 
good or dangerous for the democratic process, but radically different and isolated 
from mainstream political processes” (349). Similarly, Schaal argues that many 
theoretical contributions fail to systematically link reflexion on democratic theory 
with technological expertise. He argues that in research, the Internet is generally 
understood as an empty signifier for technological progress (cf. 300). For Henry 
Jenkins and Mizuko Itō, this approach seems especially careless at a time when
more and more organizations, institutions, and businesses have embraced a rhetoric of 
participation, yet it is abundantly clear that not all forms of participation are equally 
meaningful or empowering. Many of the core debates of our time center around the 
terms of our participation: whether meaningful participation can occur under corporate-
ly controlled circumstances, when our ability to create and share content is divorced 
from our capacity to participate in the governance of the platforms through which that 
content circulates. (1)
Early research on the Internet and politics, as well as on the Internet generally 
– and other media too –, is characterised by radically normative views. In this pe-
riod, the most prominent views on the effects of ICTs on politics were the replace-
ment and the mobilisation hypotheses. Scholars like Benjamin Barber, who rep-
resented what later became known as the replacement hypothesis (cf. Althaus and 
Tewksbury), saw the Internet as a new public sphere that would replace many “tra-
ditional channels for political involvement” targeted both at information and par-
ticipation, for example media or town hall meetings (Linaa Jensen 349). Amongst 
German-speaking scholars, it was especially popular to categorise people into one 
of three categories: net-optimists, net-normalists, and net-pessimists (cf. Escher, 
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‘Mobilisierung’ 449). Today, many scholars would agree that “although the Inter-
net extends the media matrix available for political campaigning, agenda-setting 
and political participation”, it supplements rather than substitutes other forms of 
political participation and other media as a source of information (ibid.).
In those early years, other scholars focused on the so-called mobilisation 
hypothesis. These scholars were optimistic that the Internet could help mobilise 
and politicise previously disengaged parts of society. However, in the last years 
this hypothesis could only be supported within concretely limited research fields 
and/or among low numbers of participants (e.g. Feezell et al.; Saglie and Vabo; 
Xenos and Moy). Indeed, most research has shown that only those already 
politically active in other ways use the Internet for further political information and 
participation. Hence, the Internet was simply reproducing and thereby reinforcing 
existing social biases, an idea commonly summarised as the “digital divide” (cf. 
Gibson et al. 561).
Whether one finds taxonomies like net-optimists, net-normalists, and net-
pessimists (cf. Escher, ‘Mobilisierung’ 449) relevant or not, it becomes evident that 
their respective understanding of democracy, and with it, that of agency, play a key 
role in assessing what opportunities the Internet offers for political participation. 
As Escher illustrates, these understandings are heavily dependent on fundamental 
assumptions on the part of the researcher: are citizens responsible and competent 
to decide freely and independently, as in participative democratic theories, or do 
they need guidance and governance, as in liberal elitist democratic theory (cf. 
‘Mobilisierung’ 451).16 Depending on the perspective of the scholar, the diversity 
of information and enlargement of the political public sphere provided through 
the Internet was either welcomed for offering variety and for decentralising media 
and opinions, or condemned as overloading, spreading false information and 
anonymity, catalysing lobbyism, commercialisation, and centralisation (cf. 450). 
As British political scientist Colin Hay notes that “[…] those with the most 
restrictive and conventional conceptions of political participation identify a 
strong and consistent pattern of declining political participation and engagement 
over time, whilst those with a more inclusive conception discern instead a change 
in the mode of political participation” (23). If one correlates this with the broad 
spectrum of perspectives towards the diversity of information and enlargement of 
16 The latter view on citizens of liberal democratic theory is also referred to in Michel 
Foucault’s analysis of governmentality. Drawing especially on Christian pastoral 
power, Foucault compares governing a population to herding a flock of sheep (cf. 
Sarasin 181). Here, citizens need to be taken care of, guided, and looked after for a 
population to thrive. Unfortunately, a more thorough consideration of Foucault’s theo-
ries goes beyond the scope of this thesis.
36 | Political Participation in the Digital Age
the public sphere just outlined, the diversity of research findings on politics and the 
Internet becomes understandable. As Anduiza et al. point out, “although the effect 
might be small at times, more evolutionary than revolutionary, and require certain 
conditions, it is rarely contested that digital media have an impact on civic and 
political involvement [...]. However, the mechanisms by which Internet use makes 
political engagement more probable remain somewhat elusive” (1). A key step in 
identifying these mechanisms is to broaden the scope for research, as Jorba and 
Bimber point out: “[i]f anything has been shown in a decade of research on digital 
media in the Unites [sic] States, it is that the effects on political participation and 
civic engagement are connected to people’s attitudes, interest, and motivation rather 
than simply to reduced transaction costs or easier access to information” (22). 
In any case, the enormous expansion of the repertoire of political participation 
through the Internet is clear, and many of these acts of online participation appear 
to be the direct equivalent to an offline act. For instance, sending an email to 
a political representative appears equivalent to sending a letter, and signing an 
e-petition to signing a petition on paper. Even political consumption that has 
recently gained public attention because of concomitant Internet campaigns, 
consisting of blog posts, vlogs, pictures, and all accompanied by hashtags, 
constitute a mode of political participation established long before the spread 
of the Internet (see for example Baringhorst, Politik mit dem Einkaufswagen; 
Baringhorst, ‘Politischer Konsum’).
However, it is only in the past few years that scholars have begun to 
increasingly argue that “digitally networked forms of participation do not establish 
an expansion of one of the available modes of participation. They create a new 
and distinct mode of participation […]” (Theocharis and Deth 158; cf. Gibson 
and Cantijoch; cf. Valenzuela). Here, it is crucial to note that terms like online 
participation, e-participation or Internet participation are very inclusive and 
therefore tend to lack definitory clarity. That is, by “digitally networked forms 
of participation”, Theocharis and van Deth indeed mean the usage of social 
networking sites for political participation. In their large quantitative survey 
across Germany, the authors measured three items that they defined as part of 
a new and distinct dimension of digitally networked participation: commenting 
on social media on political/social issues, posting or sharing political links on 
social media, and encouraging other people to take action using social media (cf. 
Theocharis and Deth 151). Indeed, it is hard to think of offline equivalents to 
participation modes based on inherently novel technological phenomena such as 
social networking sites. Nevertheless, detailed differentiation of the researched 
modes of participation and the general field of research are necessary to avoid 
conceptual and analytical misunderstandings.
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2.2.2 The Special Case of Social Media
An anthropological approach can contribute to conceptual and analytical clarity to 
research on Social Media by stressing both sociality and a comparative perspec-
tive. In other words, that is in understanding “the way in which people associate 
with each other to form social relations and societies” as “(t)he core to the study of 
social science“ (Miller et al. 4). After focussing on the more general research con-
text of the Internet and politics, this sub-chapter looks at Social Media as today’s 
prime avenue for online political participation. Here, the benefits of a distinct 
anthropological perspective in research on Social Media will be discussed, as will 
the “vagaries of public semantics” revolving around the term Social Media (Miller 
et al. 9). Subsequently, I will provide a brief history of the Internet before it began 
to become dominated by Social Media in the public view. I will then outline one 
way of defining Social Media, that is, by highlighting key features in which the 
organisation of Social Media differs from other media. The concepts of scalable 
sociality and polymedia developed by the anthropological think-tank around Dan-
iel Miller at University College London will feature throughout this section. 
Generally speaking, social anthropological research usually incorporates 
a comparative approach to the study of socio-technological phenomena (cf. 
Miller et al. 24). Rather than placing the research focus on individual platforms, 
anthropological investigations tend to trace a certain phenomenon through multiple 
media. Miller et al. describe this as employing “[…] a theory of polymedia that 
recognises our inability to understand any one platform or media in isolation. 
They must be seen as relative to each other, since today people use the range of 
available possibilities to select specific platforms or media for particular genres of 
interaction” (211). Further, they remind us that “(i)t is the content rather than the 
platform that is most significant when it comes to why social media matters” (1).17 
But what is Social Media? The term Social Media appears to be the colloquial 
expression for certain offers and forms of digitally networked media which facil-
17 Miller et al.’s collaborative project Why We Post (at University College London) and 
the extensive book series of the same name that has resulted from it are illustrative 
examples of the anthropological approach to Social Media, which they understand 
as a “[…] study of what people post and communicate through platforms, of why we 
post and the consequences of those postings” (ibid.). Within the context of the Why 
We Post project, nine cultural anthropologists spent 15 months living in nine different 
communities around the world, researching the role of social media in people’s every-
day lives. Results were published in a number of different languages and were at least 
partly published as open access. For more information, see the website at http://www.
ucl.ac.uk/why-we-post (last accessed on 10 August 2019).
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itate both the editing and publishing of content online, as well as the connection 
and exchange between people (cf. J.-H. Schmidt, Social Media 16).18 Ebersbach 
et al. name six prototype-appliances dominating the Social Media-sphere accord-
ing to their technical characteristics: wikis, blogs, microblogs, social-network-
ing-sites (SNS), social sharing, and elements that many platforms deploy, such as 
crosslinking with RSS.19 The final element cannot be allocated to a single one of 
the prototypes, but is rather a form of extension. Often, one can find combinations 
of several prototypes, such as blogs with a microblog extension (cf. Ebersbach et 
al. 37).20 Social Media appears as a new form of communication that deviates from 
the traditional dichotomy of broadcasting and dyadic media. As Miller et al. point 
out “with the development of the Internet, this polarisation between public and 
private media started to change” (2). According to Baym, SNSs in particular “offer 
numerous benefits, including the abilities to carefully craft a public or semi-public 
self-image, broaden and maintain our social connections, enhance our relation-
ships, increase access to social capital, and have fun” (‘Social Networks’ 400).
However, in academic circles, the term Social Media has become disputed and 
increasingly seen as misleading and ambiguous. The prime focus in the critique 
of “Social Media” is the central claim within the term: that the social-ness of 
digitally networked media marks it as unique and distinct from other media. This 
terms therefore suggests that other media exist which are not social, when media 
as means of communication are inherently linked to an exchange between people 
and in that way, media are social in their very essence (cf. J.-H. Schmidt, Social 
Media 16). As Baym argues, “(t)here is nothing more ‘social’ about ‘social media’ 
than there is about postcards, landline telephones, television shows, newspapers, 
books, or cuneiform. There are distinctive qualities to what we call ‘social media’ 
[...], but being social is not among them” (‘Struggle for Society’ 1). Further, Baym 
18 The term Web 2.0 is another oft-used expression. To a larger extend, the term Web 2.0 
is used to describe technical, economic, and legal aspects rather than aspects concer-
ning the sociality of its users (cf. Ebersbach et al. 27).
19 RSS (short for Rich Site Summary or Really Simple Syndication] enables users to stay 
up-to-date with one’s favourite websites without manually checking them regularly for 
new posts. RSS gathers headlines from those sites and feeds them to an app or website, 
a so-called RSS reader. That way, the user only needs to scroll through the RSS reader 
(for example Feedly or Bloglovin) to see all the new posts from their favourite web-
sites. Subsequently, the user is either able to read the full article directly or is redirected 
to the corresponding website after clicking a headline in the RSS reader (cf. Gil).
20 For example, there may be a small frame at the right-hand side of the blog’s starting 
page, displaying the blogger’s latest tweets on Twitter or her latest posts to the image-
based Social Media site Instagram.
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criticises the often neglected neo-liberal connotation of the term “Social Media”, 
arguing that it only “emerged at the time that companies began harnessing what 
people were already doing online” (ibid.). 
In consciously using the emic term “Social Media” in their publications, 
scholars like Miller et al. thereby accept the “vagaries of public semantics” 
(Miller et al. 9). Used both by research participants and the general public alike, 
the term Social Media has become part of general language use and consequently 
brings a certain concision with it that other expressions, though potentially more 
correct or precise, lack. In this book, “Social Media” is used to refer to the distinct 
platforms – like facebook and Twitter – which epitomise the term in the public 
view; whereas the term “information and communications technologies” (ICTs) 
is used to describe the entirety of digital technologies and media through which 
people communicate.
Before going into greater detail in the comparison between Social Media and 
other media, I will here outline key differences between the early Internet, Web 
1.0 so to speak, and the Internet after the arrival of Social Media, as this is helpful 
in evaluating changes and understanding the overall context.21 As Baym points 
out: “[w]hen the first Internet connection was made in 1969 through what was 
then called ARPANET, funded by the US Department of Defence, no one en-
visioned that an interpersonal communication medium had been launched”. In-
stead, the Internet “was developed to safeguard military knowledge”, and “(f)or 
its first quarter-century, the Internet was text-only. With its limited social cues, 
it seemed a poor match for personal interaction. Yet it took mere months for its 
developers (who were also its primary users) to realise the medium’s utility for 
personal communication. Within three years of the first login, email was in use 
[…]” and the first mailing lists followed soon after (Personal Connections 13). 
The development of Usenet newsgroups in the early 1980s was another means of 
asynchronous group discussion with wide reach (cf. 14), and in 1985, one of the 
earliest still existing online communities, Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Link (Well) was 
founded in San Francisco (cf. Ebersbach et al. 22). Four years later, physicists 
around Sir Tim Berners-Lee at the Swiss physics laboratory CERN developed 
the World Wide Web. Baym stresses that “(t)his heralded a shift from communi-
cation that was purely text-based to multimedia communication, and gave rise to 
more new forms of mediated interaction” (Personal Connections 15f.). With the 
disconnection of ARPANET in 1990, the US government withdrew from further 
developing the Internet, an event which marked a watershed in the process of the 
Internet’s commercialisation (cf. Ebersbach et al. 23). 
21 For a detailed, balanced, analytically sophisticated account of the Internet’s history, see 
Janet Abbate’s Inventing the Internet (2000).
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After the “dotcom-bubble” burst in 2000, the first economic crisis of the IT-in-
dustry, Internet use did not decrease, rather new business concepts and offers 
emerged. The Internet has increasingly become seen as a platform to store content. 
For example, the most successful community-project platform ever, Wikipedia, 
was started in 2001. The restructuring of the Internet in this period became referred 
to as “Web 2.0”, which is often seen as defined by interaction and communication 
in which the roles of recipient and producer can no longer be distinguished. In this 
understanding, users became ‘produsers’, both consuming and producing content 
within one and the same application and session (cf. Bruns; cf. Koch, ‘Empirische 
Kulturanalyse’ 185; cf. J.-H. Schmidt, Neue Netz 177). However, this simplistic 
view has become increasingly questioned:
[o]ne might begin by questioning how much of Web 2.0 and online social networking 
is really new. As someone who has been studying online interactions since the early 
1990s, I shake my head at the idea that the contemporary Internet is ‘user generated’ 
while that which preceded it is not. The very phrase ‘user-generated’ only makes sense 
when there is an alternative, in this case something like ‘professionally generated for 
profit.’ Until 1994, this alternative did not exist. On an Internet with no World Wide 
Web, sponsored by the United States government, all of the content was generated by 
the people, for the people. We only call Web 2.0 ‘user generated’ because a well-es-
tablished class of professional content providers now dominate the Internet. (‘Social 
Networks’ 384)
Inspired by Baym’s critical stance, I look at the ways in which Web 2.0 media 
can be compared to and differentiated from both other media and face-to-face 
communication. Baym argues that these differences can be analysed in terms of 
interactivity, temporal structure, social cues, storage, replicability, reach, and mo-
bility (cf. Personal Connections 7ff.). In her book Personal Connections in the 
Digital Age, she makes it clear that “if we want to build a rich understanding of 
how media influence personal connections, we need to stop talking about media in 
overly simplistic terms. We can’t talk about consequences if we can’t articulate ca-
pabilities” (6). She then continues by asking: “What is it about these [Social, JTK] 
media that changes interaction, and, potentially, relationships?” (ibid.). Here, 
“personal connections” and “relationships” can simply be substituted according 
to research interest, such as in my case “information and participation practices”.
In comparison to other forms of media, Social Media allow their users to talk 
back with unprecedented ease and speed. You do not agree with a newspaper 
article or TV report? Social Media makes it easy to address this immediately and 
facilitates discussion between you, other media users, and the authors/producers. 
A citizen of Reykjavík can easily start an initiative concerning the run-down 
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state of the playground in her neighbourhood. This will not take much longer 
than writing a customer review. Yet it could very well result in the replacement 
of a broken swing within a couple of months, provided that the initiative gains 
momentum and is endorsed by enough other Betri Reykjavík users that it makes it 
onto the city council’s agenda and is approved by city councillors.22
Social cues are another important concept in differentiating media and in ex-
plaining the special role attributed to Social Media. As Baym points out, “(s)ome 
media convey very little information about the identities of those with whom we 
are communicating. […] In [those] lean media, people have more ability to expand, 
manipulate, multiply, and distort the identities they present to others. The paucity 
of personal and social identity cues can also make people feel safer, and thus 
create an environment in which they are more honest” (Personal Connections 8). 
But this feeling of security does not only effect honesty, as one email conversation 
I had with a Betri Reykjavík user revealed. Suffering from social anxiety, he told 
me he preferred to take part in political deliberation and discussion processes on-
line because the Internet was a kind of safe zone where he could form friendships 
(that eventually lead to offline meetings), unlike in face-to-face situations.
Of course, online anonymity also opens up opportunities for online “terror” 
(Baym, Personal Connections 8), for example in the form of cyber-bulling, shit-
storms, identity-theft, or trolling. Many online participation tool developers and 
political implementers therefore criticise anonymity as an untenable condition 
for participating in political deliberation or decision-making processes online. As 
such, and to ensure that they were seeking to act in their community’s best interest 
and to avoid any destructive and potentially criminal uses of the platform, would 
be users of LiquidFriesland could only register under their real names and had to 
prove that they lived in the district of Friesland.
In another regard, with Social Media “(t)he gatekeeping function of mass 
media is challenged as individuals use digital media to spread messages much 
farther and more widely than was ever historically possible” (Baym, Personal 
Connections 10). In tweeting, writing a blog-post, or posting an initiative to Betri 
Reykjavík or LiquidFriesland, individuals can reach a much greater number of 
people over a much greater distance than ever before. Baym sees this as “a pow-
erful subversion of the elitism of mass media, within which a very small number 
of broadcasters could engage in one-to-many communication” (ibid.). Transferred 
to the realm of politics and political communication, this means that Social Media 
offers a bridge between individual citizen and politics, a bridge which was once 
22 The chapter on Research Fields provides in-depth information on the workings of Betri 
Reykjavík and LiquidFriesland. 
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reserved for the traditional authorities of political formation of opinion and inter-
est intermediation, such as political parties and unions (cf. Tenscher et al. 191).
By looking at different media through Baym’s key concepts, a more nuanced 
picture of what Social Media is begins to emerge. In order to describe this picture, 
or “to define what is popularly called social media but also includes prior media”, 
Miller et al. suggest the term “scalable sociality” (3). They define sociality as “the 
way in which people associate with each other to form social relations and soci-
eties” (ibid.). Situations are scaled from the most private to the most public, and 
from the smallest group to the largest group: “At one end of both of these scales 
we still see private dyadic conversation and at the other end we still see fully 
public broadcasting” (3). 
Of course, people also associate with each other to form social relations within 
the context of politics, both online and offline. Online, sociality develops from 
people engaging (with each other), discussing, deliberating, voting, and research-
ing information within various digital political formats. I find “scalable sociality” 
to be a particularly valuable definition because it also includes prior media (cf. 
Miller et al. 3). By including “prior media” in their study of Social Media, Miller 
et al. acknowledge its ongoing influence and role in information, communication, 
and participation practices and that, at least in most cases, connections with fam-
ily, friends, and acquaintances first developed in offline situations. In the same 
spirit, boyd and Ellison “use the term ‘social network site’ rather than ‘social net-
working site’ to emphasize that these sites are more often used to replicate con-
nections that exist offline than to build new ones.23 Their choice of noun over verb 
positions Web 2.0 as an extension of pre-existing social phenomena rather than as 
a transformation” (as cited in Baym, ‘Social Networks’ 386). 
This thought also proves to be true in the realm of Social Media and politics. 
Many studies have found that those citizens who engage, inform, and participate 
around politics online were active and engaged in offline ways prior to the Internet 
(e.g. see Emmer et al.; Kubicek et al.; Wimmer; Glaab). Once more, it becomes 
clear that online participation tools work more as an extension of pre-existing 
habits and routines – “social phenomena” as boyd and Ellison call them – rather 
than a transformation or new formation of practices. 
Moreover, the concept of “scalable sociality” offers a rare and refreshing 
stance within the literature on Social Media and politics that, in my impression, 
drastically overstates or underplays the possibilities for and influence of Social 
Media on politics, and on political participation in particular (see chapter 2.2.1 
Simply Slacktivism?!). Between the diametrically opposed publications of the 
23 Please note that the lower case printing of danah m. boyd’s name in this thesis is not a 
mistake, but respects the style of writing the author herself chose (cf. boyd).
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net-optimists and the net-pessimists (cf. Buchstein), there has been a lack of in-
vestigations in which emphatic involvement with participants in the field has been 
perceptible. Miller et al.’s How the World Changed Social Media is one of the few 
exceptions. Together with Baym (see esp. ‘Call for Grounding’) and van Deth (see 
esp. ‘Map’), Miller et al. seem to be among the few to contribute a balanced view 
to the otherwise largely dichotomous depiction of Social Media, both in public 
media and academia, as either the saviour (e.g. see Dahlgren) or the final nail in 
the coffin of political participation (e.g. see Eisel). 
By including prior media in their look at Social Media, Miller et al. also ac-
knowledge that people rely on “polymedia”. That is, people mix and match media 
in their information, communication, and participation practices. Most often, peo-
ple do so without differentiating between reputed online–offline divides. Nobody 
uses just one medium for everything; rather, “the precise selection of social media 
within an environment of polymedia is based less upon technological affordances 
and more on local genres of social interaction or cultural significance” (Miller et 
al. 211). Miller et al.’s scalable society approach thus stresses the mundane and 
routine status of digital media “as they are increasingly embedded in everyday 
lives and social norms coalesce around their use” (Baym, Personal Connections 
5). Consequently, in this book, I adopt Baym’s suggestion that the emphasis and 
prime research interest should lie “on the mundane and the everyday, on how peo-
ple incorporate digital media into their routine practices of relating and with what 
consequences” (ibid.).
As such, Social Media do not only change information practices, practices of 
information exchange and communication within political space, but also influence 
political decision-making processes by affecting relational structures between rep-
resentatives and those represented in a number of ways.24 Kneuer points out that 
parliamentarians and members of the government have become communication 
partners with whom citizens can directly and easily exchange ideas with through 
Social Media (cf. ‘Wirkung’ 14). Kneuer continues that today, parliamentarians and 
members of government may feel the urge (or the obligation) to actively use face-
book, Twitter, blogs and other media to communicate with citizens (ibid.).
24 As recent events have shown, Social Media sites have also been used to manipulate 
political elections. In 2018, whistleblower Christopher Wylie revealed that data about 
“50 million Americans and at least a million Britons had been harvested from Face-
book and improperly shared with Cambridge Analytica”, a data analytics firm working 
for Donald Trump’s election team and the Brexit campaign. Information on friends, 
“likes, activities, check-ins, location, photos, religion, politics and relationship details 
[…] was used to influence the outcome of the US presidential election and Brexit” by 
targeting voters through personalised political advertisements (Solon and Laughland).
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2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have outlined the two main research areas that this book draws 
on and contributes to: political participation, and Internet and politics. The an-
thropological gaze has been seriously under-represented in both research fields. 
This perspective opens up rich opportunities to explore these research areas both 
separately and in the places that they overlap, allowing the cultural anthropologist 
to make the research more diverse and empirical. The anthropological approach is 
valuable for the production and communication of knowledge for its emphasis on 
two key factors: comparison and sociality. 
Firstly, in research on political participation in the digital age, the comparative 
perspective of cultural anthropologists means that rather than focusing the research 
on individual platforms, anthropological investigations tend to trace a certain 
phenomenon through multiple media, hereby drawing on Marcus’ motto to follow 
the people, follow the thing, follow the metaphor; follow the plot, the story, or 
allegory; follow the life or biography; follow the context (cf. 106ff.). Miller et al. 
describe this approach as employing “[…] a theory of polymedia that recognises our 
inability to understand any one platform or media in isolation. They must be seen 
as relative to each other, since today people use the range of available possibilities 
to select specific platforms or media for particular genres of interaction” (211). 
Secondly, a key characteristic of cultural anthropology is the focus on sociali-
ty, deeply intertwined with a firm belief in cultural relativism. This approach ena-
bles an empathetic and emic view onto research fields which is often paired with a 
micro-perspective both of and on the actual participants. In focusing on the actual 
participants, listening to their stories, descriptions and reasoning, this research 
opens a hitherto strongly under-researched dimension of diverse motives for and 
perspectives on political participation as well as Social Media use. Facilitated by 
the ethnographic method, which provides great depth, this micro-perspective ap-
proach tends to undermine popular assumptions around apparent social problems 
such as the oft-cited political apathy (ger. Politikverdrossenheit) or the degen-
eration of society to a mass of individualised, asocial smombies.25 Together, the 
distinct characteristics of the discipline also mean that cultural anthropologists are 
well equipped to research areas not necessarily dominated by their peers. In the 
upcoming chapter, I focus on the websites LiquidFriesland and Betri Reykjavík, 
the central research fields in this book.
25 “Smombie” is a portmanteau from the words “smartphone” and “zombie” and became 
Germany’s annual youth word in 2015. It describes a slowly walking pedestrian paying 
exclusive attention to the screen in hand and not to his surroundings (cf. ‘Jugendwort’).
3  Doing Ethnography I:  
Constructing Research Fields1
The last few decades have brought with them several major developments and 
challenges for ethnographers in conducting fieldwork. The most prominent of 
these have been increased mobility, and the growth and spread of information and 
communication technologies. Before introducing the reader to the actual fields 
and samples of this research study, I therefore discuss the three main challenges 
I encountered during this research project: the spatial boundaries of research in 
both online and offline fields, the temporalisation of field work, and the blending 
and blurring of originally dichotomous concepts of home and field within the eth-
nologic research process.2
It appears more difficult than ever for cultural anthropologists / European 
ethnologists to constitute or to clearly demarcate the boundaries of their fields.3 
Today, the scientific community typically considers field sites as changing, shift-
ing, and being in a constant state of flux, as opposed to our predecessors, who 
1 This insertion entitled “Doing Ethnography” is the first of three throughout the book. 
These insertions precede the three key chapters on research fields, methodology, and 
analysis. The aim here is to condense meta-commentary and my reflections regarding 
the topics to come.
2 As I found out after writing this section, Michi Knecht also identified and discussed 
these three challenges in her 2012 article “Ethnographische Praxis im Feld der Wissen-
schafts-, Medizin- und Technikanthropologie”.
3 The full name of the discipline I located myself in is cultural anthropology/European 
ethnology (as taught at Göttingen University). Generally, the debate about names and 
what they are about appears a constitutive element of the discipline after 1945 (cf. 
Bendix and Eggeling). In this study, I will for simplicity’s sake use the name cultural 
anthropology.
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conceived of research sites as static and geographically confined.4 Today, cultural 
anthropologists rarely study cultural phenomena strongly tied to one, confined 
locality. As Michi Knecht stresses 
Das Feld der Gegenwartsethnografie hat seine früheren ‚naturalistischen’ Konnotationen 
weitgehend verloren. Es wird nicht mehr bloß aufgesucht. Die Definition dessen, was das 
ethnografische Feld in einem spezifischen Forschungsprozess ausmacht, welche Orte und 
Beziehungen zu ihm gehören, wie seine Grenzen beschaffen sind, diese Fragen und As-
pekte sind Teil des Forschungsdesigns, das sich in der Zusammenführung theoretischer 
Interessen und empirischen Wissens im Verlauf des Forschungsprozesses immer mehr 
konkretisiert. (88f.)
The field of contemporary ethnography has mostly lost its earlier ‘naturalistic’ con-
notations. Researchers do not just go there anymore. The definition of what makes an 
ethnographic field in a specific research process, which places and relationships belong 
to it, the conditions of its boundaries – those questions and aspects are now part of the 
research design. By bringing together theoretical interests and empirical knowledge, the 
research design becomes increasingly concrete throughout the research process.
As Ulf Hannerz stresses, cultures “as collective systems of meaning […] belong 
primarily to social relationships, and to networks of such relationships. Only indi-
rectly, and without logical necessity, do they belong to places” (39). Referring to 
the most prominent symptoms of globalisation, enhanced mobility and the spread 
of information and communication technologies, Hannerz notes that “the less peo-
ple stay put in one place, and also the less dependent their communications are 
on face-to-face contacts, the more attenuated does the link between culture and 
territory become” (39). Or, as danah m. boyd poignantly sums it up: “Mobility 
complicated matters […], but mediated technologies changed the rules entirely” 
(27). Here, boyd directly addresses the role of digitalisation and medialisation of 
the everyday life of both researched subjects and researchers alike, which to her 
have “completely disrupted any simple construction of a field site” since “in a 
networked society, we cannot take for granted the idea that culture is about collo-
cated peoples. It is not a question of mobility but of access to a hypertextual world. 
Geography can no longer be the defining framework of culture; people are part 
of many cultures including those defined by tastes, worldview, language, religion, 
social networks, practices, etc.” (27). Already in the 1990s, US-American social 
4 In the neighbouring field of anthropology, the “criteria to define ‘the field’ by geo-
graphic location, a language different from one’s own and a clear separation of home 
from the field” seems to remain even stronger (Caputo 28). 
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anthropologist Sarah Strauss had recognised the same trend: “a field site can no 
longer be seen merely as a geographical location, but rather may be viewed as 
an intersection between people, practices and shifting terrains, both physical and 
virtual” (171f.).
Some have argued that the challenges and difficulties of constituting one’s 
field(s) or field site(s) multiply when researching on, in, with, and through the In-
ternet. For example, Heike Mónika Greschke identifies the potentially premature 
assumption of the research field’s boundaries as “(o)ne of the challenges of ethno-
graphic research on the Internet”(44). However, I believe that defining the bound-
aries of a research field/project is complicated by definition, whether research is 
predominantly about the Internet or not. I do, however, agree with Greschke’s 
assertion that “(d)efining the boundaries of the research project […] becomes an 
ongoing task during the whole research process. It requires taking a set of deci-
sions during fieldwork, regarding entrance and starting points, the traces to follow 
and when to stop fieldwork” (44). However, I do not see how these challenges ap-
ply solely to ethnographic research projects focusing on the Internet; rather, they 
are relevant to most research projects in today’s globalised and interconnected 
everyday life – indeed, I would suggest that these challenges are not restricted to 
ethnographic research projects. 
Nevertheless, ethnography in virtual contexts may appear challenging because 
of the potential methodological novelty it entails. Indeed, Gisela Welz stressed the 
lack of theorisation on the effects of ICT upon their usage in ethnographic field-
work (cf. ‘Lernkulturen’). It is significantly more challenging for researchers to 
master the methods of virtual ethnography, as they evolve parallel to the research-
ers and the researched subjects’ ever changing social media practices in everyday 
life, and are thus intertwined with them or are overlapping with “private” uses of 
the Internet (cf. Boellstorff et al. 27f.). The digital has, in other words, become “a 
field in which we practice as much as we analyse” (Pink et al. 6f.).
Nancy Baym points out that online realms “are no longer contained within 
their own boundaries (if they ever were). What appear to be single online groups 
often turn out to be multimodal” (“Call for Grounding” 721). She criticizes com-
munication studies, her own discipline, for having produced many tightly focused 
“studies of single web boards, newsgroups, chat rooms, social network sites” 
which have neglected to study “how individuals and groups link these contexts 
to one another as they traverse the Internet and meet the same individuals across 
multiple domains” (721). In this thesis, I try to put Baym’s critique into practice: 
although I take the individual websites LiquidFriesland and Betri Reykjavík as 
vantage points for my research, I then follow people’s patterns of information, 
deliberation, and participation practices from there, through online and offline 
scenes, and back.
48 | 
While Knecht argues that the field must not be simply visited, I agree with 
British sociologist and social anthropologist Vered Amit who goes a step further:
 
The notion of immersion implies that the ‘field’ that ethnographers enter exists as an 
independently bounded set of relationships and activities that is autonomous of the 
fieldwork through which it is discovered. Yet in a world of infinite interconnections and 
overlapping contexts, the ethnographic field cannot simply exist, awaiting discovery. 
It has to be laboriously constructed, pulled apart from all the other possibilities for 
contextualization to which its constituent relationships and connections could also be 
referred. (6) 
Similarly, Katharina Eisch argues that the field is primarily constituted only within 
dialogue and the personal willingness of researcher and the researched to become 
involved (cf. 35). In addition, Vered Amit points to the important but often forgot-
ten fact that “the process of construction [of the field] is inescapably shaped by 
the conceptual, professional, financial and relational opportunities and resources 
accessible to the researcher” (6). In other words, both scholars indirectly suggest 
that the idea of objective field work completed by a neutral researcher is a chi-
mera, and that this is rightly so, for an uninvolved researcher would ultimately 
produce little relevant data.
Scholars have adopted different strategies to enable them to construct research 
fields despite the inherent challenges and difficulties this entails. Perhaps the most 
prominent strategy is George Marcus’ idea of a multi-sited ethnography. He sug-
gested that rather than remaining bound to one field site, researchers should ac-
tually follow the people, follow the thing, follow the metaphor; follow the plot, 
the story, or allegory; follow the life or biography; follow the context (cf. 106ff.). 
Heike Mónika Greschke argues that “[m]ulti-siting […] becomes crucial in terms 
of moving around sites, relating sites of production and use, online and offline, 
and following traces across social networks and different media” (Home in Cy-
berspace 44). Here, the plural use of the word (field) sites hints lexically at the 
impossibility of constituting a research field strongly confined to one locality. To-
day, fields overlap and constantly refer to one another, drawing inspirations and 
influences from each other.5
Whereas novel modalities like multi-sited, mobile research have become widely 
established and become conventional within the spatial organisation of ethnograph-
ic fieldwork, this has not been the case for the new temporalisations of fieldwork. 
5 Following Christine Hine’s suggestion, I use only the term “field” and not “field site”. As 
Hine argues that the term “field” “is diffuse and only occasionally constituted as a whole 
and certainly not a place”, it rather corresponds to my understanding (“Boundaries” 12).
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There has been a trend towards temporally discontinuous fieldwork in recent years, 
but this is toward shorter, sequential stays in the field (cf. Welz, ‘Pragmatik’ 41).6 
There appear to be various reasons for this trend. One key reason comes from the 
possibilities and pressures on academia in today’s neoliberalist world itself, with 
scholars today only rarely receiving funding for long-term research stays. At the 
same time, the structure of researched societies or social situations today favour, or 
even require shorter, more frequent field stays, since many research fields manifest 
themselves only temporarily or are ephemeral (cf. Welz, ‘Pragmatik’ 41).
Swedish social anthropologist Helena Wulff refers to this alternation between 
states of on- and off-fieldwork as yo-yo-fieldwork. Indeed, Wulff sees many advan-
tages in this method, as it allows researchers to publish or present interim findings 
at conferences in between field visits, and to discuss with colleagues and experts 
of the research field or subject (cf. 122). However, temporally discontinuous field-
work can also be demanding of researchers. Katharina Eisch, for example, points 
out that the empathetic involvement of the researcher is even more important in 
temporally discontinuous fieldwork than in single rounds of stationary data collec-
tion. According to Eisch, the researcher that gathers data in a temporally discon-
tinuously manner must pay special attention to and deal with a lot of changes, be 
they in the field itself, in the living situations and living conditions of informants, 
or in the relationships between the researcher and actors in the field. The researcher 
therefore has to continuously maintain friendships and contacts in the field (cf. 35). 
Moreover, as British social anthropologist Virginia Caputo recalls about the 
early stages of her research process, she felt insecure and self-conscious about her 
difficulties in keeping “the field and home conceptually separate and distinct in 
practice”, because her research experience “was of continually coming and going 
to and from the field, to the point where, at times, the field became indistinguisha-
ble from home” (26). It was only as her research progressed that she realized that 
the difficulties she had in separating field and home were “an important part of 
the progress of research itself. Indeed, the interruptions experienced in practice 
became part of the resulting ethnography” (26). 
As Wulff points out, even when the researcher “is temporarily physically away 
from the field, she is not so mentally” (122). Most often, “fieldwork is still go-
ing on through information and communication technologies when […] at home” 
(122). However, the views on usage of information and communication technolo-
gies during fieldwork and its implications differ widely among ethnographers. For 
example, upon comparing his field stays in Sri Lanka in the 2000s with those of 
6 In my opinion, the idea that a researcher needs spend a full year’s cycle in the field 
in order to understand it remains strong in European Ethnology – although not to the 
extent that it does in Social and Cultural Anthropology (cf. Götz 102).
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30 years earlier, British social anthropologist Bob Simpson found that the usage 
of information and communication technologies today made it more difficult to 
experience the distance between here and there, near and far which had once been 
a vital caesura within the research process: “In ever more powerful manipulations 
of time and space, what is far away can, at any point, seem to be more immediate 
than what is in front of one” (2). Simpson finds that research and his ability to 
engage in it are interrupted by Skype, email, and the interactive homepage of his 
home university: 
in order to experience fully the sensitive and subtle communications of those worlds 
[his research fields], other ‘noise’ – the daily routines of home and work […] – has to 
be screened out. Part of the attraction of fieldwork for me, then, is that it is a kind of 
experiment with selfhood – wiping the slate as clean as possible in order that others 
might write afresh on it. Yet this ‘tuning in’ seemed to remain elusive. Yes, I could have 
switched off all means of communication – but I didn’t, and I began to wonder just how 
clean one can get the slate when it is so easy for the world ‘back there’ to intrude into 
‘the world out here’, and what the implications are for the kinds of knowledge we might 
then go on to produce. (ibid.)
Not only access to computers and the Internet potentially interrupt and distract the 
researcher in the field. Virginia Caputo reminds us that already the use of earlier 
versions of ICT7, like fax machines or even telephones, occasionally resulted in 
blurring of the boundaries between field and home: “my fax machine connected 
me with a supervisor overseas, and telephones calls at home connected me with 
key informants after I had left the field. At times, I did not need to physically travel 
to the field to be able to reach my key informants or for them to reach me” (26). So 
is it wrong to attribute the blurring of boundaries between field and home largely 
to the pervasiveness of the Internet? Have we succumbed to a tendency to ascribe 
things to technologies that “are better attributed to novelty and the ways in which 
cultures project their concerns onto technology”, as Baym diagnosed in her “Call 
for Grounding in the Face of Blurred Boundaries” (720)? There is little question 
that the spread of the Internet in the 1990s 
7 As Nancy Baym reminds us, it is important to recall “that technology need not mean 
computing nor be digital. We have other precedents, and other technologies. Human 
communication and technology begins with the invention of writing. It includes pigeon 
training, ink, woodblocks, 16th-century books, and 17th- and 18th-century pamphlets. 
It includes photography, audio recording, radio waves, moving pictures, the telegraph, 
television, and countless other technologies, more of which have been forgotten than 
remembered” (‘Call for Grounding’ 720).
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produced an extraordinary array of hyperbolic proclamations about its potential impact 
on the world. The Internet, prognosticators stated, would solve long-standing problems 
of education, make bureaucracies function better, create a global community through 
increased connectivity, empower the disenfranchised, and forever alter the roles of con-
sumer and producer. (Sturken and Thomas 1)
Nevertheless, I believe that the Internet and ICTs developed over the last two dec-
ades have certain characteristics that hold the potential to interrupt conventional 
sequences within research processes more than other technologies have done in 
the past. First, ICTs have become increasingly portable through the development 
of laptops, smartphones, tablets, and in so doing, have allowed access to the in-
creasingly omnipresent Internet. Whereas many previous technologies were lo-
calised, physical things – a caller on a landline would simply miss you when you 
were out –, today, being able to reach someone any time of day or night is com-
mon in many societies, as are expectations that one will reply instantly to emails 
or WhatsApp and facebook messages. Second, information and communication 
have become increasingly multi-directional: one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-
one, or many-to-many (cf. Kneuer, ‘Potential’ 37). In that way, the researcher also 
receives masses of information and communication from individuals which is not 
personally addressed to her. The researcher sees facebook posts from field con-
tacts in her timeline, regardless of relevance for her research or whether she is in 
the office or at home on the weekend. Third, information and communication have 
become increasingly concurrent and non-chronological. While you could only re-
ceive one fax at a time from one sender (in Caputo’s example this was a supervi-
sor), it is no problem to receive several emails or chat messages simultaneously 
from several senders, be it supervisors, friends, insurance agents, parents, or field 
contacts. Together, newer ICT like the Internet or smartphones blur boundaries of 
work and private spheres most especially through their omnipresence. Potentially, 
and more imminent and pervasive than ever before, the field is always with us – in 
the form of the Internet-enabled smartphone in our pocket. 
In any case, ethnologic research fields no longer appear ‘secluded’ or ‘far 
away’, but have indeed become frequently intertwined with the everyday (work-
ing) lives of ethnologists (cf. Hess as cited in Knecht, ‘Nach Writing Culture’ 90). 
This has certainly been the case for me in this research project. Through ICT, the 
fields have become much more visible in my everyday life at home, especially 
through facebook. Through friendships with informants as well as subscriptions 
to various media outlets, citizen initiatives, and political parties, and even when 
I was away from them, the fields became highly visible in my facebook timeline.
Still, it was not always easy to keep up-to-date on the latest news from the 
fields without being there and purposefully doing research. On a number of occa-
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sions, for example, paragraphs that I had just written were rendered obsolete or 
even factually false by facebook posts. Here, the question of when to end field-
work becomes an act of self-discipline even more delicate than had once been 
the case. Similarly, Greschke argues that “(e)asy access to the field can lead to an 
endless extension of the researched period with the danger of generating a mass of 
data that becomes too large to cope with” (58). Once the ethnologist has declared 
the research period over, she must actively resist incorporating newer information 
that comes to her through ICTs. 
The challenges detailed in this chapter were those that bothered personally me 
most during this individual research process. Of course, other researchers in other 
research fields and with other research questions will naturally encounter other 
challenges. Even someone attempting a replication of this study would likely face 
other problems than I had to. Nevertheless, I believe the challenges I faced are 
likely to be applicable to a wide range of researchers and research projects today. 
Globalisation, and with it increased mobility, as well as the spread and develop-
ment of ICTs, have brought marked changes in how ethnography can, must and is 
being done. Traditional concepts of the “field” have been questioned, challenged, 
and redefined (cf. Hess and Schwertl 25). Amongst others, Hannerz has helped to 
change the persistent myths of fields as static and geographically confined, stress-
ing that cultures are based on social relationships, and not geographical places (cf. 
39). We have had to learn that even in online realms – where one may have ini-
tially expected a naturally confined field around an individually identifying URL 
to exist –, fields are no longer contained within their own boundaries, but refer to 
other websites, media, and people (cf. Baym, ‘Call for Grounding’ 721; cf. Miller 
et al. 211ff.).
As the spatial organisation of ethnographic fieldwork has been questioned, 
challenged, redefined – so too has the temporalisation of ethnographic fieldwork. 
Increasingly, the process of data collection has become temporally discontinuous, 
stringing together several shorter research stays in the field. This development has 
brought with it distinct challenges for the researcher, one of which is the blending 
and blurring of formerly dichotomous concepts of home and field within the eth-
nographic research process.
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4 Research Fields
Having outlined the research questions and described the state of research in the 
areas of political participation, digital democracy, political communication and 
social media, as well as the challenges I see in doing ethnography today, I now 
turn to the research fields of the study. Both sub-chapters on the two fields have 
the same structure. First, I explain briefly how the online participation tools work. 
Second, I contextualise them within their context of origin, that is, I describe the 
central actors involved in the website’s development, such as computer program-
mers, politicians and administrative personnel, as well as their users. Finally, I 
then discuss how I accessed the respective fields before introducing the actual 
sample and my sampling techniques.
LiquidFriesland and Betri Reykjavík are two independent websites with no 
connection to one another other than they share the same goal, to facilitate in-
creased political participation amongst the citizens of their localised reference 
areas, the North-German district of Friesland and the region of the Icelandic capi-
tal of Reykjavík respectively. But it was never my intention to study the websites 
as entities as such, but rather the ways in which the citizens use and interact with 
them. In other words, the focus of this study is not on the websites but rather on 
the people involved – the users, programmers, administrators and politicians – 
and their practices. As people do not use only one website or, for that matter, one 
medium, I did not stop researching when a proposal on Betri Reykjavík linked to 
an article on a newspaper website, or when an interviewee told me about another 
website she uses to communicate with city officials and politicians. “What hap-
pens via new technology is completely interwoven with what happens face-to-
face and via other media“, as Baym points out (‘Call for Grounding’ 721). That is 
also the reason I gladly accepted the invitation to attend a podium discussion on 
political participation in the district of Friesland, and the reason I spoke to people 
who were not directly connected to the website in any way but who still seemed to 
have something fruitful to say about to my research questions. Instead of lingering 
on the initial internal need to constitute a field with clearly defined boundaries, I 
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thus followed “Hannerz’s recipe for the study of cultural complexity” by focusing 
“on the interfaces, the affinities, the confrontations, the interpenetrations and the 
flow-through, between clusters of meaning and ways of managing meaning” (as 
cited in Hine, ‘Boundaries’ 7).
4.1 LiquidFriesland
It was “Hannerz’s recipe” that helped me through the difficult period I had after dis-
covering that one of my research fields, LiquidFriesland, had gone offline in Spring 
2016. Here, Hannerz’s suggestion helped me to understand that just because the 
website was no longer online, neither my research field was lost, nor my research 
pointless and in vain. I realised that my research field consisted of more than just the 
content found under that URL, www.liquidfriesland.de, but also included the people 
connected to the website and their information, communication, and participation 
practices, as well as their references to other websites, media, people – all of which 
had, of course, continued to exist after the website had closed. 
I will go back to the beginnings of LiquidFriesland however to explain how 
it developed. Here, Sven Ambrosy played a key role. A member of the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany, he has been Landrat, the administrative head, of 
the district (ger. Landkreis) of Friesland since 2003. As a reaction to the pub-
lic discourse on new forms of participation in the Stuttgart 21-project1, Ambrosy 
wanted to offer citizens an additional, modern, and flexible way to take part in 
municipal decision-making processes.2 An article about the Pirate Party’s usage 
of the open-source software LiquidFeedback started Ambrosy thinking whether 
it was possible to set up a similar tool in his district. Without further ado, Fries-
land’s administration contacted LiquidFeedback’s programmers, the Association 
for Interactive Democracy, to inquire about the possibility of collaborating. The 
programmers agreed to LiquidFeedback’s application, the first on a municipal lev-
1 Stuttgart 21 is a disputed railway and urban development project in the city of Stutt-
gart in the south of Germany. The project saw unusually high numbers of protesters 
from all levels of society. Around ten thousand people protested the conversion of 
the existing terminal station into a through station underground in 2010. On 30 Sep-
tember 2010, police took an especially hard-line toward the predominantly peaceful 
protesters, using water cannons and pepper spray and other measures. To subsequently 
include the population in the planning project, which had been neglected the commen-
cement of construction, arbitration proceedings were conducted – a novel experiment 
in democratic participation in Germany (cf. Brunold).
2 Cf. Sven Ambrosy, telephone interview, 16 September 2015.
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el, and things moved quickly: in May 2012, the programmers presented the project 
to politicians and an interested public in Friesland. Two months later, the district 
assembly voted unanimously for a one-year trial of the platform (cf. Landkreis 
Friesland, Juni 2013 4).3 In November that year, LiquidFriesland went online 
– promising to offer a space for citizens’ opinions, feedback, and ideas, and to 
distribute information faster and more widely within Friesland. 
I stumbled on LiquidFriesland only a few months after its launch while re-
searching and browsing the web for a prospective research field that would be 
suitable for a comparison with Betri Reykjavík in my future PhD project. I had 
already conducted researched on Betri Reykjavík for my master’s thesis. At first 
glance, LiquidFriesland had potential both in terms of the similarities it had to 
and striking differences it had from Betri Reykjavík. These will, of course, become 
clear throughout the book. Friesland’s location in the north of Germany also made 
it easy for me to reach it on one- or two-day trip, and the working language of 
German also came in handy for me as a native speaker. 
Nevertheless, my entrance into the Friesland field turned out to be rockier than 
in Iceland. That is, my initial attempt at accessing LiquidFriesland in 2013 was 
immediately thwarted: as I did not possess citizen status in the district of Fries-
land, I was not able to apply for an access code. I was therefore confined to guest 
access, through which I could read the initiatives and comments put online, but 
could not see the identities of those debating, or participate in the debate myself. 
Thus, in a second attempt at entering the field, I approached LiquidFriesland 
from above, by sending an email to Landrat Sven Ambrosy about my plan to in-
vestigate the website as part of my doctoral thesis. In reply, I was invited by Fries-
land’s then press secretary, Sönke Klug, to attend an event in Friesland at which 
Ambrosy and Klug gave a presentation on LiquidFriesland to some members of 
the city council of Seelze who were interested in implementing a similar platform 
in their city.4 During that meeting, without ever having had a private word with 
Ambrosy or Klug, I was introduced to the visitors from Seelze as “our PhD can-
didate”. It was only after the official event that I had the chance to speak to Sönke 
Klug one-on-one to discuss my dissertation project and ask the initial questions I 
had about the website. 
In the aftermath and processing of this initial meeting, I also asked for full 
access to the platform – for research purposes only. Klug promised to discuss my 
enquiry with the programmers. After a fortnight, I was notified that I would not be 
allowed permission because the contract between the district of Friesland and their 
3 In June 2013, the future operation of LiquidFriesland was passed, but without a fixed 
term.
4 Seelze Direkt went online in July 2015 but in 2019 it had also been terminated.
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user-citizens concerning LiquidFriesland would not allow for an exception to the 
rule that users must be registered citizens of the Friesland district.
Obviously, the lack of full access to LiquidFriesland fundamentally shaped 
my research and consequently, my thesis. Throughout the research process, I de-
pended on the administration naming possible interlocutors of potential interest 
to me, which again, had a fundamental influence on my research as well as re-
search findings (cf. Schwell). I was thus left with little control over decisions 
about whom to interview or not, since I had no possibility of finding out which 
users participated, in what ways, or at what frequency. In the end, I did manage to 
speak to a variety of user types, just as I had planned to do. Nevertheless, I have to 
presume that certain “hidden areas” (Mann and Stewart 90) remained, and getting 
to know of them would have shaped my research in another way.5 
The workings of LiquidFriesland
So how did LiquidFriesland actually work? LiquidFriesland was a customized 
version of LiquidFeedback, a voting and communication platform originally de-
veloped for use within political parties (cf. Behrens et al., Principles).6 The voting 
and communication platform aimed at enabling registered users to influence polit-
ical decision making by discussing ideas, voting for or against others’ petitions, or 
proposing motions. In order to go to the discussion stage, citizens’ initiatives had 
to pass a quorum of ten percent, meaning that at least ten percent of the users sub-
scribed to the particular thematic category that an initiative was assigned to must 
support or at least follow it (cf. Landkreis Friesland as cited in Diefenbach 33). 
Once in the discussion stage, other users could suggest changes to the initiative, 
which the author could, in turn, incorporate into her final proposal (see Figure 1). 
After some weeks, the initiative was transferred to the frozen stage: changes could 
no longer be made, and users would hold a final vote on the idea. Again, a ten per-
cent quorum had to be met for the idea to be taken up for mooting by the district 
assembly in its regular meetings (cf. Diefenbach 33). 
5 Whenever I spoke about this field access dilemma, both users of the websites as well as 
members of academia frequently suggested I log into LiquidFriesland using somebody 
else’s credentials. However, I decided against his practice for ethical reasons.
6 In the media and public opinion, LiquidFeedback is often falsely attributed to the 
Pirate Party, as it was the first party to use it extensively. LiquidFeedback was in fact 
invented by the Association for Interactive Democracy which is based in Berlin. The 
group has since distanced itself from the usage of their software by the Pirate Party (cf. 
Behrens et al., ‘Piratenpartei’).
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Fig. 1: Starting Page of LiquidFriesland7
LiquidFriesland was LiquidFeedback’s first application on a municipal rather than 
on the intraparty level that it was originally designed for. To suit the needs of a dis-
trict administration, the programmers made a number of alterations to the 
software, the two most important of which concerned the registration process and 
the expansion of parties approved for submitting motions. 
The registration process for LiquidFriesland consisted of three steps. First, the 
interested citizen completed an online registration mask, with her real full name and 
address. Second, the administration checked the identity of the prospective user: if 
there was a person of that name registered under the given address, the administration 
sent out a letter with an access code to log into LiquidFriesland. Third, the citizen 
logged in online using the access code, and could then set up a user profile. Hence, 
it took some time and effort to set oneself up for participation. The platform was 
also altered to include administrative motions (ger. Verwaltungsverfahren). With 
this feature, communication and participation in LiquidFriesland did not only 
7 Screenshot taken on 16 May 2015 at www.liquidfriesland.de/lf/index.html.
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work bottom up, but also top-down. That is, the district administration itself 
could submit motions for citizen feedback before voting in the district assembly. 
According to Sönke Klug, former press secretary of the district of Friesland, 
very few of the around 200 motions discussed in the district assembly each year 
were actually interesting, comprehensible, and relevant enough to make mooting 
them in LiquidFriesland pay off.8 By the time it had closed, the administration itself 
had put up a total of 14 motions for discussion on the site (cf. Landkreis Friesland, 
August 2015 1), hoping for direct feedback from citizens before bringing up the top-
ic for discussion in the district assembly. This version of the programme, customised 
for the use in municipalities, and launched in the Friesland district in late 2012, was 
later adopted and used by other municipalities in an almost identical form.9 
Sampling Process
I sampled and contacted the three actor groups – users/citizens, programmers, and 
administration and politicians – in different ways. While the identities of users 
remained difficult for me to establish due to my restricted, guest access to the web-
site, it was easy to identify the administrative officials and politicians involved, as 
they were public figures who had mostly already featured in the media. 
Through Sönke Klug, it was also easy to establish the identity of the program-
mers, and I sent them an email asking for an interview at the end of September 2013. 
However, before agreeing to meet me in person, the Association for Interactive De-
mocracy first wanted to speak to me on the phone a few days later to find out more 
about me and my research interests.10 During that telephone call, one of the program-
mers and I set up a face-to-face meeting in Berlin on 1 November 2013. 
I generally contacted administrators, district assembly and other politicians 
via email. I built up ongoing contact with Friesland’s press secretary Sönke Klug 
via email and telephone throughout the years, meeting him occasionally when 
I was in Friesland to interview users, to conduct focus groups, or go to a panel 
discussion about LiquidFriesland. Klug also helped set up a phone interview with 
district head Sven Ambrosy, who could not meet in person due to time restraints. 
8 Cf. Sönke Klug, personal interview, Jever, 25 August 2015.
9 In early 2019, only Achim Dialog (launched in May 2016) still appears to be active, 
whereas Seelze Direkt (launched in July 2015), Wunstorf Direkt (launched in March 
2015), and Bürgerplattform ROW (launched in March 2015) cannot be accessed any-
more under their respective URLs. All websites were still online at end of 2016.
10 This may have had to do with the fact that the Association for Interactive Democracy 
does not give interviews to journalists or other media representatives, as the associa-
tion points out in their Information Kit, an introductory pdf-guide downloadable from 
their website (cf. 11).
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Finally, I interviewed individual users and recruited others for participation in 
one of two focus groups.11 Due to my limited access to the website, I depended on 
the district’s press secretary to suggest potential interviewees to me. His first two 
suggestions were no strangers to me, having recognised both from media coverage: 
one as the voluntary LiquidFriesland representative Djure Meinen and the other, 
Peter Lamprecht, as the author of one of the very first motions on LiquidFriesland.12 
Interestingly, the other two users I met for individual interviews were suggested 
to me by at least two of Klug, Meinen and Lamprecht. Even early in the fieldwork 
process, this showed me the limitations of recruiting participants solely based on 
references by Sönke Klug and the interlocutors he suggested. All of them were elo-
quent and experienced conversationalists that had already talked to journalists about 
their engagement at LiquidFriesland. To get more diverse and potentially less prac-
ticed views on the tool, but also on politics and digitalisation in general, I decided 
to expand my methodology by focus groups with “ordinary” citizens. I recruited 
participants for the focus groups by distributing flyers and putting up posters across 
Friesland. On two days at the end of May 2014, I drove across the district, dis-
tributing hundreds of flyers and dozens of posters to banks, cafés, cultural centres, 
supermarkets, and pharmacies in every larger village; an acquaintance in Jever dis-
tributed flyers to friends, neighbours, and relatives; and I also delivered flyers to the 
district administration who promised to distribute them within their branches. Gen-
erally, I was aiming to attract participants interested in talking about “Alltag – Poli-
tik – Beteiligung” (“The everyday, politics, engagement”) and who were not already 
registered users of LiquidFriesland. I therefore carefully worded and designed the 
flyer and poster to avoid stressing my connection to LiquidFriesland. However, this 
sampling technique was not especially successful. In the end, only one focus group 
participant was recruited who was not already registered in LiquidFriesland. This 
also has to do with the fact that the district administration had emailed the flyer to all 
registered LiquidFriesland users.
11 Most names of individual users of LiquidFriesland have been pseudonymised. Real 
names were used when either the participant explicitly wished so or if they were public 
figures and also speaking in their role as such, like politicians and programmers.
12 His initiative suggested the reintroduction of the old JEV-number plate, JEV meaning 
Jever, the administrative centre of the district of Friesland. In the first months after 
LiquidFriesland’s launch, Lamprecht quickly developed into a model-user of some 
kind for two reasons. First, he was not politically active prior to his engagement on 
LiquidFriesland. Second, media heavily stressed the fact that he was not disappointed 
after his motion had been dismissed; his quotation “Das ist halt Demokratie” (That’s 
democracy, after all.) has become an aphorism favoured by many media outlets.
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4.2 Betri Reykjavík
In contrast, gaining initial access to Betri Reykjavík was smooth. However, the 
sampling process did hold some surprises in store. Betri Reykjavík is an online 
participation tool programmed by Gunnar Grímsson and Róbert Bjarnason, Ice-
landic IT specialists and Internet pioneers working together under the registered 
name of Citizens’ Foundation. The website is based on the open source software 
Your Priorities, which they developed.13 
Betri Reykjavík went online in 2010, about half a year before municipal elections 
in Iceland’s capital Reykjavík. Then in its early version and still called Skuggaborg 
(eng. Shadow City), it offered a space to every political party running in the elections 
to promote their ideas and enter into discussions with potential voters. While not 
every party made use of this possibility, the Best Party participated eagerly, asking 
citizens for their ideas on how to improve life in Reykjavík. In the end, this public 
generated content became the Best Party’s programme, helping it achieve election 
victory with their head, actor and comedian Jón Gnarr, becoming major. Because of 
the Best Party’s heavy usage of the participation tool in its early days, Betri Rey-
kjavík is still strongly associated with the party and their creative take on Icelandic 
politics – even though by 2014, Gnarr’s tenure had ended, the Best Party had dis-
banded, and some of its former members had regrouped to form a new party, Bright 
Future. Today, the website Betri Reykjavík does not bear much resemblance with 
its predecessor from 2010. Areas designated to political parties have disappeared. 
Instead, every citizen can submit an idea, vote for or against ideas of other users, 
and comment on those (see Figure 2). The ideas are organised into eleven different 
thematic categories, for example urban planning, sports, or education.
Since October 2011, there has been an official collaboration between the Cit-
izens’ Foundation and the City of Reykjavík. At the time, the city signed a con-
tract committing itself to deal with citizens’ suggestions at the end of each month. 
Here, the five top priorities across the board and the top priority from each of the 
categories are said to be processed by an administration employee, and to then be 
decided on by the specialist councils within the city council. 
To my knowledge, this official and binding partnership between a grass-
roots-movement and a government was the first in the world. But this partnership 
has not been without difficulties. Due of changing political majorities within the 
city council, Betri Reykjavík has been neglected by the administration from time 
13 Anybody can use Your Priorities free of charge to develop a participation tool to their 
needs, and many people from many parts of the world have already done so. The 
portfolio of tools that are created based on Your Priorities can be accessed at https://
citizens.is/portfolio (last accessed 8 August 2019). 
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Fig. 2: Starting Page of Betri Reykjavík14
to time. At various times, the position of the administrator in charge of dealing 
with the incoming motions has been vacant for a couple of months. At one time, 
the motions were so backed up that no ideas from citizens were discussed in the 
city council for half a year. Consequently, the relationship between the Citizens’ 
Foundation, the city administration and the city council has been rather tense at 
times. 
Access to content on Betri Reykjavík is completely unrestricted; everyone who 
wants to can open the website and read everything there. To contribute one’s own 
ideas as well as endorse or oppose a proposal by somebody else, a user must be 
registered. Registration is not, however, restricted in any way. People from all 
over the world can therefore quickly fill out the registration mask –name, email 
address, password, declaration that all information provided is correct (cf. ‘Ru-
les’) –, and be ready to engage fully on Betri Reykjavík. 
Although according to the rules, real names must be provided, it appears like-
ly that some users have used pseudonyms, such as when usernames seem to be 
adapted from film stars or comic characters. It is, however, difficult to ascertain 
if user names are a person’s real name or a pseudonym, as real names typically 
conform with the Icelandic naming system (first name plus patro- or matronym). 
Unlike in Friesland, there is no comparison of users’ identities with registered 
citizens. In any case, given the smallness and close-knitted nature of Reykjavík 
society, most users seem to have registered under their real names to communicate 
openly with their peers, who they are relatively likely to have met in face-to-face 
situations. 
14 Screenshot taken on 3 May 2018 at https://betrireykjavik.is/group/47.
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At the beginning of May 2019, more than 245 ideas from Betri Reykjavík 
had been classified as officially successful and implemented, for example like the 
extension of several playgrounds and adding more fruit and vegetables to school 
meals. Around 470 ideas were in progress at the time of writing, while roughly 
200 ideas had officially failed for a variety of reasons. More than 14,000 users 
were registered with Betri Reykjavík at the time it was still possible to check on 
this number (2013); a feature that since has been disabled. In any case, the figure 
had limited meaningfulness, since it includes profiles of people who registered 
but were inactive or had never been active. It also reveals nothing about “lurkers” 
– users who follow discussions but do not register, as full access to the website is 
possible without registration. 
Due to the free, full access, I obviously started my research as a lurker within 
Betri Reykjavík (see chapter 6.1 Participant Observation). I first became interested 
in the subject of digital democracy and the political culture of the digital in Iceland 
during research for my MA thesis in 2011, which I completed at the end of 2012. 
At the beginning of 2013, I decided to continue research in these areas, making it 
my PhD project. My general interest in Iceland however dates back to 2009, when 
I was enrolled as an ERASMUS-exchange student at the University of Iceland in 
Reykjavík. My fieldwork also included trips to Iceland in 2012 and 2014, and my 
data therefore includes experiences, observations, and data collection. Moreover, 
memories from 2009 make a somewhat historic comparison from 2009 to 2012 to 
2014 possible; enabling me to perceive general changes over time in the cultural, 
political, and economic conditions of Reykjavík and Iceland.
After lurking on Betri Reykjavík for several days in 2011, I emailed program-
mers Gunnar Grímsson and Róbert Bjarnason to ask for a face-to-face interview. 
Second, in June 2012, I contacted 19 registered users of Betri Reykjavík through 
the tools’ then personal message-feature (it was later removed). As establishing a 
sample of relatively active and engaged users seemed most promising for fruitful 
results, I contacted users ranked amongst the top-fifteen within the then three ex-
isting user rankings.15 Most of the contacted persons replied within a few days, and 
in the end, I met nine of them for face-to-face-interviews in Reykjavík in July and 
15 In the early days of Betri Reykjavík, users were ranked into three categories: most in-
fluential, most talkative, and ambassadors. In the most-influential ranking, those users 
with the comments marked helpful by other users ranked highest. In the most-talkative 
ranking, users were ranked according the quantitative numbers of comments they had 
authored. Ambassadors were those users who were most successful in convincing 
other people to join Betri Reykjavík through the use of personalised links on social 
media, especially facebook or Twitter. 
4 Research Fields | 63
August that year. For my PhD research, I contacted these nine interviewees again, 
and was able to arrange meetings with six of them in 2014. 
Aside from talking to users of Betri Reykjavík,16 I also met with software pro-
grammers Grímsson and Bjarnason on a relatively regular basis. In 2012, I inter-
viewed them twice. Two years later, I met them four times during the five-week 
period that I stayed in Iceland. In addition to two interviews, I was allowed to car-
ry out participant observation at two meetings with their co-workers from France, 
the Netherlands, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
I also spoke to several political representatives in Iceland. In 2012, this was 
most notably the then mayor Jón Gnarr (Best Party), as well as Gísli Marteinn 
Baldursson, then city councillor for the Independence Party, and Jón Þór Ólafsson, 
founding member of the then newly established Icelandic Pirate Party. My 2014 
research stay was planned to coincide with the municipal elections. That way, 
I could witness the atmosphere during election day, and experience the media 
coverage on-site first hand, and during the weeks of coalition consolidation and 
formation. Moreover, it was highly interesting to follow the first steps of the new 
municipality, such as which plans they had in mind for Betri Reykjavík. 
Since it interested me to hear the opinions of all parties regarding Betri Rey-
kjavík and their approach to electronic/digital democracy in general, and not 
only the voices of those who saw to its official incorporation into municipal de-
cision-making processes back in 2011, I contacted all list leaders of the parties 
running for election in the municipal elections in the City of Reykjavík. Of course, 
this was an ambitious goal right from the beginning, since for the mayoral candi-
dates, the days and weeks before and after the elections are probably the busiest 
in the legislative period. However, I did manage to arrange three meetings: with 
Halldór Auðar Svansson (Pirate Party), Halldór Halldórsson (Independence Par-
ty), and Dagur B. Eggertsson (Social Democratic Alliance), who at the time of 
the interview had already been the new mayor of Reykjavík for about two weeks. 
Halldór Auðar Svansson and Halldór Halldórsson both became councillors on the 
new city council, with the former also becoming director of the newly established 
governance and democracy council (Stjórnkerfis- og Lýðræðisráð). I also spoke to 
Birgitta Jónsdóttir, a member of Icelandic parliament Alþingi for the Pirate Party. 
One of the users interviewed in 2012 and again in 2014 had, in the meantime, be-
come a politician: Þórgnýr Thoroddsen had joined the Pirate Party and in course 
of the 2014 election, became head of the sports and leisure council (Íþrótta- og 
tómstundaráð). 
16 Most names of individual users of Betri Reykjavík have been pseudonymised. Real 
names were used when either the participant explicitly wished so or if they were public 
figures and also speaking in their role as such, like politicians and programmers.
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The sample also included two civil servants, Guðjona Björk Sigurðardóttir and 
Jón Halldór Jónasson, who, amongst other things, dealt with citizens requests on 
the online complaint-management tool Borgarlandið. I had never come across this 
tool, nor had Gunnar and Róbert heard about it, but Guðrún Sigurðardóttir, a user 
of Betri Reykjavík that I interviewed both in 2012 and 2014 told me that instead 
of using Betri Reykjavík, she had found herself frequently gravitating towards 
Borgarlandið. Consequently, I looked at the website and met up with the admin-
istrative staff managing the tool. 
In the attempt to contextualize both my thoughts and my findings, I spoke 
to three Icelandic political scientists, Jón Ólafsson, Viktor Orri Valgarðsson, and 
Krístinn Már Ársælsson. The latter is also founder of the Association for Sustain-
ability and Democracy (ALDA). I spoke to Hörður Torfason, who has become 
well-known as one of the first Icelandic LGBT activists and as the driving force 
behind the Pots-and-Pans Revolution, the protests in the wake of the financial cri-
sis 2008–09 (see chapter 8 Results and Discussion, 8.4.3.1 Political Participation 
in Times of Crisis). 
5  Doing Ethnography II:  
Methods and Translating Them into Practice
It’s late on the evening of Tuesday 8 October, 2013, and I’m sitting next to 
Susanne Engstler at her desk in her home. Together, we are staring at her com-
puter screen. “Or rather like this?”, she asks and looks at me. I don’t know 
how to answer. In fact, I’m completely stunned. This evening, events come 
thick and fast. Only a moment ago, we were comfortably sitting on the couches 
in her living room, talking about LiquidFriesland and how she used it. And 
now she is asking me for suggestions on how to word the initiative she wants 
to start on LiquidFriesland. In the initiative, she demands “complete access 
for scientists”, or rather, complete access for me. Having herself completed 
a PhD, Engstler was furious upon hearing that I had to make do with guest 
access to the platform. Immediately, she got up and had us go upstairs to craft 
an initiative demanding full access to LiquidFriesland for scientists. So much 
for preferably having no influence on the field you’re studying!
How could I have guessed that a focused interview with a user of LiquidFriesland 
could end this way? Only an hour later, there was already a counter-initiative 
started by another user of the platform, arguing against Engstler’s initiative. In the 
end, the idea did not reach the necessary quorum to qualify for discussion by the 
city council. Even if it had, the power to decide over access policies lies with the 
programmers of LiquidFriesland, and the city council could have done nothing 
to change it. Still, this incident perfectly illustrates the manifold layers of social 
situations ethnographic researchers are confronted with. 
This vignette also illustrates how the researcher can, intentionally or not, in-
fluence her research. Since “(e)thnography is a lived craft rather than a protocol 
which can be separated from the particular study or the person carrying it out” 
(Hine, Ethnography 13), the usage of methods like elaborating research theses, 
constituting research fields, and collecting and analysing data is highly dependent 
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on the person of the researcher and is heavily shaped by her world views and 
attitudes, diverse social criteria (cf. Hauser-Schäublin 55), and “the conceptual, 
professional, financial and relational opportunities and resources accessible to the 
researcher” (Amit 6). 
According to Tom Boellstorff et al., it is only natural that “all science con-
tains strong elements of subjectivity in the sense that science results from the 
work of subjects, that is, scientists. Subjectivity is an inescapable condition of 
science” (41). Boellstorff et al. further stress that “no pure realm of objectivity ex-
ists in which the interests, biases, predilections, concerns, attitudes, dispositions, 
conceits, judgments, axioms, and presuppositions of investigators are absent and 
without impact”, neither in qualitative nor in quantitative studies (41).1 Subjec-
tivity is not perceived as contradictory to the practice of science, rather, it is the 
meaningful implementation of cultural anthropology in practice, as Massmünster 
points out (cf. 536).
My own research is influenced by the fact that I did not get to know Iceland as 
a research field, but as a place of residence, as I had moved there in 2009 to study 
at the University of Iceland. I arrived little more than a year after Iceland had been 
first shaken by the effects of what was to become a severe financial crisis. After 
returning to Germany, I followed events in Iceland through media coverage and 
personal contacts. My way of addressing the field and engaging within it is thus 
inseparable from the experiences and knowledge that I gained about it long before 
I started doing the research.
Digital Ethnography?
Readers may wonder that the methodology-chapter of an ethnography that is in-
vestigating two online participation platforms is lacking distinct segments on the 
methods of so-called virtual or digital ethnography. Since the alleged dichotomy 
1 Consequently, thinking of quantitative research as objective is also a chimera in my 
opinion. A survey questionnaire is as influenced by the social and cultural background 
of the researcher creating it as an interview guideline, as is every piece of material and 
every finding interpreted from the survey. The homogeneity of the findings of quanti-
tative research as opposed to the common heterogeneity of the findings of qualitative 
research is predominantly due to the limited and the predetermined answer options 
within a survey. However, this homogeneity is a simplistic fallacy since interviewees 
are not given the possibility to differentiate their statements as part of their complex 
everyday lives. The apparent objectivity of quantitative research and indeed all re-
search for that matter, including natural-scientific research, has long been questioned, 
cf. Karin Knorr-Cetina, Epistemic culture: how the sciences make knowledge (cf. 
241ff.), Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (cf. 1ff.).
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of “real world vs. virtual world”, of “offline practices vs. online practices” contin-
ues to lose relevance in people’s everyday life, it also does so in its investigation. 
Ultimately, the same set of methods are employed in all ethnographic research, re-
gardless of whether it is conducted in predominantly physical or in predominantly 
virtual research situations.
I am not in any way suggesting that guides and textbooks concerning the 
methodology of virtual ethnography have not been useful. On the contrary, I 
have heavily relied on them, and very much appreciate the work of authors like 
Christine Hine, Gabriella Coleman, Gertraud Koch, Robert Kozinets, alongside 
countless others, and what they have done for the establishment of research in 
virtually mediated fields. However, I do think they are mistaken in establishing a 
completely new methodology of virtual ethnography, and thus failing to identify 
the key-methods they describe for what they have been all along, the cornerstones 
of ethnography. The authors mentioned above have indeed begun to see that them-
selves, as some of their more recent publications show (Hine, Ethnography for the 
Internet; Kozinets, Netnography Redefined).2 Similarly, Nancy Baym warns us 
not to rashly “take the stance that, since the Internet is new, old theory and meth-
ods […] have nothing to offer in its exploration” (‘Qualitative Internet Research’ 
180), when in fact “old theory and methods” are all we need to be equal to the 
exploration of our multi-faceted research fields today.
2 Even the titles of these works hint at this increasing consciousness. Hine stood back 
from her Virtual Ethnography (2000) and turned towards an Ethnography for the In-




Having clarified key terms and assumptions in the methodology of this project in 
Doing Ethnography II, I will now briefly outline the different methods employed 
during my research process, such as participant observation, interviews, and focus 
groups. As I have argued, it does not make sense to have one set of methods to 
explore the so-called “offline” lives of people, and a completely different set of 
methods to investigate the so-called “online” lives of people, since people “live 
everything at once”(Miller 28).
The term ethnography has come to describe various disciplinary purposes: that 
of knowledge production, that of genre and way of expression, and that of theo-
ry-generator (cf. Knecht, ‘Nach Writing Culture’; cf. Knecht, ‘ethnographische 
Praxis’; cf. Boellstorff et al. 15). Today, the discipline’s core aim is to gain an emic 
understanding of contemporary everyday concepts of practices, discourse, knowl-
edge, and assemblage (cf. Knecht, ‘ethnographische Praxis’ 5). This is mostly 
achieved through multi-perspective, multi-methodological access based on ac-
tive and observing participation in the everyday lives of research subjects (cf. 
Schmidt-Lauber, ‘Feldforschung’ 219). In the course of the discipline’s history, 
the conditions, practices, and conventions of ethnography have changed substan-
tially (cf. Knecht, ‘ethnographische Praxis’ 3).
6.1 Participant Observation
Participant observation is typically identified as the key method of ethnographic 
fieldwork, and is commonly defined as “a total immersion in search of a holistic 
understanding” (Howell 16), meaning the direct participation and engagement 
of the researcher in everyday life within a specific research field and an empa-
thetic and comprehending understanding combined with analytical distance (cf. 
Schmidt-Lauber, ‘Feldforschung’ 220). Schmidt-Lauber herself points out that 
because of the inherent ambivalence between closeness and distance in partici-
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pant observation, it is a fundamentally contradictory approach and behaviour. On 
the one hand, the ethnographer focusing on closeness would sooner or later “go 
native” and herself become part of her research field (cf. Schmidt-Lauber, ‘Feld-
forschung’ 231); while on the other hand, somebody stressing distance would pre-
sumably never notice or witness crucial details (cf. Hauser-Schäublin 42).
In my opinion, this view is too binary and neglects the manifold nuances that 
are so characteristic of ethnographic fieldwork. There appears to be “no other form 
of scholarly enquiry in which relationships of intimacy and familiarity between 
researcher and subject are envisioned as a fundamental medium of investigation 
rather than as an extraneous by-product or even an impediment”(Amit 2). Or as 
Tim Ingold argues, 
there is really no contradiction between participation and observation; indeed, you sim-
ply cannot have one without the other. The great mistake is to confuse observation with 
objectification. To observe is not, in itself, to objectify. It is to notice what people are 
saying and doing, to watch and listen, and to respond in your own practice. That is to 
say, observation is a way of participating attentively, and it is for this reason a way of 
learning. (23)
I agree with Ingold, and see non-participant observation, which has become a re-
cent trend (cf. Lamnek), as something of an oxymoron. Whether in face-to-face 
research situations or in online research situations, one cannot observe without 
participating. It could be argued that a structurally different “non-participant ob-
servation” – that is, lurking – is possible in online settings. However, on closer 
inspection, even lurking essentially becomes participant observation. Many early 
works on virtual ethnography (cf. Kozinets, Netnography; cf. Wellman and Hay-
thornthwaite) depict lurking as a convenient method for the ethnographer to gain an 
overview of her prospective research field without visibly effecting it. Heike Móni-
ka Greschke notes that “[w]ithout ever leaving her desk, she [the researcher] must 
only start her web browser, and then she is suddenly off exploring strange worlds 
‘out there.’ Numerous public discussion forums, e-mailing lists, personal homepag-
es, weblogs, MUDs, chats, etc. open up views of the beautiful new world of cyber-
space” (40). Already, one becomes aware that turning on the computer, opening the 
Internet browser, typing an URL into the bar, logging in and then strolling through 
forums, agendas and discussions is not, in any case, non-participant behaviour. 
Moreover, lurking could only ever be regarded as the starting point for an 
ethnographic analysis: its boundaries of interaction and for communication are 
too restrictive, and the data the researcher could extract from such research too 
limited. Greschke argues that 
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If one adopts lurking as a research practice, one should be aware that one takes only one 
possible position within a complex system of communications. Ethnographers who only 
adopt the role of the lurker may easily get access and a great deal of – even ‘naturally 
occurring’ – data (Silverman, 2007) at a low cost. What they see and what they are able to 
understand, however, remain as limited as nineteenth-century armchair ethnography. (43) 
Further, in its etymological sense, lurking does not appear a fitting term for a re-
search method. The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary describes the verb “to 
lurk” first and foremost as “to wait somewhere secretly, especially because you are 
going to do something bad or illegal” (sec.1). Although another definition of the 
verb, “to read a discussion in a chat room, etc. on the Internet, without taking part 
in it yourself“ has been added (sec.3), the term essentially never lost its dubious 
connotation. As such, even seasoned scholars of the field had to acknowledge the 
term’s limited suitability in describing a research method (cf. Hine, Ethnography 
for the Internet 57). 
6.2 Interviews
Hammersley and Atkinson argue that “[i]nterviews in ethnographic research range 
from spontaneous informal conversations in the course of other activities to for-
mally arranged meetings in bounded settings out of earshot of other people” (108). 
This open definition of interviews is likely not one that everybody would agree 
on. Nevertheless, I refer to it here as it does foster the understanding that “[w]
hatever their form, interviews must be viewed as social events in which the in-
terviewer […] is a participant observer” (120; my highlights). In a practical and 
refreshing manner, Hammersley and Atkinson counter the chimera of individually 
and separately applicable methods often depicted in methodological textbooks. In 
doing so, they refute the idea that the researcher can simply apply one method in 
one situation and another in another situation, and that those methods would not 
overlap or inform each other in any way. 
To my mind, a cultural anthropologist who can conduct an interview without 
being a participant observer seriously lacks a unique and fundamental quality of 
our disciplinary community, “the anthropologist’s antennas” (Howell 17). Invited 
into a research participant’s home for an interview, it is the cultural anthropolo-
gist’s work to notice his taste in interior design, food and drink preferences, fam-
ily structures, or communication patterns with other members of the household. 
Meeting up in a public café for an interview, the cultural anthropologist cannot 
help but notice the smell and sounds of coffee brewing, the cacophony it contrib-
utes to, combined with background music and the sound of other guests chatting, 
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the threadbare quality of the armchairs, the blackboard menu hanging behind the 
counter. Sitting opposite an interview partner for a prolonged amount of time, the 
cultural anthropologist surely notes his physical appearance, his way of speak-
ing – is he slightly nervous or is he confident –, the condition of his clothing, the 
way he uses his body when he talks. The point I want to illustrate here is that the 
situational and flexible combination of different methods is a natural, if not con-
stitutive characteristic and strength of being an cultural anthropologist. For me, 
like Howell, this methodological flexibility and open involvedness is at the core 
of “ethnographic fieldwork undertaken as an integral part of my anthropological 
identity – as the continually expanding source of my knowledge about human 
sociality and about human potentials: their dreams, longings, and practices” (19). 
Similarly, Hammersley and Atkinson stress that “ethnography is not just a set of 
methods but rather a particular mode of looking, listening, and thinking about 
social phenomena” (230).
Interviewing Techniques
Most of the interviews that I conducted for this study were focused interviews, 
and were influenced by Schmidt-Lauber’s conception of qualitative guided in-
terviews (cf. Interview) and Judith Schlehe’s notions of thematic interviews. Al-
though I brought a guideline with me to every interview, I rarely looked down at 
it. Schmidt-Lauber points out that
(i)n contrast to the rapid question-answer cycle of (mostly quantitative) social science 
survey techniques, […] ethnographic interviews should encourage the interviewees to 
tell stories and leave much room for them to develop the situation and the course of the 
conversation while the interviewers should show as much restraint as possible, adjust-
ing their comments to the course of the narrative and to the person of the interviewee. 
(‘Ethnological Analysis’ 569)
I also conducted some so-called expert interviews.1 Like Warneken and Wittel, I 
am critical of the prevalent definition of expert interviews as primarily providing 
material that is not to be analysed hermeneutically, but rather as a source of in-
1 Naturally the question arises as to how the term “expert” is defined here, and which 
participants I understand as experts in their fields. Bogner et al. make clear that the 
image of the expert is both constructed by the researcher and society, dependent on the 
specific research questions as well as the social representativeness of the so-called ex-
pert (cf. 11). First, I categorised as experts those people who are professionally invol-
ved with the designing and programming of the participation platforms, predominantly 
IT experts and software programmers. Second, I categorised as experts those people 
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formation to take at face-value (cf. 11). Agreeing with Dominic Boyer’s line of 
reasoning, I treated “experts not solely as rational(ist) creatures of expertise but 
rather as desiring, relating, doubting, anxious, contentious, affective – in other 
words as human subjects” (38). For me then, interviews with experts were not 
simply sources of information, but were rather subject to the same processes of 
analysis as the other interviews.
These “expert interviews” were often marked by a palpable imbalance in con-
versation. Indeed, they resembled audiences granted to me, the researcher, rather 
than a conversation or exchange between equals. Warneken and Wittel cite Bert-
hold Vogel, who described the mechanics at work in such situations as effects of 
paternalism (cf. 7). The effects of paternalism were characterized in my interviews 
by a demonstrative good naturedness on part of the male interlocutor toward my 
research and I, combined with permanent attempts to take over moderation from 
me, the female researcher, and the imposition of conversation content. Initially, 
these experiences were irritating and frustrating, but in the end I came to see them 
as “data in and of itself” (Schmidt-Lauber, ‘Ethnological Analysis’ 563; cf. Koch, 
Technikgenese).
The telephone interview is a format situated on the periphery of the ethno-
graphic methodological canon. As mediated communication reduced to pure 
voice, it does not seem to fit the discipline’s methodological demands to immerse 
oneself within the research field and with all senses for a prolonged period of 
time.2 Although my initial research design did not foresee me conducting phone 
interviews, due to heavy time-constraints on their behalf, it proved to be the only 
way to speak to two informants during the research process. As the US-American 
communication scholars Kerk F. Kee and Larry D. Browning stress, phone inter-
views are first and foremost a ‘practical’, as well as ‘time and cost-effective’ mode 
for data collection.3
that are professionally involved with local administration and municipal politics, such 
as politicians and administration employees.
2 It was little surprising that searching for literature on “telephone interview” (Telefon-
interview) in both English and German in the Virtual Library of Social and Cultural 
Anthropology (EVIFA), a mere 26 hits showed up. All but one publication was more 
than ten years old, and most were much older. Moreover, most centred on surveys 
conducted by phone, not qualitative interviews by phone. A Google Scholar search for 
“phone interview anthropology” in both English and German delivered no interesting 
results whatsoever.
3 Whether one has teaching and administrative responsibilities at university, one’s per-
sonal/family situation does not allow any absence, or one lacks sufficient funds for tra-
vel expenses – the telephone interview, like the email interview, allows the researcher 
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6.3 Focus Groups
Focus groups have been used within a wide range of academic disciplines. The 
method’s historic roots lie in Anglo-Saxon market and advertising research from 
the 1940s, where test persons were presented with stimuli in the form of product 
packaging or advertising films and their reactions to it were recorded. The tempo-
ral point of view was the focus of researchers’ attention, as the reaction of multiple 
test persons could be recorded simultaneously (cf. Loos and Schäffer 15). In the 
mid-1950s, the German Frankfurter Institut für Sozialforschung and other schools 
pushed for a new orientation toward group dynamics in focus group research. 
This new focus on group dynamics stressed the fact that individuals’ opinions 
often only become apparent in discourse with others (cf. Loos and Schäffer 20). 
Since the early 2000s, focus groups have become increasingly popular in socio- 
and educational-scientific research, whereas they remain rare within cultural an-
thropologists’ methodological repertoires (cf. Hammersley and Atkinson 112; cf. 
Boellstorff et al. 105).4 This may have something to do with the fact that “focus 
groups are artificially set up situations” (Kitzinger as cited in Jowett and O’Toole 
458); although they may resemble participant observation when the conversation 
is flowing, they are not “natural” situations, but social situations created by the 
researcher, but then one-on-one interviews are so, too. Unlike focused one-to-
one interviews, where the interviewee is encouraged to speak about all possible 
aspects, arguments and value judgments connected to a specific topic through a 
more or less elaborated and fixed set of questions, the discussion between par-
ticipants within focus groups is guided by a few stimuli given by the moderator 
(cf. Zwick and Schröter 27). Here, stimuli are not restricted to questions, but also 
include the distribution of short articles to read and discuss, or the presentation of 
pictures or short video clips meant to stimulate exchange between the discussants. 
The main idea behind this method is to facilitate the effects of group dynamics, 
which are believed to have a positive influence on the participants’ engagement 
and willingness to provide information (cf. Schulz 13). For example, new ideas 
and points of view may be stimulated by spontaneous comments within the group 
that would otherwise remain hidden or unrecognised in one-to-one interviews (cf. 
Schulz 12). While one-to-one interviews typically lead to deeper insights into 
to expand her (geographical reach) in data collection beyond what would otherwise 
be possible (cf. Kee and Browning 4). Telephone interviews also appear to me to be a 
chance for scholars with physical disabilities broaden the reach of their research.
4 Dissertations like that by Sabine Wöhlke are a rare exception. In Geschenkte Organe?, 
the German cultural anthropologist discusses ethical and cultural challenges in familial 
live kidney donations (cf. 67ff.).
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the individual attitudes and experiences of interviewees (cf. Schulz 13), it is im-
possible to harvest as wide a range of opinions as in focus groups. In times in 
which opinions and attitudes are regarded as socially constructed, fragmented, and 
ephemeral, the method of the focus group does justice to this fact by paying close 
attention to the interaction process, deliberation, and the formation of opinion 
through mutual communication (cf. Littig and Wallace 10).
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, participant observation, interviews, and focus groups were iden-
tified as the methodological cornerstones of the investigation. Most importantly, 
the suitability of established methods of ethnography, regardless of whether one 
researches predominantly online or offline situations, was stressed. Alongside her 
participants, the researcher “lives everything at once” (Miller 28) during periods 
of participant observation. This is also true for interviews, which “must be viewed 
as social events in which the interviewer […] is a participant observer” (Hammer-
sley and Atkinson 120). Once again, the chapter illustrates that “(e)thnography is a 
lived craft rather than a protocol which can be separated from the particular study 
or the person carrying it out” (Hine, Ethnography 13).

7  Doing Ethnography III:  
Making Sense of the Data
Concerning data analysis, I agree with Hammersley and Atkinson who point out 
“that there is no formula or recipe for the analysis of ethnographic data” (158). 
They warn against the impression created in some literature that there is such 
thing as “a standard set of steps” the ethnographer should follow to make sense of 
their data. Rather, data analysis is a highly emergent, contextual, and immanently 
personal process (cf. Boellstorff et al. 159). 
The realisation that data analysis is an emergent, contextual and personal pro-
cess is one of the main conclusions of the critically-reflexive Writing Culture de-
bate of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Also known as the Crisis of Representation, 
the Writing Culture debate brought to the fore how all science is a contextual and 
social practice of knowledge production – or rather, of knowledge construction 
(cf. Hess and Schwertl 2). For the discipline of ethnography, the US-American 
historian James Clifford in particular illustrated how the practice of representation 
and the concrete processes of ethnographic writing are processes of construction, 
are partial truths or true fiction (cf. 22). 
Ethnographic data analysis is not a distinct stage in the research process. Rath-
er, the process is circular and iterative, and begins as early as “the pre-fieldwork 
phase, in the formulation and clarification of research problems, and continues 
through to the process of writing reports, articles, and books” (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 158). This circular and iterative process of data analysis appears central 
to US-American sociologists Barney Glaser’s and Anselm Strauss’ approach of 
Grounded Theorizing.1 In this approach to data analysis “[t]heory evolves during 
actual research, and it does this through continuous interplay between analysis and 
1 Here, I take up Hammersley and Atkinson’s suggestion to speak of “grounded theo-
rizing” as an activity, thereby distinguishing it from the outcome of this activity, that 
is, “grounded theory” (cf. 158).
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data collection” (Strauss and Corbin 273).2 Thus, Grounded Theory is a general 
method of on-going comparative analysis. Unlike the common sequential pro-
cedure in testing theories or hypotheses (operationalization, data gathering, data 
preparation, evaluation), generating theory from empirical evidence requires re-
curring cycles in which fieldwork, analysis, and interpretation are tightly knit (cf. 
Mey and Mruck 15).
This circular approach to on-going comparative analysis is the main point I took 
away from grounded theorizing for my research. As one can see from Figure 3, periods 
of data collection, especially in the physical fields, alternated throughout with pro-
longed periods of transcription and preliminary analysis.3 The easy accessibility of 
the websites allowed for prolonged on and off engagement with the research fields. 
I mainly analysed my data using the computer programme MaxQDA (VERBI 
Software), which made it easier to gather, organise, and analyse the data, which 
ranged from interview transcripts to screenshots, to images or power point pres-
entations. While there is certainly the potential to lose oneself in “playing around” 
with the myriad detailed functions the software offers, it does greatly assist the 
researcher in the exploration, interpretation, categorisation, classification, and 
2 Since their original publication in 1967, Glaser and Strauss have developed differing 
views on how to apply the Grounded Theory method, resulting in a split between their 
paradigms. However, for this study it suffices to refer to the overall concept. For an in-
depth examination of the different nuances of Grounded Theory, see Mey and Mruck.
3 The bars indicate in which half of the respective year that fieldwork was undertaken. 
Notably the bars regarding fieldwork, especially in the physical fields of Friesland and 
Reykjavík, do not indicate the lengths of the stays. The hatching on the websites’ bars 
signifies the prolonged, but on and off character of fieldwork.
Fig. 3: Phases of Fieldwork in the Research Fields
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construction of theory from data (cf. Hilpert et al. 176).4 Many qualitative data 
analysis software programmers rely on grounded theorizing as the basic principle 
of data analysis (cf. Kuckartz 82).
4 Boellstorff et al. stress the problematic nature of using qualitative data analysis program-
mes in ethnography. These include “a tendency to believe that qualitative analysis software 
is somehow more ‘objective’ than hand coding and analysis”, as well as the fact that “the 
situated and contextual nature of ethnographic research and analysis defies standardization 
and mechanization. It is erroneous to assume that a piece of technology (which, incidental-
ly, is made by people) can do the interpretative work of a thoughtful human mind” (165f.).

8 Results and Discussion
Simply looking at individuals acts of political participation, such as marching in a 
demonstration or signing an e-petition, is not enough to understand how people’s 
participation repertoires are influenced by ICT. Indeed, as information, communi-
cation and participation are all mutually dependent and interactive, one also has to 
research people’s information and communication practices. 
Consequently, one focus of my research is on participants’ information 
practices, and their practice in terms of navigation and sense-making where a 
seemingly infinite amount of data is available and accessible online, and in which 
agency in producing information has shifted dramatically. Thus I attempt to 
simultaneously look at participants’ use of traditional offline, online, and social 
media – something which has rarely been done before (cf. Strömbäck et al. 2).
After outlining the most common modes of political participation, I also look 
at (online) political participation from three different perspectives: the continuum 
of online participation (between empowerment of the citizens and the simulation 
of participation), differentiating between participation in times of crisis and in 
times of affluence, and participants’ preference for participation at the local rather 
than national or international level.
8.1 Political Participation – A Definition?
Interviewer: When did you start to be interested in politics?
Guðrún:  I’m not interested in politics.
Interviewer: What are you interested in then? 
Guðrún:   Surroundings, solutions – things that have always been done THAT 
way, but is it possible to do it THIS way? Like that. Politics are way 
down at the bottom.1
1 Guðrún Sigurðardóttir, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 9 July 2012.
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In only my second interview in 2012, Guðrún’s statement that she was not interested 
in politics put me off my stride for a moment. What I had imagined to be a clever 
opening question that would surely initiate a lengthy narration about her political 
activity resulted in a declamatory one-liner. Despite being one of the most active 
users of Betri Reykjavík – with many initiatives and comments on diverse topics put 
into the system –, Guðrún was apparently “not interested in politics”.
For many years now, Guðrún’s statement has had me thinking about how the 
(scientific) vocabulary of scholars does not necessarily conform with or to partici-
pants own interpretations. The academic sets out to investigate a theoretical set of 
practices or a theoretical concept within a field, and yet has only a sketchy under-
standing of how actors in the field itself understand the topic. As is clear from the 
example above, my understanding as the researcher, and Guðrún’s understanding 
as the researched about her practices, did not exactly coincide.
As Miller et al. illustrate through the term “Social Media”, researchers may 
decide to accept the “vagaries of public semantics” in defining one’s research topic, 
pointing out that this “definition is not absolute, nor does it contain firm boundaries; 
rather it is a heuristic device which helps to clarify the parameters of our study” (9). 
Keeping this in mind, I took pains to avoid constructing the research objective at 
my writing desk. As such, in the course of fieldwork, the research objective polit-
ical participation was transformed into numerous phrases that came from partici-
pants themselves, such as taking part in politics and society, engaging politically, 
engaging civically, being interested in what is happening in the municipality, being 
an activist, and being a politician. Indeed, all those attributions and activities, apart 
from being a professional politician, fit well into van Deth’s map of political partic-
ipation modes (see chapter 2.1.2 New Modes – New Definition?), thereby assuring 
me that my research was still firmly grounded within research areas and fields.
In other words, “political participation” appeared to be an abstract term which 
participants seldom identified with – even though they talked extensively about 
their activities, activities that I would have immediately categorized as modes of 
political participation. This becomes especially visible in Þórgnýr’s case. In 2014, 
I asked him about his new positions as a deputy city councillor, chair of the sports 
and leisure council, and vice chair of the culture and travel council in Reykjavík:
This is what happens when you start poking your nose at things you shouldn’t be poking 
your nose at […]. I suppose it takes me being opinionated, but self-diagnosed apolitical. 
So Betri Reykjavík was a fine venue for me to actually take part in discussion I was in-
terested in. But it turns out, that I was involved in some activism with some friends and I 
didn’t really connect it to politics at the time. It is kind of a naive, very tight perspective 
I had on things […] and before I knew it, I was running for parliament last year. And I 
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was just filling in on the list, to be honest. […] And done, here I am. That’s a little bit of 
a change and I was a LITTLE BIT surprised about that.2
As a result of these insights, I was able to create a multi-faceted work on how 
people are taking part in shaping the conditions of their, as well as their families’ 
and friends’, day-to-day world. Van Deth notes more than 70 modes of political 
participation, including such diverse activities as voting in elections, buy-cotts, 
and guerrilla gardening (cf. ‘Partizipationsforschung’ 11). As such, I see no sense 
in drawing strict arbitrary lines between what “political participation” is or is not. 
Indeed, I would always argue for a more inclusive measurement system. For me, 
the key factors in defining “political participation” are interest, engagement and 
commitment to the democratic community and to society, in whichever modes 
that they may appear – rather than a restrictive, scholarly label.
8.2 Information Practices through the Ages
With the spread of the Internet, the sheer mass of information available has grown 
exponentially. Not only has the technological capacity to store seemingly infinite 
amounts of data been created (cf. Reichert), but agency in producing information 
has also shifted immensely, with vocational journalists losing their interpretation-
al sovereignty and countless semi-private bloggers (cf. Al-Ani) and citizen-jour-
nalists (cf. Meikle) entering the stage. This development has been widely featured 
both in academic and societal discourses. Often neglected in these discourses is, 
however, the changing role and position of the reader/user. Consequently, this 
chapter investigates the information practices of readers/users and their naviga-
tional and sense-making practices while simultaneously using traditional offline, 
online, as well as social media. Ultimately, thinking about information practices is 
important for the overall investigation of political participation in the digital age to 
“examine how people combine the use of offline and online media and how their 
“political information repertoires” or “news diets” influence political participation 
(cf. Strömbäck et al. 2). 
8.2.1 Defining Information Practices
The term “information practices” first came to me during analysis as a working 
title to group the various practices of participants revolving around information. It 
was only later that I found out that there was indeed a whole theoretical complex 
2 Þórgnýr Thoroddsen, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 19 June 2014.
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connected to investigating the “practices of information seeking, retrieval, filter-
ing, and synthesis” (Talja and Hansen as cited in French and Williamson 738). Al-
though information practice research most often focuses on information or library 
sciences, its findings have been invaluable for my work too. 
There are basically two theoretical strands in information practice research: 
information behaviour, and information practice. In my research, I draw 
particularly on information practice, as it
‘assumes that the processes of information seeking and use are constituted socially and 
dialogically rather than based on the ideas and motives of individual actors. All human 
practices are social, and they originate from interactions between the members of com-
munity.’ In this way, the concept of practice shifts the focus away from the behavior, 
action, motives, and skills of monological individuals. Instead, the main attention is 
directed to them as members of various groups and communities that constitute the 
context of their mundane activities. (Tuominen et al. as cited in Savolainen 120)
This definition puts information practice in line with social constructivist thought, 
stressing with Anthony Giddens “the dialectic between structure and action by 
emphasizing the role of actors as knowledgeable individuals routinely and re-
flexively monitoring the ongoing flow of everyday action in social contexts” (as 
cited in Savolainen 120). French and Williamson furthermore point out that “[p]
eople often follow a messy and iterative path when engaging with information and 
knowledge, what Pescosolido et al. (1998) called ‘muddling through’” (739), and 
what I refer to here as a mix-and-match mentality.
8.2.2 Information Practices Today: A Mix-and-Match Mentality
The information practices of many people today are no longer limited to reading 
the only local daily newspaper in the morning. It has been replaced by a mul-
ti-method approach combining different media formats and media outlets for each 
of the formats into “personal news repertoires” (Strömbäck et al. 1). Within these 
“personal news repertoires”, “the Internet is one among several media used by 
‘media omnivores’”, as Linaa Jensen remarks (1).
A selective mix-and-match mentality appeared to be a constituent element of 
interlocutors’ information practices in both of my fields. In Friesland for example, 
the young mother Anna Wagner-Becker subscribes to Süddeutsche Zeitung. Hav-
ing to weigh up costs, she and her family decided on the nationwide newspaper 
over a local one. As such, she reads the online version of the regional Nordwest 
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Zeitung to inform herself about local and regional issues on an almost daily basis.3 
Hans Meyer subscribes to Nordwest Zeitung in its paper format. Since retiring, 
Meyer ‘treats’ himself to two daily published nationwide papers, Die Frankfurt-
er Allgemeine Zeitung and Die Süddeutsche Zeitung. Rounding out his analogue 
information base, Meyer also ‘noses through’ through the free weekly newspaper 
Friesländer Bote.4 He does not read online news services. Each day, Heinz Schulz 
visits the websites of the daily Die Welt, as well as the weeklies Der Spiegel and 
Focus, since according to him, every newspaper reports on different topics from 
different angles.5 
In the Icelandic field, participants appear to mix-and-match from more diverse 
media formats. Fewer people depended on print newspapers, and most tended to 
compare and contrast several online news outlets and blogs. If participants did 
read a newspaper, it was most likely to be the daily Frettablaðið, which is free 
and distributed across many parts of Iceland six days a week.6 In fact, Iceland is 
“the country with the highest market share of free newspapers” (Bakker 6) and has 
only one subscription-based daily newspaper, Morgunblaðið (cf. 43). 
Guðmundur Kristjánsson exemplifies Icelandic information practices: “I almost 
never read a physical newspaper, but maybe the headlines, maybe on the first page 
[…]. It’s very hard to not get it through your door, so I pick it up and sometimes 
I read through it or just try to read some headlines.”7 Rather, Guðmundur follows 
some people on facebook to see what they are doing. And there are also groups on 
facebook that somebody would post in topics of interest or something like that, so I use 
that a lot. I’m not so much drawn to blogs, there are one or two I sometimes look up and 
also some post lists, so I get an email notification about things. And that is [it] – emails 
and facebook is probably most important.8 
3 Cf. Anna Wagner-Becker, focus group, Varel, 9 September 2014.
4 Cf. Hans Meyer, focus group, Varel, 9 September 2014.
5 Cf. Heinz Schulz, focus group, Varel, 9 September 2014.
6 Due to budget cuts in the wake of the crisis 2008–09, and because home delivery in a 
sparsely populated country like Iceland is often expensive, the paper has been offered 
with a distribution cost (€0.18 per copy in 2010) added for the more remote parts of 
the country since autumn 2009. Theoretically, retailers can choose between selling the 
paper or giving it to their customers, but in my experience, copies are handed out for 
free, as the availability of the paper also generates traffic, that is additional sales, to the 
stores (cf. Bakker 6).
7 Guðmundur Kristjánsson, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 22 June 2014.
8 Guðmundur Kristjánsson, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 9 July 2012.
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This quotation shows that in Iceland, facebook serves as “an active forum for 
debate among both citizens and public officials” (Freedom House, ‘Iceland Press 
2012’)9 and “[b]logs are a major source of news and information” (Freedom 
House, ‘Iceland Press 2016’). Guðrún Sigurðardóttir’s information practices are a 
case in point, as she receives “one newspaper. But I read or glance of three others. 
Blogs, here and there, one article here, one there. But there is no blog that I read 
every day or every other day, it’s just random”.10
This mix-and-match mentality fits with the notion of bricolage. Borrowed 
from the French ethnologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, bricolage describes “a mode 
of cultural assemblage at an opposite pole to engineering [italics in the original]. 
Where engineering requires pre-planning, submission to various laws of physics 
and the organisation of materials and resources prior to the act of assembly, 
bricolage refers to the creation of objects with materials in hand, re-using existing 
artefacts and incorporating bits and pieces” (Hartley 22f.). As an intellectual 
activity, bricolage has been interpreted as employing the knowledge that one 
already has, and to mixing-and-matching capacities and access ways, and to using 
that knowledge freely, so that new insights and/or horizons of meaning can be 
revealed (cf. Jonas and Jonas 239). Generally, bricolage may be comprised of 
practices such as “remixing, reconstructing, and reusing of separate artefacts, 
actions, ideas, signs, symbols, and styles in order to create new insights or 
meanings” (Deuze 70). 
Participants can thus be understood as bricoleurs, extracting and combining the 
information relevant to them from diverse media formats by multiple approaches, 
for example by mixing one or two local online sources with a national newspaper, 
different print newspapers (both daily and weekly) and newspaper websites, 
combining information from the online presences of nationwide newspapers with 
bits and pieces from personal blogs and their facebook walls. Indeed, the individual 
potential for the recombination of offline and online media as well as practices are 
seemingly endless, and result in highly individualised information practices and 
bodies of knowledge. According to Dutch media scholar Mark Deuze, digital culture 
in particular consists of the practices and beliefs of the bricoleur whose activities 
should not, however, be confused with boundless freedom and endless creativity: 
9 The important role that facebook plays in Icelanders lives is also confirmed by statis-
tics. In 2014, 84.3 percent of Internet users stated that they had used social networking 
sites like facebook or Twitter within the last three months (cf. Statistics Iceland, Online 
Communication).
10 Guðrún Sigurðardóttir, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 9 July 2012.
8 Results and Discussion | 87
The bricoleur’s strategies are constrained not only by pragmatic considerations such as 
suitability-to-purpose and readiness-to-hand but by the experience and competence of 
the individual in selecting and using ‘appropriate’ materials” (Chandler, 1998, online). 
Here we can also observe how bricolage simultaneously consists of repurposing and 
refashioning the old while using and making the new. (71)
That way, information practices seem to take place within a context of ‘tradition’ 
and ‘innovation’, of ‘old’ and ‘new’, of ‘persistence’ and ‘dissolution’, and by that 
can be identified as subjects to socio-cultural change. But German cultural anthro-
pologist Klaus Schönberger warns against interpreting this context of change as a 
dichotomy or a dialectical interplay (cf. 207). Rather, he argues for understanding 
socio-cultural change as a fundamentally open and combinatorial process. 
Schönberger further characterises this context of change with the conceptual 
pair persistence – recombination. In doing so, he points out that some practices 
do persist despite changing technological circumstances, effectively moving along 
or floating along (cf. 207). In the field of information practices, this means that 
although the Internet has become available to increasingly larger parts of the 
population, this does not automatically mean that everyone at once and completely 
shifts their information practices into online realms.
That is, individuals’ information practices do not necessarily follow the 
socio-technological enabling potential of media formats, nor do they necessarily 
follow hegemonic societal co-texts, discourses, or narratives about web-based 
information practices. Rather, information practices take place and are shaped on 
the basis of already existing social structures and connected social praxis, or what 
Schönberger calls persistence (cf. 207). 
These information practices can also be seen as tinkering or “the meticulous 
and ongoing process of adapting, meddling with or adjusting something in order 
to make repairs or improvements” (Damsholt and Jespersen 25). In their study on 
ethnological perspectives on innovation, Damsholt and Jespersen point out that 
to understand “how adaptations or transformations to everyday life come about” 
tinkering “is far more relevant than the idea of a sudden break” (25). To the au-
thors, innovation is “an ongoing tinkering with and within an established order” 
(27). Here I would argue that innovation is congruent with what Schönberger de-
scribes as socio-cultural change: it “is only thought to be possible if it can be 
integrated with the constitutive logics of everyday life” (Damsholt and Jespersen 
23). That is to say, regularly consulting online media formats will only become 
part of participants’ repertoires of information practices if these formats suit the 
individuals’ everyday lives in various respects, for example revolving around the 
formats’ usability, content, and reliability.
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8.2.3  Filtering, Sorting, Contextualising –  
Information Practices Evolving
As I argued in the preceding sub-chapter, actors are in the daily process of select-
ing and mixing-and matching various information articles from a vast array of 
media and media formats. Participants do so consciously and with varying degrees 
of competence. Especially in times of post-truth, actors must increasingly make 
a concentrated effort to evaluate items of information regarding their plausibil-
ity and credibility.11 This chapter will illustrate the ways in which participants 
have incorporated the Internet, online media and online communication into their 
everyday information practices, thereby maintaining abilities that were part of 
their empirical knowledge long before the spread of the Internet, and combining 
those with the formation of new skills in information practice.
The gigantic flood of information the Internet brings with it presents actors 
with a number of challenges. Today, actors must master practices that were 
not needed as much a few decades ago. Filtering, sorting, and contextualising 
have become an integral part of people’s everyday information practices, as this 
interview excerpt from Peter Lamprecht illustrates (the italics mark the practices 
that are increasingly part of citizens’ new skill sets):
Das Internet insgesamt natürlich, bietet erheblich mehr Informationsmöglichkeiten. 
Man muss natürlich immer auch so ein bisschen berücksichtigen, von WEM lese ich 
WAS WO. Das ist ja die Kunst das hinterher zu filtern und einzuordnen, das ist natürlich 
auch so eine Sache noch. Ich kann auf alles Mögliche reinfallen, im Internet kann ich 
viel posten und loswerden. Ob das dann so seine Richtigkeit hat ist auch immer die 
Frage. Und je mehr Möglichkeiten ich zum Informieren habe, desto leichter kann ich 
auch mal Fehlinformationen aufsitzen und es ist nicht unbedingt einfacher geworden 
sich qualifizierte Informationen zu beschaffen. Wenn man mal sieht in Forenbeiträgen 
und und und, wo man dann durchaus mal gucken muss […] wer initiiert da was und 
muss das entsprechend dann auch einschätzen. Aber insgesamt bietet das Internet schon 
eine Menge Möglichkeiten, die vor zwanzig Jahren in dem Sinne überhaupt noch nicht 
so waren. Wo ich vielleicht überhaupt mal in der Zeitung was gelesen hatte um mich 
schlau zu machen, da sind die Möglichkeiten natürlich deutlich verbessert worden.12
11 It would go beyond the scope of this paper to further discuss the concept of post-truth, 
especially since it only became a major issue in Germany in 2016 (cf. Schaal et al.), 
two years after fieldwork was completed. I consider two editions of the journal Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ) especially suitable for further information, No. 44-
45/2017 Wandel des Politischen? and No. 13/2017, Wahrheit.
12 Peter Lamprecht, personal interview, Jever, 16 September 2013.
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Generally, the Internet enables considerably more opportunities for information. How-
ever, you do have to consider WHAT you are reading WHERE and by WHOM it is 
written. It is a skill to filter the information and categorize it; that is a bit tricky. One 
can fall for all kinds of stories; I can post and tell a lot on the Internet. If that is correct 
is another story. The more opportunities I have to collect information, the easier it is 
to be taken in by incorrect information. It has not necessarily become easier to obtain 
qualified information. If you take discussions in online forums for example, you must 
identify the people initiating them to be able to evaluate the information. All in all, the 
Internet still offers a lot of opportunities that did not exist twenty years ago, when you 
read a newspaper at the most to inform yourself – here, the opportunities have improved 
substantially.
Because of the substantial flood of information that the Internet theoretically pro-
vides, actors must consciously decide how much information they need about a 
topic and how much time they are willing to spend on it, as the focus group par-
ticipant Helmut Weber points out:
Wie viel Zeit nehme ich mir denn heutzutage, um informiert zu sein? Reicht mir diese 
Information, die ich bekomme, tagtäglich nach dem Frühstück oder während des Früh-
stücks, Tageszeitung erstmal aus, bin ich damit erstmal zufrieden? Sage ich mir, Jo, 
bin ich erstmal zufrieden. Entdecke ich ein Thema, das mich wirklich bewegt, wie zum 
Beispiel das Fracking hier regional gegeben, dann stochere ich nach.13
How much time do I devote to being informed these days? Does the information that I 
get after or during breakfast through the daily newspaper suffice, am I content with that? 
I say to myself, yes, I’m happy with that for now. If I then come across a topic that really 
moves me, like fracking here regionally, then I investigate.
Sometimes, this reduction to two or three interest areas is not voluntary. Rather, 
many research participants complain that to be sensible and effective with their 
time, they must limit their interests and consequently their information tech-
niques, and even more so their participation behaviour. If only time would allow, 
they would immerse themselves in more topics, gather more information, form 
opinions on them, and/or be more active regarding those issues. However, for 
most people most of the time, this is simply not practical or compatible with work-
ing full-time, caring for a family, and pursuing other recreational hobbies. Thomas 
Fischer vividly describes how he reads news, and how he restricts himself:
13 Helmut Weber, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
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Ich zweifle erstmal grundsätzlich das an, was da steht und ich sag, ‚Hmm, da muss ich 
mal nachgucken, ist das denn so?!‘ Kann ich aber nicht, kann ich nicht überall, sondern 
bei den Sachen wo ich sage das kann aber eigentlich nicht sein oder da gucke ich mal 
nach. Das kann ich nicht bei allen Sachen machen, weil dann müsste ich hauptberuflich 
irgendwie Informationsjunkie werden und nichts Anderes mehr tun und nicht mal dafür 
würde meine Zeit ausreichen, auch wenn ich nicht mehr schlafen täte.14 
First, I question everything that I read and think that I have to look into it, is that really 
the case?! But I can’t, I can’t do that for everything, just for the things that I don’t think 
can be possible, so I look them up. But I can’t do that for every issue, because then I 
would have to become a full-time information junkie and do nothing else and even then, 
my time wouldn’t suffice, even if I did stop sleeping. 
Participants routinely weigh up the strengths and weaknesses of a respective me-
dia or piece to ultimately judge whether the information can be trusted and relied 
upon. Fischer points out: 
wenn man die Zeitung liest, wird man auch plus minus desinformiert, ich versuche, 
also ich benutze viel das Internet mich zu informieren, und ich gehe da immer, ich weiß 
nicht ob das bekannt ist, auf die sogenannten Nachdenkseiten, also diese kommentiert/
ist eigentlich eine kommentierte Presseschau, würde ich es mal nennen. Und da tue 
ich mich viel um und versuche zumindest, mir rauszuziehen, was mir zumindest wahr-
scheinlich vorkommt.15 
When you read the newspaper, you will be more or less disinformed. I try to, so I use 
the Internet a lot to inform myself and I mostly visit, I don’t know if you are familiar 
with it, the so-called Nachdenkseiten (literally Think-about or Reflection Pages), which 
is what I would call an annotated press review. That is what I visit a lot and at least try 
to distil what appears reasonable.
Peter Lamprecht, points out that one cannot avoid consulting different information 
sources, and that each source has weaknesses.16 In my opinion, such a view would 
have been quite unusual 15 or 20 years ago, when (vocational) journalists held 
an information monopoly and consequently had the opinion hegemony (cf. Al-
Ani). In the quest to determine reliable information sources, traditional media like 
newspapers do not fare well with participants today. As they have in many places 
14 Thomas Fischer, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
15 Thomas Fischer, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
16 Cf. Peter Lamprecht, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
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around the world, traditional media sources are on the decline in the district of 
Friesland. Despite continually losing subscribers,17 the district still has three daily 
newspapers, while many other districts no longer have any.
Focus group member and former journalist Wolfgang Müller says that he has 
quit reading newspapers, because he thinks they no longer provide information 
but rather disinformation. In his eyes it has become increasingly difficult to grasp 
“the big picture”, because newspapers only show one side of the coin.18 Likewise, 
Thomas Fischer said that he only reads the local section of a newspaper to find out 
about events like the next performance of the choir or the carnival agenda. For Fis-
cher, contention and debate have vanished from newspapers, which have basically 
been reduced to a place where unaltered press releases from press organisations or 
statements from people somehow influential enough are printed. To Fischer, the 
established newspapers have become ‘mere royal correspondents’.19
In Iceland, personal links between newspapers and individual politicians and 
influential businesspeople have threatened unbiased and balanced reporting for 
decades.20 The situation fills Gunnar Grímsson with indignation:
17 Cf. Sönke Klug, personal interview, Jever, August, 25 2015. 
18 Cf. Wolfgang Müller, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
19 Thomas Fischer, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
20 For example, Morgunblaðið, the newspaper with the second highest circulation in 
Iceland, is owned by a company controlled by some of the country’s major fishing 
corporations (cf. Ohlsson 43). Moreover, the paper is currently edited by the former 
conservative prime minister Davíð Oddsson, who happens to have been the country’s 
longest serving prime minister (1991–2004). He was also the mayor of Reykjavík 
(1982–1991). Even more controversial was the fact that after his time as prime mi-
nister, he chaired the board of governors of the Central Bank of Iceland until 2009, 
when he resigned due to protests against his involvement in the economic crisis in 
Iceland. At Morgunblaðið, Oddsson fired a number of experienced journalists, leading 
to accusations that Icelandic media owners take part in manipulation for political ends, 
and protecting special interests rather than safeguarding professional and balanced 
reporting (cf. V. Árnason et al.).
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We don’t have a decent media, we just don’t. […] The best newspaper in Iceland is 
actually The Reykjavík Grapevine21. And next to it is DV,22 which is also the closest 
thing that we have to yellow press. But it’s still true that they are the ones going in for 
the kill and say there’s something wrong here and dig up the dirt and tell us about that. 
And Grapevine is the best in doing factual non-bias, no, obviously biased in one way: 
THEY TALK TO BOTH SIDES.”23 
Many participants see the Internet as a possible solution to the lack of balanced 
information. For Fischer, the Internet is a kind of
Segen, weil ich Information da noch finden kann die ich noch nirgends sonst überhaupt 
bekomme, es gibt unheimlich viele Sachen, Kampagnen, Initiativen. Was weiß ich was 
Ärzte ohne Grenzen, was Campact alles macht, was Attac alles macht, die Nachdenk-
seiten, wie auch immer, das kann man da alles lesen. Das kriege ich aus der NWZ, aus 
der Zeit, aus Spiegel sowieso gar nicht mehr, das kriege ich da alles gar nicht mehr 
mit.24 
blessing, because I am able to find information I wouldn’t get anywhere else. There 
are so many causes, campaigns, initiatives – say Doctors without Borders, or what 
Campact is doing, what Attac is doing, the Nachdenkseiten, whatever – you can read 
about all of it on the Internet. I won’t get information like that from the NWZ (Nordwest 
Zeitung), or Die Zeit, or Der Spiegel – they wouldn’t even report on such topics. 
Another focus group participant, Christa Hoffmann, points out that interests con-
trol all news sources. She personally would pick and mix from different sources 
and try to make her mind up about a certain issue. She stresses that one has to 
consult several information sources to find out what is behind that issue.25
21 The Reykjavík Grapevine is an English-speaking newspaper being published every 
two weeks from May to October, and monthly from November to April. According 
to their self-description, they especially cater to tourists in Iceland, delivering “com-
prehensive content on all of the main topics of discourse in Iceland at each time: in 
cultural life, politics or general social affairs” (sec. bottom banner).
22 Indeed, DV is identified by unbiased observers as “historically one of the country’s 
main outlets for investigative and critical reporting” (Freedom House).
23 Gunnar Grímsson, personal interview I together with Róbert Bjarnason, Reykjavík, 12 
July 2012.
24 Thomas Fischer, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
25 Cf. Christa Hoffmann, focus group, Varel, 9 September 2014.
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Another method of informing oneself, and one barely mentioned in the litera-
ture, is attending council or committee meetings to gather first-hand knowledge 
about specific topics:
Entdecke ich ein Thema, das mich wirklich bewegt, wie zum Beispiel das Fracking hier 
regional gegeben, dann stochere ich nach. Wo kann ich nachstochern dann? Dann gehe 
ich zu den entsprechenden Ausschusssitzungen, wo ich gerade vor kurzem in Neustadt-
gödens gewesen war und habe in der Hinsicht Informationen bekommen, die ich vorher 
in den Medien, die ich lesen oder sehen durfte, nicht erfahren konnte.26
If I do stumble upon an issue that really concerns me, for example fracking here in 
the region, then I investigate. Where can I investigate? I can go to the respective com-
mittee meetings, like I have been to in Neustadtgödens just recently, where I found 
out information that I didn’t get to know about from the media that I was able to read 
beforehand.
Some participants did not attend political decision-making processes only from a 
passive stance as observer/audience, but also as active members on political com-
mittees. Here, information gathering and participation took place simultaneously. 
Those people believed that they could only gain information on all aspects of a 
topic by actively taking part in the political process: 
Bei mir [ist] im Moment so der Punkt da, tatsächlich so das Gefühl da, nicht die rich-
tigen Informationen zu bekommen und daher [bin ich] auch so ein bisschen auf der 
Suche und am gucken, wie KRIEGT man denn tatsächlich die Informationen, die man 
braucht um sich das gesamte Bild zu machen. Und da gibt s eigentlich nur den Weg, 
tatsächlich auch sich so ein bisschen in den kommunalpolitischen Prozess zu begeben. 
Man muss ja nicht gleich in einer Partei sein, aber dass man in Ausschusssitzungen 
geht. Wir hatten in Varel das große Thema Famila-Erweiterung […]. haben nämlich 
auch noch ein Geschäft in Varel, sind also auch noch unmittelbar betroffen von so einer 
Geschichte. Das heißt wir sind in Ausschüsse gegangen, in Ratssitzungen gegangen 
und haben da natürlich auch versucht, uns zu BETEILIGEN. Und wie Sie schon sagen, 
Beteiligung fängt erstmal damit an sich zu informieren, was überhaupt läuft, was der 
Kenntnisstand ist.27
Lately, I have been at a point where I feel I do not get the right information and there-
fore, I am looking for the place where I DO get all the information that one needs to 
26 Helmut Weber, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
27 Wolfgang Müller, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
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form an opinion about a certain issue. Actually, there is only one way – that of becom-
ing part of the local political process. You don’t have to be a member of a political 
party right away, but to go to committee meetings. In Varel, the expansion of Famila 
(supermarket chain) was a huge issue. We also have a shop in Varel, so we are directly 
affected by such an issue. For us, this meant going to committee meetings, going to 
council meetings, and we just tried to PARTICIPATE. And like you say, participation 
begins with informing oneself about what’s going on, what do we know at this stage.
Here, information practice and the mode of political participation intersect. Both 
quotations illustrate, to differing degrees, how political participation can also be-
come part of people’s information practices. 
8.2.4 Excursus: Journalism in the Internet Age
The temporal restriction and specialisation in a few selected issues which is nec-
essary today (and has been at least since the flood of information that the Internet 
has brought with it) is not only an issue which ‘normal’ citizens encounter in their 
information practices, but also one that journalists, a group of actors of pivotal 
importance in the dissemination of political decision-making processes and their 
outcomes, must face. 
When focus group participant and former journalist Wolfgang Müller started 
working at the newspaper, Ostfriesen-Zeitung in 1987, he found that the general 
amount of information was relatively manageable. However, this has changed 
tremendously through time. Today, there is simply too much information available, 
due to the Internet in general, and major Social Media platforms like Twitter, 
facebook, which themselves have increasingly become information sources to 
journalists.28
Müller, who also has several years’ experience participating on local political 
committees, stresses that today, one can no longer be an expert on several political 
issues at once. He believes that one must become a specialist, simply because be-
coming thoroughly informed would consume almost impossible amounts of time. 
He also points out how the conditions in which journalists work have changed today: 
Ich habe früher noch das Glück gehabt, ich konnte noch investigativ arbeiten. Das heißt 
mein Chefredakteur hat gesagt: ‚Wolfgang Müller, du kriegst jetzt zwei Tage, geh mal 
dieser Geschichte nach.’ Und man hat nochmal irgendeinen Schweinehund ausgraben 
können und mal eine Schweinerei aufdecken können, gerade im Kommunalpolitischen. 
Und da passiert so viel, auch heute, wo es nicht mehr in der Zeitung steht, jederzeit. 
28 Cf. Wolfgang Müller, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
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Nur heute haben die Kollegen […] nicht mehr die Zeit, nicht mehr die Energie und auch 
nicht mehr die Erlaubnis/weil es eben Zeit und Energie und Geld ist, diesen Geschicht-
en nachzugehen. Das heißt, das Investigative, das Nachforschen, die Wächterfunktion 
auf unterster Ebene ist nicht mehr gegeben.29
In the past, I was lucky – I was still able to work investigatively. What I mean by that 
is, my chief editor would say: ‘Wolfgang Müller, you have two days, look into this 
story’. So you were still able to expose a swine, expose a scandal, especially in local 
politics. There is so much happening in local politics, still today, constantly, but it’s not 
in the paper anymore. The colleagues don’t have the time, the energy, the permission 
anymore, because it costs time and energy and money to investigate those stories. What 
I mean is that investigations, looking into things, being watchmen at the local level is 
not fulfilled anymore.
Aside from the challenges that come with managing the flood of information, 
journalists also face a broader societal shift in the way that “today’s digital envi-
ronment has dramatically altered the contours of media presence and ownership, 
the ethos of media coverage and behaviour” (Roy 90). Before the Internet became 
part of our everyday, Roy points out that the
journalistic ethos partly underpinned the functioning and stability of representational 
democracy in two important ways: firstly, professional journalists acted as key inter-
mediaries between politicians and political processes and the public at large, and sec-
ondly, journalists and politicians themselves colluded either formally or discreetly and 
indirectly in determining the relative boundaries between public and private space. (90)
I am not suggesting that vocational journalists loss of interpretational sovereignty 
and the entrance of semi-private bloggers onto the stage (cf. Al-Ani)30 has shaken 
representative democracy to its foundations, but that conditions for foundational 
elements like the freedom and neutrality of press are shifting. This shift can be 
seen in Iceland, where a 2015 study found that “bloggers and social media com-
menters may have [the] biggest impact on what Iceland’s journalists say—and 
don’t” (Baumhardt). As professor of journalism at the University of Akureyri Bir-
gir Guðmundsson said in conversation with Baumhardt: “journalists working in 
the country’s mainstream newsrooms are holding back or omitting information, 
perspectives and worthwhile investigations in pursuit of fitting a more politically 
correct narrative. […] this narrative is reinforced via social media, where popular 
29 Cf. Wolfgang Müller, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
30 For a concise overview on the state of citizen journalism today, see Allan and Thorsen.
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bloggers and commentators function as ‘shadow editors’ of journalists” (Baum-
hardt). Here, it becomes clear that the Internet does not only present citizens with 
new challenges regarding their information practices, but journalists also face in-
creasing challenges both in reporting and in the destabilisation of their previously 
established roles in a democratic democracy.
8.2.5  Conclusion, or: Today’s Citizens –  
Informed Better Than Ever?
Considering today’s “high choice, hybrid and fragmented media environments” 
(cf. Chadwick in Strömbäck et al. 3), I argue that filtering, sorting, and contextu-
alising information have become parts of citizens’ new skill-sets in information 
practice. Possibly more empowered and better informed than ever, participants 
confidently mix and match information from different media formats and me-
dia outlets, both online and offline. Especially in the Icelandic field, information 
through Social Media has taken on a particularly important role.31 Even before the 
debates around “post-truth” had begun, many participants’ accounts from both 
fields questioned the depth and neutrality of information traditional media outlets 
and journalists, illustrating a decreasing level of trust in them, and possibly lead-
ing to increasingly pluralised mix-and-match information practices. 
Moreover, the digital components of information repertoires hold special 
potential for political participation. The Canadian sociologist Shelley Boulianne 
found that the distinct social networking characteristics explain why people who 
use Social Media for information are more likely to engage politically. Strömbäck 
et al. summarize her work 
in an online environment, news is coming from trusted sources such as friends and ac-
quaintances, and the information might be encountered unexpectedly in the sense that 
people are not looking for it but might still be exposed to political information when 
friends or acquaintances share political news […]. Second, because the information 
is coming from people’s own networks, such information might mobilize citizens to 
become politically active to a larger extent than information coming directly from news 
organizations. Third, online information might be contagious, in the sense that seeing 
others reading news or participating in politics can be engaging by itself […]. Fourth, 
31 That brings with it another set of questions, such as the homogeneity of information 
provided through the algorithms running social networking sites, such as facebook, 
where “you tend to never see stuff you don’t agree with. And that is not a very healthy 
political debate”, as Icelandic politician Birgitta Jónsdóttir pointed out; personal inter-
view, Reykjavík, 18 June 2014.
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in a digital environment, networks are often larger. This increases the likelihood that 
people are being confronted with content from weak ties, which facilitates information 
flows and makes it more likely that people are exposed to politically relevant news. (4)
As one of Betri Reykjavík’s programmers points out, around 70 percent of people 
visiting Betri Reykjavík “come from facebook. If you want to promote a cause of 
your own, you put in the idea on Betri Reykjavík and then you use facebook […] to 
get a lot of support for your idea, to be active and promote it outside the system as 
well”.32 Similarly, Strömbäck et al. found a “positive relationship between a social 
media news repertoire and both offline and online participation” (16). This effect 
was only observed with Social Media, and not with the online use of more tradi-
tional news outlets, suggesting that social networking characteristics “are more 
mobilizing than traditional online or offline news”, both for modes of online and 
offline political participation (16).
8.3  Communication within Online Participation Tools:  
Software is Politics
Next to information, communication is a prerequisite of political participation. 
This chapter shows that communication within online participation tools, as a 
novel mode of political participation, causes various challenges both for users 
and for administrators and politicians. Especially from users’ perspectives, online 
participation is characterised by opacity in moments that transparency, openness, 
and directness would have been expected (cf. Bimber 122; cf. Jenkins and Itō 24). 
Transparency, openness, and directness is also lacking in administrations’ and pol-
iticians’ communication towards citizens, as they continue to adhere to traditional 
practices of political communication. 
These issues also manifest themselves in rather unintuitively designed web-
sites which provide little space for debate and deliberation amongst users, despite 
having originally been presented as venues for discussion and consultation. Inco-
herent public relations work by Betri Reykjavík and LiquidFriesland also causes 
confusion amongst registered users, the public, and the media. Ultimately, for on-
line participation tools to develop and become established, a growing and on-go-
ing commitment from both politicians and programmers is needed. Politicians, 
in particular, need to be open to changes and to the restructuring of both political 
culture and political communication (cf. Rosenzweig and Eith 12).
32 Róbert Bjarnason, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 12 July 2012.
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8.3.1  “There is a black box at that stage”33 –  
The Opacity of Communication in Online Participation Tools
In popular discourse, measures of digital democracy are often linked with catchy 
keywords like transparency, openness, or directness. Political scientist Markus 
Linden, for example, has identified five common promises in digital democracy, 
namely equality, participation, information, responsivity, and rationality (see State 
Research, 2.1 Political Participation). In most cases, however, the practical reality 
of communication in online participation tools linked to municipal decision-mak-
ing processes looks rather different. 
Focusing on the experiences of participants who had proposed an idea (or set 
an idea in, as it was referred to), this chapter shows that they faced important mo-
ments of opacity, confusion and conflicts at the following stages: 
• immediately after they set their idea in,
• after their idea was sent to the city council / a committee, 
• and once they were informed about the outcome.
Users’ ultimately experienced these moments as discouraging, which has negative 
effects on both the effectiveness and relevance of the respective online participa-
tion tool. In this section, I primarily look at the Icelandic rather than the German 
sample, as Betri Reykjavík’s less restrictive structure and larger user base made it 
more likely to cause users moments of confusion and conflict. 
Users who submitted an idea to Betri Reykjavík faced the first significant 
moment of confusion and conflict once they had set it in. For most, initial feelings 
of accomplishment and responsibility began to wane within the first few weeks. 
Guðmundur’s experience was typical: “It [the idea he set in] is a big issue and 
there are I think 70 people who have promoted it. It hasn’t moved […], nothing 
has come from Betri Reykjavík, nothing. So it is a little bit irritating, you put 
something in, but you get no report, you get maybe a lot of supporters only, but 
you get no response from the government.”34
Due to Betri Reykjavík’s extremely stripped-down structure, it is not clear at 
all how long it will take for the idea to be sent to the committee in charge or in 
fact, if it will ever be sent at all. This has its roots in the specific design of Betri 
Reykjavík: there is no restriction or time frame on how long an idea will remain 
open to discussion and voting. In practice, this can mean that ideas that are set in, 
gather momentum and generate a number of votes may be sent to the committee in 
33 Kristínn Már Ársælsson, personal interview, Reykjavík, 20 June 2014.
34 Guðmundur Kristjánsson, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 9 July 2012.
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charge within a month or two.35 However, it can also mean that it may take years 
for an idea to eventually make it to the top-15 which are sent off to city council.36 
Being successful to the degree that it is sent off to city council is the “only way 
out” of the system for an idea. As the life-span of ideas is unrestricted – they are 
never archived or deleted –, less popular ideas simply float endlessly around the 
system and remain unresolved. 
Of course, this opacity not only effects users’ experience of the platform, but 
also its effectiveness and success. For many users like Guðmundur, the impression 
that nothing was happening with their ideas was highly demoralising. The 
programmers also seemed aware of the problems that the open time frame caused, 
as Róbert Bjarnason said: 
We definitely want to work with the city and trying sort of to evolve the concept. And 
we thought about maybe splitting it into a few parts, having like four times a year, 
having like a three-step process or something. For you have one month to add ideas and 
then one month to vote for them and debate them, or like one month to add and debate 
and then one month to vote and debate, so you couldn’t be able to vote on them in the 
first part. And then one month for the city government to give some sort of an answer 
back.37 
None of these plans have been put into practice at the time of writing, almost five 
years after the interview. 
However, I do not think that the open time frame of Betri Reykjavík as such 
poses the main disturbance for user experiences, but rather that they are not pro-
vided with enough and/or clear information about how the platform works. Sev-
eral users have reported that they searched in vain for guidance or manuals on 
how to use the website. The only available guidance is a vague, half-page process 
35 For example, user Sunna set in the idea “Tröppur opp Vatnshólinn við Háteigsveg” 
(eng. Stairs up (the hill) Vatnshólt from (the street) Háteigsvegur) on 4 February 2016. 
One month later, Unnur Margrét Arnardóttir, clerk of the City of Reykjavík, posted the 
notice to the idea that it had been forwarded to the recreation and leisure committee (cf. 
sec.news).
36 For example, user Sigurbjörg Ása Óskarsdóttir set in the idea “Svæðið milli Vestur-
bergs og Bakka” (eng. Land between (the neighbourhoods) Vesturberg and Bakkar) 
on 27 May 2016 and 16 months later, Unnur Margrét Arnardóttir, clerk of the City 
of Reykjavík, posted the notice to the idea that it had been forwarded to the planning 
committee (sec.news)(sec.news)(sec.news).
37 Róbert Bjarnason, personal interview V together with Gunnar Grímsson, Reykjavík, 
18 June 2014.
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description – provided that they find the tiny question mark in the top right corner 
(see Figure 2, 57). For example, Guðrun reports that she could no longer navigate 
the site after the layout had been changed: “I didn’t go there for a few weeks. And 
then I don’t know if there was a trial run or […] instructions somehow. There was 
nothing when I checked. And I was trying, and everything was so difficult and ehh, 
I just stopped it”.38 Back in 2012, Guðrun had told me that although she was not 
especially skilled in using computers and technology, that “the beginning [i.e. start 
using Betri Reykjavík] is easy: just create an account and start writing or either 
support or against something. That’s no problem”.39 
It often remains unclear to users why changes, such as the deletion of features 
and the addition of others, were made. No explanations or information is provid-
ed by the programmers, and they seemed unaware that unexpected changes had 
caused problems: “In terms of user interface we have only been sort of simplifying 
and the new version which hasn’t been deployed yet […], is even simpler, and 
definitely that is the way to go. Unfortunately, it means that you remove some of 
the functionality”.40
Interestingly, the example of LiquidFriesland shows that PDF-manuals, face-
to-face introductory workshops with volunteer LiquidFriesland representative 
Djure Meinen, and video tutorials are not enough to sustain an online participa-
tion tool. First, users still criticised the fact that there was no direct helpline to a 
contact person: 
Es müsste eigentlich vorne noch mit drinstehen, auch in LiquidFriesland gleich, wenn 
man sich einloggt, gleich dann einen Link gleich zu dem Mann wo man dann auch mal 
meinetwegen Fragen stellen kann. Ja, das wäre praktisch ... Dann könnte man auch 
mal nachfragen, ‚Das und das habe ich noch nicht verstanden, wie ist das eigentlich 
gedacht?‘ Und das fehlt einem vielleicht auch, so der Ansprechpartner.41 
Right on the starting page of LiquidFriesland there should be a link to someone you 
could ask. That would be practical, if you just could enquire: ‘I did not quite get this 
feature, what are the actual intentions behind it?’ And that is what is perhaps lacking, 
a point of contact.
38 Guðrún Sigurðardóttir, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 30 May 2014.
39 Guðrún Sigurðardóttir, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 9 July 2012.
40 Róbert Bjarnason, personal interview V together with Gunnar Grímsson, Reykjavík, 
18 June 2014.
41 Susanne Engstler, personal interview, Varel, 8 October 2013.
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Second, those broad offers of help did not stop LiquidFriesland from being closed 
down due to, amongst other things, low user numbers. Users of LiquidFriesland 
did not face the same level of opacity as their Icelandic counterparts after they 
had set in an idea, since each user idea had a six week life span (cf. Landkreis 
Friesland as cited in Diefenbach 33). Rather, authors of ideas in LiquidFriesland 
faced a different potential problem, that their idea would not even be allowed to 
discussion. Those which did make it to discussion would then find that the frame-
work for discussion and deliberation in LiquidFriesland was rather limited (see 
chapter 8.3.3 “Trying to improve the debate”). In the admission stage, the first 
of four steps, an idea on LiquidFriesland could only be voted for or against (see 
chapter 4 Research Fields, 4.1 LiquidFriesland for more detailed information on 
the workings of the tools). It only graduated to the second stage, discussion, if a 
quorum of ten percent of all users invested in the issue supported it (cf. Landkreis 
Friesland as cited in Diefenbach 33). Only then, the idea went on to stages three 
and four, verification and voting (cf. Behrens et al., Principles).
In contrast to Betri Reykjavík, which has become quite confusing over time 
with around a thousand ideas floating about indefinitely, LiquidFriesland was 
always tidy, as few of the ideas set in actually made it to the discussion stage. It 
is perhaps unsurprising that the elaborate process ideas have to undergo acts as a 
deterrent to prospective users and challenges even adept Internet and computer 
users, as web designer Ursula Thoms recounts: 
Mein Arbeitskollege hat auch Zugangsdaten sich schicken lassen, der ist auch reinge-
gangen und hat dann festgestellt, dass die Oberfläche ihm nicht so zusagt. […] Wir 
müssten durchaus gut klarkommen mit Oberflächen, ich habe allerdings auch tatsäch-
lich Schwierigkeiten gehabt, wenn ich Sachen gesucht habe; wenn ich Sachen gemacht 
habe, kam andere Sachen da heraus, die ich nicht erwartet hatte. Habe ich so gedacht, 
‚Meine Güte, wenn du sogar mit deinem Background hier hängst, wie verloren sind 
dann vielleicht andere?‘ Also, rein technisch war das für mich nicht so der Bringer.42
My colleague also requested login data and after logging in he saw that the surface did 
not appeal to him […] We should be able to manage such surfaces quite well [due to 
their background in web design], but I had real difficulties when searching things and 
when I tried to do one thing, something else happened. I thought to myself: ‘Oh my 
goodness, when you with your background get stuck here, how lost are others?’ So, 
from a technological perspective, LiquidFriesland did not do it for me.
42 Ursula Thoms, personal interview, Varel, 9 October 2013.
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Another moment of opacity awaited Betri Reykjavík users whose idea was amongst 
the monthly most popular and was consequently sent to the committee in charge. 
From then on, it comes under the websites in progress section and from there, it 
is neither clear how long it will take the committee to deliberate on it, as there 
is no prescribed timeframe in which officials have to react, nor exactly how this 
deliberation process will take place. 
In our 2014 meeting, Guðmundur recalls that
I haven’t been much involved in Betri Reykjavík. But just between you sent me your first 
email [that I would come back to Iceland for additional interviews and would like to meet 
him again after our initial encounter in 2012] and now, they sent me an email saying: ‘This 
issue that you voted for or commented on […] has been processed and we’re trying to 
implement it, trying to get it done.’ But the last comment on that article, that idea was two 
years ago, so that’s very slow. […] I think that’s why it’s probably losing interest, because 
you get feedback so slowly for it. Just two years later, you have forgotten the idea and 
[….] you don’t think it’s working. And then two years later, ah, wait, it works. And then 
you maybe not did anything there for two years because you didn’t get any feedback.43
However, the users of Betri Reykjavík do not only feel left out in the rain by the 
processing time of their ideas, but also by the actual decision-making processes 
their ideas are subjected to. Users are only told which committee is deliberating on 
their ideas, and this often reveals little, as this category usually matches with the 
thematic category they set their ideas into in the first place. Interim work stages, 
like phases of researching or meetings with experts, are not communicated via the 
website. Kristínn Már Ársælsson points out that 
[t]he problem is that you put forward an idea and you can get enough likes to get it to the 
next stage, but there is a black box at that stage. You don’t see what happens, somebody 
comes along and analyses your idea, you don’t know anything about it, and it can get 
kicked out of the process without you getting information on why. You don’t get the 
chance of restructuring your idea. For example, if you put forward an idea and they say 
this is impractical, then you don’t know about it. Instead of what they could do, is that 
they let you know this is impractical, because of A, B, C, and then you could restructure 
your ideas: ‘Oh okay, I understand, so my counter proposal is to change the idea like 
this and then it should go through.’ So, there is a black box there where I think you need 
more interaction between city officials and the people who are putting in ideas. I think 
that is the major issue.44
43 Guðmundur Kristjánsson, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 22 June 2014.
44 Kristínn Már Ársælsson, personal interview, Reykjavík, 20 June 2014.
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Here, Kristinn Már hints at another facet in the users’ loss of agency – the impos-
sibility of talking back. Talking back or interactivity is arguably is one key char-
acteristic of online communication technologies (cf. Baym, Personal Connections 
7), and is severely restricted in Betri Reykjavík due to the opaque decision-making 
processes. Users do not have the opportunity to alter an idea or reply in any way 
to the committee’s decision. The committee’s decision appears to be a closed and 
final statement, although in many cases the ideas are not completely implemented 
or even sufficiently investigated. Here, the inexperience and inflexibility of the 
administration as a bureaucratic institution to handle non-linear communication 
processes with citizens and interactivity becomes visible (see 8.3.2 “There really 
isn’t a conclusion, but it sounds as if there is”). 
In LiquidFriesland, users are allowed to make changes to their ideas, but only 
in the discussion stage. At that point, other users can propose amendments and the 
original author can take on the feedback and incorporate it into the idea. Interac-
tivity is given here, but it is only horizontal. There is no option for users to react 
to the district assembly’s decision once the idea has been discussed in one of their 
sessions. 
Another factor adding to the opacity and confusion for users is that even ideas 
that could not be acted upon – for example, as they do not fall under the jurisdic-
tion of the City of Reykjavík or the district of Friesland –, would still go through 
all process stages. This is quite often the case, especially in Friesland, as the polit-
ical level of a district and its jurisdiction appear difficult for many citizens to grasp 
(see chapter 8.5 The Role of Geographical Proximity in (Online) Political Partic-
ipation). In Betri Reykjavík, the author is only informed that their idea could not 
be acted upon on the formal log extract on the idea’s news wall – a process which 
may well take years. The same is true for unrealistic ideas, a process criticised by 
the LiquidFriesland programmers:
Eine Verbesserungsmöglichkeit seitens der Verwaltung wäre bereits vor der Abstim-
mung in den Dialog mit den Teilnehmern zu treten: Im Falle unrealistischer Vorschläge 
könnte die Verwaltung ihre Einschätzung bereits während der Diskussion den Teilne-
hmern kommunizieren und damit auf eine realistisch umsetzbare Lösung hinarbeiten. 
[…] die Verwaltung [sollte sich] frühzeitig genug in die Debatte einbringen. Bürger erst 
abstimmen zu lassen und ihnen dann (also nachdem die Abstimmung der Bürger vor-
bei ist) zu erklären, warum der Vorschlag nicht umsetzbar ist, kann eine vernichtende 
Wirkung auf die Motivation haben. (Behrens)
One improvement through the administration would be to step into dialogue with par-
ticipants before the voting: in the case of unrealistic suggestions, the administration 
could share their assessment in the discussion stage and therefore work towards a more 
104 | Political Participation in the Digital Age
realistically implementable solution. […] the administration should contribute to the 
debate early on. To let citizens vote and tell them only afterwards that the suggestion is 
not implementable can have a devastating effect on motivation.
Although this initially sounds like a good idea, I believe that it is unrealistic. A 
pre-selection in terms of content may have been possible for the few ideas that 
came in through LiquidFriesland and because Sönke Klug, press secretary in 
charge of adapting the users’ ideas for deliberation through the district council, 
was a unique allrounder with close ties to councillors and the head of the district 
Sven Ambrosy. But I cannot imagine this approach working for Betri Reykjavík, 
where a number of ideas come in on an almost daily basis. This kind of pre-selec-
tion by an administrative clerk is surely an excessive workload and, most probably, 
beyond their professional competence. In my opinion, the suggestion by Liquid-
Friesland’s programmers shows a lack of understanding about the workings of a 
local administration and political decision-making processes. A city clerk neither 
could nor should be in a position to decide if an incoming idea is realistic or not. 
In proper process, standing committees and experts need to be consulted. At the 
same time, the jurisdiction of the City of Reykjavík and the district of Friesland 
are clearly defined, so an administrative clerk should indeed be able to determine 
if an idea falls under the jurisdiction or not, and consequently could inform users 
much earlier in the process, thereby avoiding frustration and demotivation. 
The final moment of opacity and confusion in users’ experience is when 
they are informed about the outcome of their idea. First, although on clicking 
the question mark symbol in the top right corner of the Betri Reykjavík starting 
page one is informed that “these ideas, along with the arguments and discussions 
about them, are addressed in the appropriate standing committee as soon as 
possible. They should preferably be addressed within one month” (‘About Better 
Reykjavík’), my research shows that this is rarely the case (see Figure 4)45. Indeed, 
45 This table shows the latest ideas that had either succeeded or failed on Betri Reykjavík 
and the time frame for each of them – from the day its author set it in, to the day it was 
marked as being sent to the appropriate standing committee, to the day the standing com-
mittee’s decision was posted to the idea’s news wall in Betri Reykjavík, (rather than to the 
day the committee decided on the idea due to a lack of data). This table only includes tho-
se of the latest ten ideas in either the successful or failed section for which all three dates 
(set in, sent off, decision) were made available on the website. There are however newer 
ideas for which not all dates were accessible on Betri Reykjavík and which therefore were 
not included in this table. The titles of the ideas are given as in the original, regardless of 
misspellings, abbreviations or colloquialisms. The table is based on the latest ideas that 
had either succeeded or failed on Betri Reykjavík as of April 2018.
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Fig. 4: Time Frame of an Idea from Set-in to Decision on Betri Reykjavík
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standing committees took nine and a half months on average to decide on the 20 
ideas that I examined closely.46
More precisely, it took the committees one year on average to decide on the 
ideas that they turned down, and around seven months for ideas they accepted. One 
can only conjecture as to why this is the case; it appears probable that it is easier 
for committees to approve a citizen’s idea when it is similar to its already existing 
agenda. Many ideas marked successful are accompanied by an answer from the 
committee stating that the idea was already planned under this or that act (which 
had already been passed) and would be implemented soon. This was the case for 
five of the ten successful ideas that I investigated more closely. Another common 
reason given for an idea’s success – two of the ten investigated – is that similar ideas 
had already been processed through the annual participatory budget of Betri Hverfi 
(eng. Better Neighbourhood).47 The most common answers to ideas that eventual-
ly fail are that their implementation would exceed the allocated budget or that they 
do not fall under the City of Reykjavík’s or the district of Friesland’s jurisdiction.
It may be possible to answer ideas with one prominent suggestion more eas-
ily and quickly than those that include several suggestions around the same geo-
graphical location but are otherwise thematically unconnected. However, practice 
reveals that ideas that contained several suggestions could be processed relatively 
quickly, provided that one of those suggestions was similar to the committee’s 
existing agenda. In their answers, committees would tend to refer only to that sug-
gestion, while the other suggestions would either be ignored or a comment would 
be made that they have to be looked into.48 In contrast, ideas around topics the 
46 The 20 ideas I examined closely for this were the latest ideas in both the ‘failed’ and 
‘successful’ categories in June 2018.
47 The answers to both the ideas “Rækta upp útivistarsvæðið í Úlfarsárdal” (eng. Culti-
vate the outdoor area in Úlfarsárdalur) (cf. sec.news) and “Leiktæki inn í Laugarda-
linn” (eng. Playground in Laugardalur) included references to Betri Hverfi (cf. sec.
news). The annual online participatory budgeting programme Betri Hverfi has been 
taking place since 2011. 450 Million ISK (more than 3.6 Million Euro) “is allocated by 
citizens each year to implement crowdsourced ideas from the citizens to improve the 
various neighbourhoods of Reykjavík. To date, 608 ideas have been approved (2012–
2017)” (Citizens Foundation, ‘Portfolio: My Neighbourhood’). The tool was renamed 
Hverfið Mitt (eng. My Neighbourhood) in 2016. In this thesis, the original name Betri 
Hverfi is employed, predominantly because fieldwork took place at a time when the 
participatory budgeting programme was still called Betri Hverfi.
48 For example, the idea “Hjólastígar í Elliðárdalur” (eng. Cycle paths in (the valley) Elli-
ðárdalur) was answered by prominently replying to one suggestion, and stating that the 
other suggestions needed more research (cf. sec.news). 
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committee is not already working on may take longer to look into and to reach a 
decision. These ideas may differ drastically from the committees’ current thematic 
focus, or they may be expressed in a fashion alien to the administration. 
Cooperation between programmers and administration
Cooperation between the programmers and the city administration did not always 
work smoothly. For example, there was a period of at least six months in which the 
city administration did not process a single idea from Betri Reykjavík. This was 
due to personnel shortages and a high turnover in the clerical position responsible 
for handling the ideas. Róbert remembers that “basically they had this one em-
ployee, […], doing half position, but he was sort of moved to do something else 
for six months and nothing happened. And they did not even update the status of 
the ideas that went into the committees”.49 This, of course, caused massive delays 
in the processing of ideas. This was not only a moment of opacity, confusion and 
conflict for the users of Betri Reykjavík, but also for the programmers, as they do 
not have any influence on the (temporal) process in which the ideas are processed 
by the committees. Moreover, the programmers reported communication difficul-
ties with the politicians in charge: “It’s not because the people in the administra-
tion aren’t real nice and it’s good working with them, but they don’t make the 
decisions. I mean, we had to send them an email with ‘Betri Reykjavík is dying’ 
in order to get a meeting with the politicians. We’re not gonna do that every half 
of year from now on”.50 These differences between cooperation partners Citizens’ 
Foundation and City of Reykjavík have not gone unnoticed by the participants: 
“I can see that this website is obviously run by somebody that’s not their job, not 
their main job, because then it needs more work, it needs more time, I think”.51 
Finally, every once in a while, ideas seem to get lost, and even the committee 
cannot explain why it took them so long to answer. This was the case for two of 
the twenty ideas I looked at more closely: the idea “Tröppur upp Vatnshólinn við 
Háteigsveg” (eng. Stairs up (the hill) Vatnshólt from (the street) Háteigsvegur) 
was first sent to the recreation and leisure committee, who in turn forwarded it to 
the planning committee. In the end, the idea was answered 25 months after it had 
been sent to the city administration (cf. Sunna, sec.news). This delay was even 
surpassed by that for “Færanlegur kaffistandur í Grafarholtið yfir sumarið” (eng. 
“Movable coffee stand in Grafarholt during summer”). Although the idea quick-
49 Róbert Bjarnason, personal interview IV together with Gunnar Grímsson, Reykjavík, 
10 June 2014.
50 Gunnar Grímsson, personal interview V together with Róbert Bjarnason, Reykjavík, 
18 June 2014.
51 Freyja Kristinsdóttir, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 23 June 2014.
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ly became popular among users of Betri Reykjavík and was sent to the planning 
committee within around six weeks, it was apparently lost for three full years 
before the planning committee eventually rejected it (cf. Friðriksdóttir, sec.news). 
Without doubt, processing periods that long have a massive negative impact on 
people’s motivation and desire to continue using the tool, and obviously reduce 
its credibility in general. Betri Reykjavík programmer Róbert Bjarnasson sees this 
similarly: “I think many people are also a bit burned. They spent a lot of time on 
taking part and then it’s like a slap in the face for the city not to give answers and 
things like that”.52 
While Róbert Bjarnasson is certain that it is the city administration’s fault that 
ideas are not processed in a timely fashion, for platform users it is not exactly 
clear where, how or why ideas become stuck in the system: Are software issues 
responsible for the lack of dialogue? Or have poorly developed algorithms left 
semi-popular ideas skittering around the Betri Reykjavík platform forever? Or is 
it the fault of the city administration that cannot keep up with the speed users set 
ideas in? Participants drew their own conclusions about the delays: 
I think they [the city administration] didn’t think it through enough. They thought it 
great to get the response from the people, but they didn’t think it through how they want 
to process everything that came through. Maybe they got a lot more feedback then they 
thought they would and just couldn’t handle the amount of ideas that were coming in, 
so they still are trying to get through the back of it?53
I believe that this insecurity contributes to people’s doubts about online participa-
tion tools in the stricter sense, and about digital democracy in general. While the 
time delays in the examples above do appear to be extreme, several participants 
did report process times of around two years.54 
Users of LiquidFriesland did not face the same degree of time delays from 
the administration. The communication channel between users of LiquidFries-
land and their district administration seemed more direct, which may have been 
because citizens’ ideas were only being submitted to one political body, the district 
assembly, as opposed to the City of Reykjavík with its many standing committees. 
In most cases, the district assembly had reached a decision within a few months 
of it being submitted. 
52 Róbert Bjarnason, personal interview V together with Gunnar Grímsson, Reykjavík, 
18 June 2014.
53 Guðmundur Kristjánsson, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 22 June 2014.
54 Guðmundur Kristjánsson, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 22 June 2014.
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I assume that the processing time also has a lot to do with the will of the re-
spective administrations to use the platforms as tools for digital democracy. The 
fact that LiquidFriesland was largely initiated by the district of Friesland itself, 
whereas the City of Reykjavík only agreed to incorporate Betri Reykjavík in their 
decision-making processes, certainly played a role here. Moreover, the number of 
ideas that came in each month through LiquidFriesland was significantly lower 
than through Betri Reykjavík. During LiquidFriesland’s lifespan, from the end of 
2012 until August 2015, a total of 85 initiatives made it through to discussion by 
the district administration (cf. Landkreis Friesland, August 2015 5–10). In con-
trast, as the City of Reykjavík, had processed 438 ideas since 2011, with a similar 
number in progress at the time of writing (2019) (cf. ‘Starting Page’). In other 
words, the district administration of Friesland did not have to face the same level 
of challenges as the City of Reykjavík.
Moreover, statements of the Reykjavík city officials rarely include exact time 
frames for implementation, with references instead made to distinctive planned 
projects put into practice. Betri Reykjavík user Per Hansen does
not think that we get to know about the process, not enough. It is discussed in the city 
council and they produce a short text like two or three sentences and then you don’t know 
what is going to happen. Some things are actually executed, or they say we have done this 
already and it’s actually right, I agree. But I think there should be some kind of reference 
number, or they should update the issue when they do something, correlate it somehow, 
take it one step further.55
Here, Per Hansen also hints at the city administration’s vagueness in replying to the 
ideas. The fact that the administration is not bound to deal with a user’s idea in its 
original wording and has the right to change ideas considerably (cf. ‘About Better 
Reykjavík’), means that vague, roundabout answers are the norm. The administra-
tion seems to cherry-pick elements of user’s ideas to answer, while ignoring other 
elements. Programmers Gunnar and Róbert see calculated purpose in the way com-
mittees word their replies. In the next-subchapter, I will take this apparently strate-
gic vagueness as an opening to discuss bureaucracies’ habitus of communicating, 
both within online participation formats in the narrower sense and in their attitude 
towards and handling of digital democracy in more general terms.
In this sub-chapter, I illustrated how online participation tools linked to mu-
nicipal decision-making processes like Betri Reykjavík and LiquidFriesland do 
not fulfil the promises of digital democracy. These promises – equality, participa-
tion, information, responsivity, and rationality (cf. Linden) – cannot be fulfilled 
55 Per Hansen, personal interview, Reykjavík, 23 July 2012.
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because users face repeated moments of opacity, confusion, and conflict. These 
moments of opacity, confusion and conflict show that successful online democ-
racy can function in a sustainable long-term manner only if it is accompanied 
by extensive changes and restructuring of both the political culture and political 
communication (cf. Rosenzweig and Eith 12). Business as usual does not work for 
any of the actor groups studied, that is users, programmers, and politicians and ad-
ministrators. Rather, these groups must adapt and open up to each other’s differing 
communication and work habits. This, of course, is easier said than done. In the 
next chapter, I will investigate the habitus of politicians and administrations once 
online participation tools and digital democracy have been introduced. 
8.3.2  “There really isn’t a conclusion, but it sounds as if there is”56 
– Bureaucracy’s Dealings with Online Participation
In the previous sub-chapter, I looked at users’ perspectives and how the expect-
ed increase in transparency and openness of decision-making processes through 
the platforms was thwarted, or at least diminished, by opacity and lacking ac-
countability. I now turn to look at the administrations of the City of Reykjavík 
and the District of Friesland. I look at both users’ and programmers’ experiences 
of communication with the administration. It becomes apparent here that online 
participation is not only a learning process for users and programmers, but also 
for the administrations and politicians who receive and are responsible for the 
possible implementation of citizens’ input. This is perhaps unsurprising, given 
that online participation constitutes a new mode of political participation that does 
not conform with established bureaucratic procedures in municipal and district 
administrations.
As I suggested in the previous section, both users and programmers criticised 
the vague and evasive answers given by city administration. For example, Betri 
Reykjavík programmer Gunnar Grímsson pointed out that administration person-
nel “tend to answer questions in a sort of roundabout way and then you come back 
and take a look and there really isn’t a conclusion, but it sounds as if there is a 
conclusion. It is a technique”.57 His colleague Róbert Bjarnason adds that the city 
administration’s “answers have been sort of quite holey, they have been written in 
56 Gunnar Grímsson, personal interview I together with Róbert Bjarnason, Reykjavík, 12 
July 2012.
57 Gunnar Grímsson, personal interview I together with Róbert Bjarnason, Reykjavík, 12 
July 2012.
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a sort of bureaucratic language”.58 In part, this vagueness is connected to the ad-
ministration having the freedom to change users’ ideas “considerably” (cf. ‘About 
Better Reykjavík’). In that way, the administration does not need to answer each 
suggestion precisely, but may, one could argue, cherry-pick elements to answer, 
while ignoring others.
Indeed, cherry-picking seems to be a common practice when one examines the 
administration’s answers on the idea’s news wall. In the following, I will illustrate 
this approach based on an idea by Betri Reykjavík user Ingibjörg Gísladóttir. In 
autumn 2014, she suggested turning a popular foot path in the recreational area 
Valley of Elliðaár (south-east of the centre of Reykjavík) into a two-lane path, one 
for walkers and one for cyclists. This would create more space for the different 
groups and help avoid accidents. Phrased as a functional one-liner, the idea got a 
detailed, yet almost meaningless answer in January 2015: 
Þakka góða umræðu um það sem betur má fara á göngu- og hjólastígum í Elliðaárdal. Það 
er fagnaðarefni að stígarnir eru vel nýttir á góðum degi til fjölbreyttra ferða og útivistar. 
Mikilvægt er að mismunandi hópar taki tillil hver til annars, sérstaklega verða hjólandi 
að gæta varúðar. Það er á dagskrá að beina hjólandi umferð frá sameiginlegum göngu- og 
hjólastígum í auknum mæli á Rafstöðvarveginn og yfir Elliðaárnar á brú neðan við Raf-
stöðina. Fleiri möguleikar um sérstaka hjólastíga eru til skoðunar. (Ólafur Bjarnason as 
cited in Gísladóttir)
Thank you for a good discussion about how to improve hiking and cycling paths in the 
valley of Elliðaár. It is a cause for rejoicing that the trails are well used on good days 
for a variety of journeys and outdoor activities. It is important that different groups take 
care of each other, those bicycling must be especially careful. It is on the agenda to in-
creasingly redirect bicycle traffic from joint walking and cycling routes onto (the street) 
Rafstöðvarvegur and across the river Elliðaár onto the bridge below Rafstöðvarvegur. 
More possibilities for special cycle paths are under review. 
The vagueness in the administration’s answer is obvious here, and elsewhere. 
They point out that something similar to what the idea suggests is planned, but 
there is no specific mention or reference back to the actual proposal – a two-lane 
path through the valley; nor is there any specific information about when the bicy-
cle traffic will be redirected, who is conducting the review process, if a citizen can 
take part, or when the process will be completed. There is no practical outcome or 
operational intent in the committee’s statements. 
58 Róbert Bjarnasson, personal interview V together with Gunnar Grímsson, Reykjavík, 
18 July 2012.
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Indeed, for many participants this opacity and vagueness frustrating. For in-
stance, Björn Levi Gunnarsson reports that the typical reaction to a statement by 
a committee would be ‘Oh, it got discussed in a committee. Yay! What does that 
mean?’ [laughs] […] It’s just a notification, and a notification you can’t click on, 
like on facebook, were you can actually see the comments, because there are no 
comments.”59 Björn Levi further criticises the linear, non-interactive communica-
tion process built into Betri Reykjavík. For him, “definitely more of a conversation 
kind of platform would be the next step to take it in.” Here, he primarily sees the 
obligation to act with the city administration and politicians: “There isn’t anything 
coming from the municipality, from the city into the system, saying like ‘Hey, we’d 
appreciate like votes or comments on these things we’re working on’. So, more in-
teractivity. At the moment, it’s just like you put things in and there is SILENCE and 
you get occasional notifications ‘Yeah, it is gone into a committee.’ Then nothing.”
From the perspective of users and programmers then, it seems as if a “tech-
nique” or a kind of communication strategy is at work in the administration’s 
vague statements60; and that this strategy may be facilitated by the rules of Betri 
Reykjavík which enable the administration to cherry-pick parts of the users’ ideas. 
In many cases, the administration’s responses are little more than bland state-
ments acknowledging the gist of citizens’ ideas, but without any commitment or 
promise to take concrete action. One could argue that this kind of regular interac-
tive communication between citizens and city officials, as inscribed in the online 
consultation forums, is a completely novel mode of political participation and 
communication for politicians and administration. They are used to these forms of 
bureaucratic decision-making processes and how they are communicated. While 
in many cases the administration’s answers in Betri Reykjavík would benefit im-
mensely from being more concrete and specific, it does not necessarily follow 
that there was any ill intent behind them. Nonetheless, it also seems reasonable to 
interpret this evasive and vague communication behaviour in another way, and to 
see it as a sign of a general disgruntlement amongst politicians and administrators 
with the increased participation of citizens in decision-making processes and po-
litical communication.61
59 Björn Levi Gunnarsson, personal interview, Reykjavík, 4 June 2014.
60 Gunnar Grímsson, personal interview I together with Róbert Bjarnason, Reykjavík, 12 
July 2012.
61 In the next sub-chapter, I will go into greater detail about the ways in which the soft-
ware design of Betri Reykjavík and LiquidFriesland, commissioned by politicians, 
reflects their displeasure with substantial changes in political communication and 
decision-making processes.
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It is important to note that the statement posted to the Betri Reykjavík news 
wall about a committee’s decision on an idea is, in most cases, not specifically 
worded to address regular citizens. Normally, it is simply an excerpt from the 
minutes of the committee meeting where the idea was discussed. In any case, 
administration and politicians still have to learn that regular citizens may think 
and communicate differently, not least because they are not familiar with (being 
integrated into) political decision-making processes.
In LiquidFriesland, the function to feed decisions back to the citizens did not 
exist at all. Instead, users had to look those up on a separate website within the 
district of Friesland domain. In terms of the usability and intuitiveness of the tool 
then, this is problematic – especially as very few of the participants I spoke knew 
about the other website. Anna Wagner-Becker, who was an active user of Liquid-
Friesland, regrets that she never found out what happened to her idea, despite 
checking the platform several times.62 Susanne Engstler, herself a member of the 
local village council and an active LiquidFriesland user, describes the extremely 
complicated process she thought was necessary to find out about a district coun-
cil’s decision on a specific topic:
Kriegt man auch nicht mit, auch die Initiatoren für eine bestimmte Initiative, die würde 
das doch bestimmt interessieren, wie die [Ratsmitglieder] dafür abgestimmt haben. 
Das muss man aber mühsam verfolgen, wenn das dran ist. Dann findet man zwar die 
Sitzung, welche Ausschüsse Sitzung haben. Dann werden ja auch relativ spät die Tag-
esordnungen angenommen, eine Woche vorher oder. Und dann müsste man sich jede 
Tagesordnung angucken; ‚Wann ist denn endlich mein Thema dran?‘ Das ist ja auch 
nicht/das geht ja auch nicht gleich online, dass das den nächsten Tag dann reingebracht 
wird, sondern wie sie das verteilen, weiß ich auch nicht. 63 
One is not informed, I’m sure that the initiators of a certain initiative, they are surely 
interested in the way the councillors have voted. But you have to carefully follow it, 
when it is coming in. You find out about the meeting, which committees are meeting. 
But then the agendas are agreed on relatively late, a week or so beforehand. And then 
you would have to go through the agendas, so ‘when is my topic finally going to be 
discussed?’ That is not put online right away, not on the next day, I am clueless to how 
they distribute that.
When I tell her that there is a website where all the decisions on initiatives from 
LiquidFriesland are listed, she is surprised and mildly disgruntled, suggesting that 
62 Cf. Anna Wagner-Becker, focus group, Varel, 9 September 2014.
63 Susanne Engstler, personal interview, Varel, 8 October 2013.
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a link to that website should be prominently placed on LiquidFriesland. Although 
she does not negate the possibility that up until then she had just missed the no-
tice64, this appears highly unlikely since she is an active and avid user of the tool, 
and generally appears on top of things. 
In terms of the intuitive usability of the tool then, this appears highly prob-
lematic. Negative consequences appear inevitable, as one can see in the example 
of Ursula Thoms, who ultimately asked the administration to delete her Liquid-
Friesland account, amongst other things because she was frustrated that she did 
not receive sufficient information about the outcome of initiatives.65 At a closer 
look, this aspect again supports the view that the administration adheres to the es-
tablished forms of communicating their decision-making processes, and struggles 
to see things from a user perspective. For users, it seems logical to search for the 
political decision on an initiative in the same space that it was submitted to, and 
commented and voted on.
Another factor adding to the confusion of active LiquidFriesland users and 
hindering the engagement of registered but passive users is that, unlike in Betri 
Reykjavík, one does not receive automatic email updates on the progress of an 
idea – not when another user comments on one’s idea, nor when it is moved to 
another stage in the system. Rather, users themselves have to change the default 
notification settings to receive emails from LiquidFriesland. Several users I spoke 
to had had similar experiences to Susanne Engstler – that information on the de-
fault settings and notifications is not obvious during the registration process or in 
the tool’s FAQs:
Ja, erstmal muss man darauf überhaupt kommen. Vielleicht lag das auch daran, dass 
ich da nicht so geübt mit bin, aber dass man erstmal informiert wird, das war am An-
fang das Problem. Also man klickte dann immer mal alle drei Tage oder pro Woche 
mal rein, mal gucken, was denn da so los ist, welche Initiativen es gibt. Oder ich habe 
jetzt ja auch selbst mal eine Initiative gestartet, da war man dann selbst auch interess-
iert, welcher andere interessiert sich denn auch dafür und so weiter. Aber bis ich dann 
erstmal drauf stieß, dass man sich auch immer per Email von LiquidFriesland benach-
richtigen lassen kann – und ich glaube das ist ein Manko was ganz Viele noch nicht 
verstanden haben. Weil eigentlich gibt es einen ziemlich großen Kreis der Anmelder, es 
gibt aber an sich relativ wenige, die regelmäßig mitmachen […] und ich glaube, dass 
das auch ein Problem ist des Benachrichtigens, das denen noch nicht klar ist, dass man 
automatisch benachrichtigt werden könnte.66
64 Cf. Susanne Engstler, personal interview, Varel, 8 October 2013.
65 Cf. Ursula Thoms, personal interview, Varel, 9 October 2013.
66 Susanne Engstler, personal interview, Varel, 8 October 2013.
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You actually have to come up with the idea first. Maybe the reason is that I’m not that 
[tech] savvy, but getting informed was initially quite a problem. Basically, one just 
logged in every three days or once a week to see what was going on, which initiatives 
there were. Or I have recently started an initiative myself, so of course one is interested 
in who else is interested in the initiative and so on. But once I found out that you could 
opt in for email notifications from LiquidFriesland itself – I think this is a flaw which 
quite a lot of people have not understood yet. Because, actually a lot of people have 
registered, but only a few do take part regularly […] and I think this is also a problem 
of notification, that many have not found out yet that you can be notified automatically.
The consequences of this unfortunate default notification settings can be dras-
tic. For users, having to look through all the websites’ categories to see if there 
is something new and interesting are time-consuming and annoying tasks that 
de-streamline their experience. For more committed users, it may take some time 
before they stumble on the settings themselves, and they may have been more 
active if they had received email notifications about new ideas or discussions. 
Moreover, new users may assume that they will receive automatic notifications if 
new ideas are added, especially given the low number of total initiatives that were 
being set in. It appears likely that newly registered users were confused or even 
scared off by the lack of LiquidFriesland activity round-ups coming into their in-
boxes, and consequently rarely if ever visited the site again because they thought 
that nothing was happening on it. Users may have even forgotten about their reg-
istration, having not received any kind of prompts to visit and become active on 
the platform. These hypothetical effects of the modest default notification policy 
built into LiquidFriesland may be interpreted as a side effect of the overstimulated 
times we live in today. Each day, one receives countless (spam) e-mails encourag-
ing one to ‘click here, buy this, read that’. Perhaps, then, it is difficult to keep an 
online service in mind that does not automatically call attention to itself.
However, measures of participatory and digital democracy do not only chal-
lenge administration and politicians to think and communicate in new ways, but 
also citizens submitting their ideas. Citizens must train their argumentation skills 
and learn how to formulate their ideas precisely, and perhaps even to articulate 
them in the ‘language of politicians’. The US-American political scientist Benja-
min Barber is convinced that citizens are naturally capable of more and better par-
ticipation, while other participative democracy theorists suggest that citizens will 
quickly acquire those competences once integrated into information and learning 
processes. Björn Levi Gunnarsson believes that readying citizens for deliberative 
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democracy is “a step by step process, you can’t just jump into the deep pool, you 
have to learn how to swim first”.67
Aside from mastering appropriate syntax and diction, it also appears challeng-
ing for regular citizens to assess the municipal budgeting and budget plans that 
play a, if not the, central role in political decision-making processes. This is illus-
trated by Ursula Thoms, who despite being a web designer and having used all 
the support offered by the district of Friesland to find her way around LiquidFries-
land, says that she gave up trying to understand how it worked in detail. She mus-
es that regular citizen’s apolitical-ness and inexperience is probably difficult to 
understand for people professionally engaged with politics. In this respect, Thoms 
is stressing that a lack of formal political experience does not mean that she has no 
opinion, or that she cannot voice her opinion, but that she may not be able to voice 
it in a way politicians are used to.68 Generally, my findings support Jenkins’ and 
Itō’s argument that “true participation requires many qualities: agency, the ability 
to understand a social situation well enough to engage constructively, the skills to 
contribute effectively, connections with others to help build an audience, emotion-
al resilience to handle negative feedback, and enough social status to speak with-
out consequences” (22). Further, they think that “(t)he barrier to participation is 
not the technology but the kinds of privilege that are often ignored in meritocratic 
discourse. I do think that technology has opened up new doors to some people [...] 
but it’s important to recognize the ways in which it also reinforces other forms of 
inequalities that make it harder for some people to engage” (22).
As noted earlier, it was not only users but also programmers of Betri Reykjavík 
who were dissatisfied with the city administration’s communication: ”We were 
trying to set up a meeting with the city officials and then we sent an email basically 
saying, because we saw that the users were going down, so we sent an email with 
the headline ‘Betri Reykjavík is dying’ […] And this actually got us a meeting with 
everybody.” 69 The administration’s irregular communication pattern highlighted 
once more to Gunnar and Róbert that Betri Reykjavík did not have the status they 
felt it should have within the administration. For them, the main illustration of this 
was the turnover of clerks (due to the precarious nature of the position) in charge 
of processing ideas coming in from the website and preparing them for discussion 
in the standing committees: 
67 Björn Levi Gunnarsson, personal interview, Reykjavík, 4 June 2014.
68 Cf. Ursula Thoms, personal interview, Varel, 9 October 2013.
69 Róbert Bjarnason, personal interview IV together with Gunnar Grímsson, Reykjavík, 
10 June 2014.
8 Results and Discussion | 117
One thing that’s been really bad for Betri Reykjavík is maybe another facet of not 
enough dedication on the part of the city is that we had four different people from the 
City of Reykjavík being on the project [in three years]. So we had one woman there 
starting it, […] and I think Betri Reykjavík hadn’t even opened by the time she left. Then 
we got a guy […] and it wasn’t even a formal allocation of resources of even a fifty per 
cent job. The reason that changed was that I got angry at meeting after meeting, serious-
ly, I was just shouting, What the hell are you going to run this if you don’t have a person 
doing it? and stuff like that. And then there was one guy who came in in some kind on 
unemployment system where you could have money from the government and partial 
money from the city and that was sort of an in-between-thing and he stuck around until 
he got an offer for a real job, so he understandably left because this was a very unsecure 
job, because it wasn’t long term or anything. And then we got Hilmar, and he stayed on 
for quite a while. It was during Hilmar […] that I rammed it through to get it a fifty per 
cent position. […] And now we have this woman called […] Unnur Magrét.”70
Moreover, it was only at a meeting with officials that the programmers learnt that 
our contract had lapsed, for like one year we had been without a contract. They still 
paid us a little bit for the hosting and stuff but we signed like an emergency […] six 
months contract to extend it and we were thinking maybe we should just refuse to sign 
the contract before the elections, maybe we should just go to the media, tell them how 
they really promised everything about e-democracy and then nobody can take a meeting 
with us.71
Unlike the previous contract signed with the then municipality under Jón Gnarr in 
2011, this was not a collaborative contract: 
We have like a renewal of the original agreement which was after long negotiation. It 
went away from being a collaboration agreement to sort of […] standard contractor 
agreement, which, to obvious reasons, is the thing the city is used to doing. […] We sent 
off a nice, long, sort of everybody-agreement, it was still in legalese, but the content 
was: ‘we are working on this together and you supply that, and we are supplying that 
and de-de-de’, […]. And then a new lawyer at city hall went through it and as usual, she 
70 Gunnar Grímsson, personal interview IV together with Róbert Bjarnason, Reykjavík, 
10 June 2014. It appears as if the employment situation has been improved. In 2018, 
three clerks posted news and decisions from the committees to the news walls of ideas 
in the name of the City of Reykjavík.
71 Róbert Bjarnason, personal interview IV together with Gunnar Grímsson, Reykjavík, 
10 June 2014.
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was just doing her job. But that resulted in removing almost all of the obligations of the 
city. And ours as well, it was turned into a standard contract saying ‘You are running 
this website and we are paying you for it’. A bit more, I’m obviously simplifying things 
a bit, but what that resulted in is that they removed the word collaboration where it is 
certainly placed in the document, because it wasn’t that kind of agreement anymore.72
It becomes apparent here that integrating citizens to a larger extent and on a regular 
basis through online participation tools constitutes a major challenge for admin-
istrations. Gunnar and Róbert recognise this: “It is really difficult for the system, 
for the bureaucracy, for the administration, it’s really difficult to get something 
like this [Betri Reykjavík with its regularly incoming ideas] throwing into their 
sort of normal procedures. Everything running smoothly and all of the sudden, 
you get something that sort of collides with a lot of the sort of established things 
that you’re used to.”73
The challenges described in this sub-chapter illustrate that there were a lot of 
ongoing conflicts, uncertainty and unsolved issues at play in the maintenance of 
Betri Reykjavík, at least when compared to LiquidFriesland. It becomes apparent 
that the establishment and support of the platform in the municipal decision-mak-
ing processes, as well as the mindsets of politicians and administration, are central 
elements in the successful functioning of the tool. LiquidFriesland was an online 
participation tool that was realized from the top-down. Consequently, it was nev-
er endangered by the administration’s and/or politicians’ indifference towards its 
functioning, or the processing of citizens’ ideas coming in through it.
In the case of Betri Reykjavík – which was initially a grassroots initiative by 
the Citizens’ Foundation –, however, cooperation with the city was only a belated 
step. First and foremost, it was developed and thought of as a political statement, 
both a protest against and an answer to the nepotism that had brought Iceland to 
an almost complete breakdown on all levels in 2008–09. Gunnar and Róbert may 
have had little knowledge about the workings of municipal decision-making pro-
cesses or the ways in which administrations operate. Riding the wave of societal 
rage over the economic crash and the nepotism underlaying society, the economy 
and politics within Iceland, Gunnar and Róbert came up with a website that hit a 
nerve with a great number of fellow citizens. Having been hit hard by the crisis 
72 Gunnar Grímsson, personal interview III together with Róbert Bjarnason, Reykjavík, 
30 May 2014.
73 Gunnar Grímsson, personal interview IV together with Róbert Bjarnason, Reykjavík, 
10 June 2014.
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themselves, they could easily understand the rage of their fellow citizens who felt 
failed by their elected politicians.74
Even today, there is still a struggle to completely and sustainably incorpo-
rate Betri Reykjavík into the municipal decision-making processes that had been 
agreed on, at least on paper, long ago. Indeed, as the unnoticed lapse of the con-
tract between Betri Reykjavík’s programmers and the City of Reykjavík showed, 
not even on paper.75 For the Citizens’ Foundation, “it is definitely an uphill battle, 
[…] especially with the city […] failing to give it [Betri Reykjavík] enough atten-
tion and answering”. 76 Based on these experiences, Grímsson is always at pains 
to point out during Citizens’ Foundation presentations or workshops that “one of 
the best ways for people to make their e-democracy is to get the bureaucracy, the 
administration to commit on helping you and taking on the issues.”77 As formats 
of digital democracy enable and force a relationship based on partnership between 
citizens and state, this new organisational format results in power shifts which 
both parties must be willing to face (cf. Geiger 103). 
In contrast, LiquidFriesland was implemented by administration and politi-
cians with a good knowledge of the ways in which municipal decision-making 
processes and administrative procedures work. This knowledge was used by the 
Association for Interactive Democracy to adapt LiquidFeedback for use on a dis-
trict level. LiquidFriesland then both depicts the complicated and lengthy deci-
sion-making processes and reflects the programmers’ strong principles in regards 
to verifying participants and secret ballots (cf. Behrens et al., Principles 53). In 
my opinion, however, it is the citizens – the prospective users of the platform – 
who become lost in this process of verification. When users have finally found 
their way into the platform after the complicated and time-consuming registration 
process, they have often lost their motivation to use the tool because it is compli-
cated and alien to their every-day lives.
To maintain users interest and interaction through the platform, politicians and 
the administration in particular need to rethink and adopt a simpler language that 
allows communication in all directions to become as smooth as possible. As critics 
of online participation often stress, it would still exclude parts of society. This an 
74 Cf. Gunnar Grímsson, personal interview IV together with Róbert Bjarnason, Reykja-
vík, 10 June 2014.
75 Cf. Róbert Bjarnason, personal interview IV together with Gunnar Grímsson, Reykja-
vík, 10 June 2014.
76 Róbert Bjarnasson, personal interview V together with Gunnar Grímsson, Reykjavík, 
18 June 2014.
77 Gunnar Grímsson, personal interview IV together with Róbert Bjarnason, Reykjavík, 
10 June 2014.
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issue too large to be debated here. Yet it is also a fallacy to suggest that there are 
no obstacles regarding access and participation in offline political decision-mak-
ing processes. 
Interim conclusion
It is difficult for the tools to become and to remain an established part of the 
citizens’ participation repertoire when programmers either abandon their own 
creations or lose interest in their maintenance. Rather, online participation tools 
require constant attention und support, both from the technical and from the polit-
ical and administrative sides. Staffing, commitment, and know-how are needed to 
maintain an online participation tool that is close to the citizens’ everyday lives, 
that accommodates their needs in a way they feel the urge to use it regularly. If this 
is not the case, if such online participation tools are poorly maintained and lack 
commitment from those who operate them, they will not become more broadly 
accepted by society in the long term and will therefore not become a regular part 
of citizens’ participatory repertoire. 
It is certainly not enough to have a site programmed and to then leave it with-
out maintenance, and to then somehow hope for the best. That is not the way digi-
tal democracy will work. Although computers are involved, it does not follow that 
such tools or digital democracy in general function automatically, without human 
care and commitment. Ideally, citizens, programmers, and politicians and admin-
istrators would work together on drafting and building a participation tool that 
does justice to all participants needs and wants: programmers and their principles, 
politicians and administration who want a tool that reflects the long, complicated 
process of decision-making, and the citizens who want a tool that is transparent, 
intuitive and easy to use, and similar to other web applications they use on a dai-
ly basis. Volunteer representative Djure Meinen, for example, had several ideas 
about how to improve LiquidFriesland.
Es müsste die Software attraktiver werden, sie müsste/also ich sag’ ja immer, sie kann 
nicht viel einfacher werden, weil Demokratie nun mal kompliziert ist und insofern kann 
man demokratische Prozesse auch nicht viel einfacher abbilden als in LiquidFriesland. 
Aber man könnte natürlich trotzdem über Usability im weitesten Sinne nachdenken: 
sich vom Design her etwas gefälliger aufstellen, so typische Usability-Guidelines ein-
halten, wo muss ein Knopf hin, damit der User den wichtigsten Knopf als erstes sieht, 
Hilfen prominenter anbieten – das ist glaube ich ein wichtiger Faktor.78
78 Djure Meinen, personal interview, Varel, 16 September 2013.
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The software would have to become more attractive, it would have, I always say, the 
software cannot get much easier, because democracy as such is complicated and, in that 
way, democratic processes cannot be depicted much more easily than they already are on 
LiquidFriesland. But of course, one could think about usability in the broader sense: a 
more pleasant design, where does a button have to go so that the user sees the most im-
portant button first, help-manuals could be positioned more prominently – I think those 
are important factors.
True, these findings may pose serious challenges, but online participation tools 
will only have the chance to become firmly established in the repertoire of politi-
cal participation if those challenges are met head on. 
8.3.3  “Trying to improve the debate”79 –  
Online Participation Tools Are (Not) Places  
for Discussion and Deliberation 
Another cause of confusion and conflict – aside from a lack of transparency and 
the administration struggling to implement online participation tools in their de-
cision-making processes – were the differing expectations and hopes of the actor 
groups towards the possible extent of informed communication. As Klaus Schön-
berger points out, within
eine[r] kulturwissenschaftliche[n] Technikforschung […] besteht nach wie vor die Auf-
gabe, den Sach- und Dingaspekt verschiedener Ausformungen von Technik angemes-
sen zu fassen. […] Auf dieser Basis kann empirisch gefragt werden, in welcher Weise 
technische Vorgaben (etwa in Form von Software) und Handlungs- und Kommunika-
tionsmuster welche soziale Praxis ermöglichen, unterstützen, beschleunigen, verlang-
samen oder behindern. (Schönberger 210)
anthropological technology studies the task remains to grasp the aspects of object-ness 
and thing-ness of different formations of technology. On this basis, it can be empirically 
investigated in which ways technological standards (in the format of software, for ex-
ample) as well as action and communication patterns enable, support, accelerate, slow 
down, or hinder social practice.
Through their software design, both LiquidFriesland and Betri Reykjavík appear 
to favour individualised actions like voting and the setting in of ideas over in-
79 Gunnar Grímsson, personal interview V together with Róbert Bjarnason, 18 June 
2014.
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teraction and communal actions like commenting and discussion. Whereas users 
hoped for debate and deliberation, that did not appear to be the prime goal of pro-
grammers and politicians. This sub-chapter will show that it seems reasonable to 
believe that politicians and administration, as commissioners of those platforms, 
are at least partially responsible for these issues.
“It is an idea gathering thing and an idea prioritization, but last but not least 
it is trying to improve the debate”, Betri Reykjavík programmer Gunnar Gríms-
son states. Indeed, the website is officially described as the City of Reykjavík’s 
“online consultation forum” (cf. ‘About Better Reykjavík’). The reality of the 
tool means that the terms debate and consultation can only be understood here 
in diluted terms. That is, the city “has consultations” with its citizens in that they 
provide the platform for citizens to set in ideas. However, we have learnt in the 
preceding sub-chapter that the city administration has only demonstrated interest 
in its citizens’ ideas to a limited degree. From the users’ perspective, consultation, 
debate, and deliberation barely take place, as becomes clear in Björn Levi Gun-
narsson’s statement: “it is a glorified idea-box, really. It’s an idea-box, it is a public 
pin-board, where people can read and re-pin, put a new pin on a cork with a new 
idea”.80 Krístinn Már Aðælsson sees Betri Reykjavík similarly:
I think it is a good tool to collect ideas. I don’t think there is a lot of deliberation there, 
at least not from my experience. […] There are numerous occasions where an idea has 
got enough likes and […] got into the voting phase without having a deliberation or 
there is no argument for and against, for example. You can go through the whole process 
without getting an argument against or making a pro and con analysis. You just have to 
put forward your idea and if you get enough likes, you can go the whole way.81 
What I mean by deliberation here is the 
informed discussion between individuals about issues which concern them, leading 
to some form of consensus and collective decision. To come to a collective decision, 
minds must be changed as a consequence of deliberation: this is the key difference 
between deliberative theories of democracy and those in the representative or direct 
vein. Preferences are not just aggregated but revised in the light of a preceding debate. 
(Wright and Street 850f.)
80 Björn Levi Gunnarsson, personal interview, Reykjavík, 4 June 2014.
81 Kristínn Már Aðælsson, personal interview, Reykjavík, 20 June 2014.
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That way, deliberative theorists see the formation process of political opinion and 
will as the most important aspect of democracy (cf. della Porta, ‘Deliberative De-
mocracy’ 62).
As on Betri Reykjavík, there was no space for discussion – aside from com-
ments on specific proposed ideas – within LiquidFriesland, as Susanne Engstler 
points out: 
Das Problem ist eigentlich und das spiegelt LiquidFriesland auch wieder, man kann 
nämlich keine Diskussion anfangen. Das geht einfach nicht, so wie meinetwegen auf 
facebook. […] und das führt dann da ran an LiquidFriesland, weil man eigentlich nur 
mehr oder weniger die Initiative unterstützen kann oder man kann eine neue Initiative 
einbringen. Soweit ist man aber allerdings oft noch nicht. Wenn man wegen eigentlich 
so einer Diskussion auch da ist, dann wäre das erstmal gut, wenn man dort die Möglich-
keit hätte, sich auszutauschen, bevor man eine Initiative startet. Man ist manchmal noch 
gar nicht so weit, dass man sagen möchte, da stehe ich jetzt voll dahinten.82
Actually, the problem is, and that is visible in LiquidFriesland, that you cannot start 
discussions. It’s just not designated, like on facebook for example. […] and this leads 
to LiquidFriesland, because basically all you can do is support an initiative or submit 
a new initiative. But often, one is not ready to do that just yet, because one originally 
came for a discussion, and that would be ideal as a first step, to have the possibility to 
deliberate before starting an initiative. Sometimes, one is not quite at the point where 
one would like to say one supports that idea fully.
Both LiquidFriesland and Betri Reykjavík do not appear to facilitate much dis-
cussion amongst users, but rather to encourage participants to add new ideas or to 
vote on others’ ideas. Kristínn Már Aðælsson’s and Susanne Engstler’s accounts 
of the contradiction between what the tools ought to facilitate and which actions 
are possible in practice are not isolated cases. Rather, it stands to reason that “the 
democratic possibilities opened up (or closed off) by websites are not a product of 
the technology as such, but of the ways in which it is constructed, by the way it is 
designed” by humans (Wright and Street 850).
At least initially, however, users take Betri Reykjavík and LiquidFriesland at 
face value, that is as “online consultation forums” (cf. ‘About Better Reykjavík’), 
an “online participatory social network” (Citizens Foundation, ‘Better Reykjavík’), 
or an “Online Platform für Bürgerbeteiligung” (eng. “Online Platform for Citi-
zen’s Participation”) (Landkreis Friesland, August 2015). For instance, Betri Rey-
kjavík user Per Hansen thinks that “that’s one thing that I feel should be developed 
82 Susanne Engstler, personal interview, Varel, 8 October 2013.
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or should work better, (it should) encourage discussion. Because people tend to 
just go through and click, yes – no. It seems to me that they don’t bother to really 
dig into the issue and perhaps they are not taking the right decisions because they 
haven’t been thinking about arguments for and against, (about) the background 
of the issue”.83 Closer inspection shows that both of Per’s observations, meagre 
discussion and the uninformed voting on ideas, are promoted by the specific de-
sign of the tools. The example of Anna Válsdóttir’s idea “Knattspyrnuhús á ÍR 
svæðið í Skógarseli” (“Indoor football hall on the land of Íþróttafélag Reykjavík 
(Reykjavík Athletic Association) in (the area) Skógarsel”) in Figure 5, First Look 
at “Knattspyrnuhús á ÍR svæðið í Skógarseli”, idea in Betri Reykjavík, 118, illus-
trates the “role played by design in facilitating or thwarting deliberation” (Wright 
and Street 849).84
On opening the idea’s starting page, there is little content visible aside from a 
title, a one-line description, an image and the voting buttons. The low information 
density of the ideas’ start screens is furthered by the unusually large default view 
(see Figure 5).85 Through clicking the heart-button, users endorse an idea, while 
clicking on the banned-button shows their disapproval. The speech bubble indica-
tes that 18 comments have been made about this idea, but clicking on the speech 
bubble does nothing. Rather, to read the comments, one must scroll down. 
Fig. 5:  First Look at “Knattspyrnuhús á ÍR svæðið í Skógarseli”, idea in Betri 
Reykjavík86
83 Per Hansen, personal interview, Reykjavík, 23 July 2012.
84 Translation: Indoor Football Hall on the grounds of the Sports Club Reykjavík in the 
Skógarseli area.
85 In fact, I got into the habit of scaling down Betri Reykjavík to 70 or 80 percent in my 
browser to see more content in a glance (see Figure 8, 122).
86 Idea by Anna Válsdóttir. Screenshot taken on 3 May 2018 at https://betrireykjavik.is/
post/9013.
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Fig. 6:  First Comments to “Knattspyrnuhús á ÍR svæðið í Skógarseli”, Idea in 
Betri Reykjavík87
The sharing-button enables users to share the idea on their Social Media accounts. 
So for a start, it does not appear logical that there are four buttons, alongside one 
another and with an identical design, but that only three of them are responsive.
In this case, the description of the idea is particularly meagre. Barely a full 
sentence, it simply says “Indoor football hall with a round roof”. If the user takes 
the structure of the website’s design literally, she will indeed keep herself brief 
Fig. 7: Starting Page of Betri Reykjavík in Default 100% Viewing Size88
87 Idea by Anna Válsdóttir. Screenshot taken on 3 May 2018 at https://betrireykjavik.is/
post/9013.
88 By scaling down, more content becomes visible. Screenshot taken on 3 May 2018 at 
https://betrireykjavik.is/group/47.
126 | Political Participation in the Digital Age
Fig. 8: Starting Page of Betri Reykjavík Reduced 89
in the description and add her arguments in the points for/against section below 
(see Figure 5, 120). While this is not the case here, users generally do post for and 
against comments. However, those arguments are neither placed prominently nor 
arranged clearly, and one must scroll down to read all of them (see Figure 6, 121). 
This linear and chronologic design inhibits deliberation amongst the participants 
because it is impossible to answer or add a remark directly related to a point made 
by somebody else. Reading all comments, that is informing oneself about the issue 
Fig. 9: The Overview of the Latest Ideas Added to Betri Reykjavík90
89 Starting Page of Betri Reykjavík Reduced to 67% in the Mozilla Firefox Browser 
Quantum. Screenshot taken on 3 May 2018 at https://betrireykjavik.is/group/47.
90 The grey symbols (heart, speech bubble, banned, share) are all responsive, except the 
speech bubble. Screenshot taken on 3 May 2018 at https://betrireykjavik.is/group/47.
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at question, requires more effort from users than adding a new point without ha-
ving read an overview on the issue first. According to Barber, the design of online 
discussion forums like this facilitate “people talking without listening” (as cited 
in Wright and Street 852).
Furthermore, the low information density due to the forum’s unusually large 
default view is not limited to the specific ideas’ start screens. The low information 
density is especially conspicuous on the actual starting page of Betri Reykjavík 
(see Figure 7. 121). Purportedly showing the latest ideas set into the system, the 
starting page barely shows more than the default header of Betri Reykjavík and the 
prominent orange “Add new idea” button. The difference to scaling the website 
down to around 70 per cent is striking: suddenly, the latest ideas become visible 
(see Figure 8).
However, no web designers could rightly expect users to scale-down their 
website. This conveys the impression that if programmers and politicians had 
wanted to create an overview at first glance of the already existing ideas, Betri 
Reykjavík could have easily been designed that way. Rather, the opportunities for 
action available at first glance appear to be restricted to the “simple” quantitati-
ve, hence measurable, acts of voting and sharing (as implied by the prominently 
placed heart, banned, and share buttons), as opposed to the “more complicated” 
qualitative acts of adding points for or against – that is commenting and delibera-
tion. Looking at online discussion from that perspective, an essentially pejorative 
description like clicktivism suddenly seems appropriate. This is carried to the ex-
tremes by the design of responsive heart, banned, and share buttons for each idea, 
even in the overview page of latest ideas (see Figure 9). This makes it possible 
to just “Click-and-Go” from idea to idea, that is from one colourful over-dimen-
sional image to the next, without even having read the full description, let alone 
reading the key points for and against. 
Again, the degree to which the websites design favours setting in new ideas 
over investigating and debating ideas that are already there is apparent in the large 
orange “Add new idea” button in the centre of the screen. It becomes apparent 
that exchange, networking, and deliberation in Betri Reykjavík are inhibited by 
design. Users’ also found that discussion was further inhibited by problems with 
the search function in the past. Freyja describes searching as “also one thing that 
I found difficult […]. Because I was trying to search for ideas about dogs, and I 
didn’t get all the ideas, even though I tried different words”.91 
It is indeed common to find multiple ideas revolving around a similar issue 
on Betri Reykjavík, such as the need for dog runs in Reykjavík, a topic near and 
dear Freyja: “I also noticed that in some neighbourhoods there were maybe three 
91 Freyja Kristinsdóttir, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 17 July 2012.
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ideas about the same thing. Because the people didn’t see the ideas, so they start-
ed a new one”.92 Guðrun had similar difficulties: “the bad thing about this is that 
everybody is putting in their idea, they are not reading the others. So I might have 
five ideas basically about the same thing and instead of everybody getting behind 
that […]” one idea, support is dispersed.93 Þórgnýr also criticised the fact that it 
was “not possible to combine cases. Sometimes somebody would put in a case 
that’s already there. And that un-streamlines the whole experience for everyone 
and is actually sometimes quite annoying”.94
Whereas searching for similar, already existing ideas does require a certain 
degree of reflexivity and initiative on behalf of the user, it surely would be pos-
sible to build in a reminder or even an interactive feature to the “Add new idea” 
webform that reminds the author to checking if his idea has already been submit-
ted by another user. Instead, the design favours the production of non-referential, 
disconnected and superfluous rather than communally deliberated and informed 
content. Evidence for this can be found, for instance, in the placement of the “Add 
new idea” button on almost every page in the forum, unreliable search functions, 
and the lower priority placed on posts by others, be it ideas or comments, that are 
only visible through additional scrolling and clicking. As US-American political 
scientist Anthony G. Wilhelm puts it, the design decisions underlying this produce 
“self-expression and monologue, without in large measure the ‘listening’, respon-
siveness, and dialogue that would promote communicative action, such as prior-
itizing issues, negotiating differences, reaching agreement, and plotting a course 
of action to influence the political agenda” (as cited in Wright and Street 852). 
That is, the design encourages users to focus on their own individual ideas rather 
than interacting with the system and fellow users. This adds to the dispersion 
instead of the pooling of citizens’ interests and forces, or as the British political 
scientists Scott Wright and John Street argue: “how discussion is organized within 
the medium of communication helps to determine whether or not the result will be 
deliberation or cacophony” (850).
Programmers of both tools stated that they had, in fact, intentionally restricted 
the possibilities for user discussions within the respective “online discussion fo-
rums”. Andreas Nitsche, one of the programmers of LiquidFriesland, recounts that 
“we thought about if we wanted a discussion forum. We were sure that we needed 
discussion before voting took place. […] But do we want to build a discussion 
92 Freyja Kristinsdóttir, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 17 July 2012.
93 Guðrún Sigurðardóttir, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 9 July 2012.
94 Þórgnýr Thoroddsen, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 20 July 2012.
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forum? We said NO!“95 Gunnar Grímsson and Róbert Bjarnason also stressed that 
they had intentionally omitted features facilitating discussion or the possibility of 
replying to someone’s comment in the format of a (sub-)thread, as they did not 
want users to become “lost in comment threads where you have someone blogging 
about something or a news article or something and there’s something lacking or 
someone comes in with a new insight and that’s in the seventh comment”.96
In other words, there is “an element of political choice in the creation of tech-
nologies” (Wright and Street 855). However, as Wright and Street point out, “[o]
nline discussion forums can be designed differently – in ways that facilitate de-
liberation“(853). Indeed, LiquidFriesland’s programmers had made the conscious 
decision to focus their software on voting rather than on discussion: 
Erstens, eine gute Diskussion gut abzubilden ist ja sehr schwierig und dann ist 
es ja so, dass man niemanden zwingen kann, dann dieses eine System zur Politisi-
erung zu nutzen. Und es gibt auch aus unserer Sicht gar keinen Grund dafür. Man 
kann in der Familie diskutieren, man kann am Stammtisch diskutieren, man kann 
Diskussionsrunden machen, man kann was in die Zeitung schreiben, einen Leser-
brief, Diskussionen am Arbeitsplatz – also überall finden Diskussionen statt […]. 
Natürlich elektronisch in Foren so und so, aber jeder sucht sich wirklich seinen 
Platz, wo er diskutiert und das muss man auch nicht zentralisieren, das war so 
unser Ansatz dabei. Was man zentralisieren muss ist natürlich die Stimmabgabe 
für die Abstimmung. Weil das macht keinen Sinn, wenn jeder an seinem Ort ab-
stimmt.97
First, depicting a good discussion well is very difficult. Moreover, you cannot force 
someone to use this one politicising system. And from our point of view there is no need 
to do so. One can have discussions within the family, one can have discussions within 
one’s group of regular contacts, […] one can write something in a newspaper, a reader’s 
letter, discussions at the workplace – basically everywhere that discussions take place. 
Of course, electronically in forums and so on, so everyone has their own place to dis-
cuss, and there is no need to centralise this, that was our approach. What you must cen-
tralise, of course, is voting. It just makes no sense when everyone votes at one’s place.
95 Cf. Andreas Nitsche, personal interview together with Axel Kistner, Berlin, 1 Novem-
ber 2013.
96 Gunnar Grímsson, personal interview I together with Róbert Bjarnason, Reykjavík, 12 
July 2012.
97 Andreas Nitsche, personal interview together with Axel Kistner, Berlin, 1 November 
2013.
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Here, the programmers sought to avoid confrontation by stressing the voting as-
pect of the website – users could debate and deliberate elsewhere. 
This sub-chapter reveals two key aspects of online discussion forums that until 
now have largely been ignored by both the public and by academia. First, soft-
ware design appears to be fundamental in determining whether “online discus-
sion forums” encourage or discourage debate and deliberation amongst users. The 
layout, arrangement, size, and colour of both buttons and links determines their 
visibility and therefore their use. One becomes aware that information technology 
is not “given and determinant” but rather made by humans. Second, “websites 
(and, indeed, the architecture of the Internet itself) […], are the product of techni-
cal, political and other choices” (Wright and Street 850). In short, software design 
is politics. On Betri Reykjavík and LiquidFriesland, it seems evident that political 
decisions were made to restrict the extent of actual debate and deliberation possi-
ble, both by politicians and programmers. Here, it becomes clear that communica-
tion within online participation tools is rarely clear and linear, and confusion and 
frustration await users who expect a place for “discussion, direct democracy; […] 
the open possibility of making yourself heard in an active way, not against, but 
really working with other citizens”98.
8.3.4  “So the people that work on it, are they just a company or 
are they like the city council?”99 – The Public Relations of 
Online Participation Tools
The preceding sub-chapters have focused on communication within and between 
the different groups directly involved with the platforms: users, programmers, and 
the administration and politicians. In this sub-chapter, I focus on public relations 
in terms of communication with exterior actors like the public and media. For on-
line discussion and participation forums to thrive, it appears crucial to continuous-
ly develop and pursue planned communication and public relations campaigns. In 
the case of both platforms, it appears as if operators invested insufficient financial 
and human resources in promotion.
Most participants from both fields recounted conversations with family, 
friends, or colleagues who did not know that the websites existed or their scope. 
Anna Wagner-Becker recounts that nobody in her circle of acquaintances had ever 
heard of LiquidFriesland. Once, she shared an initiative from LiquidFriesland on 
her facebook wall with the appeal to her friends to take part in it. No one did.100
98 Dominique Plédel Jónsson, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 17 July 2012.
99 Freyja Kristinsdóttir, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 23 June 2014.
100 Cf. Anna Wagner-Becker, focus group, Varel, 9 September 2014.
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Indeed, many participants hold the low sums spent on marketing and the lack 
of advertising strategy responsible for the general lack of knowledge about the 
tools, as Susanne Engstler’s statement illustrates:
Also, ich hoffe eigentlich, dass dieses Geld, das LiquidFriesland gewonnen hat, 
wirklich fast komplett eingesetzt wird um einmal Werbung zu machen [...]. Man stößt 
also zu wenig darauf, dass das bekannt gemacht wird. Es gab eine Umfrage auch die 
gestartet worden ist. Deutschlandfunk war da gewesen und hatte vorher eine Umfrage 
gemacht in den Fußgängerzonen hier in Friesland, was die Leute damit anfangen kön-
nen; kein Mensch konnte was mit LiquidFriesland anfangen! Also alle die sie gefragt 
haben. Die hätten bestimmt jemanden gezeigt, wenn sie einen gehabt hätten, der das 
gewusst hätte. Aber so haben sie so drei, vier Beispiele gezeigt, wo die Leute nichts 
damit anfangen konnten.101 
So I really hope that the money LiquidFriesland was awarded will be used to place 
some advertisements. 102 One comes across it too seldomly for it to become known to 
the public. There was a survey started by Deutschlandfunk [state-funded national radio 
station] in the pedestrian areas in Friesland about what the people know about Liquid-
Friesland. Nobody knew anything about it! That is everyone they asked. They surely 
would have shown it if they had somebody who knew it. But they showed three or four 
examples of people who did not know anything about LiquidFriesland.
It becomes clear that, at least ideally, an ongoing and diversified advertisement 
campaign would be developed to make citizens aware of the possibilities for par-
ticipation on online forums like Betri Reykjavík and LiquidFriesland. As Guð-
mundur points out: 
I don’t think they do enough to get people involved, new people involved. They are kind 
of relying on people will use it because somebody else is using it. So that is not hap-
pening enough. I think they have to be more initiative to get people involved. […] They 
had some initial effort to let people know it’s there. […] they shouldn’t stop advertising, 
always have something that would remind people of it.103
101 Susanne Engstler, personal interview, Varel, 8 October 2013.
102 In 2013, LiquidFriesland was awarded the dbb Inovation Award which included 5000 
euros prize money (cf. ‘Dbb Innovationspreis: Gewinner Stuttgart’). The district tabled 
a motion in LiquidFriesland for the users to say what they would like the money to be 
spent on.
103 Guðmundur Kristjánsson, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 9 July 2012.
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Whereas LiquidFriesland user numbers peaked relatively early in its existence,104 
new users have continued registering on Betri Reykjavík throughout the years. Of 
course, the total number of registered users cannot be compared with the num-
ber of active users. Whereas the district of Friesland’s revaluation reports gave 
detailed accounts on the (ever decreasing) number of active users, as opposed to 
those registered or those who did not complete all steps of registration, there are 
no such numbers available for Betri Reykjavík. Nevertheless, it appears likely that 
user activity has been higher within Betri Reykjavík, as the forum has continued to 
attract new users over the years. 
In the case of LiquidFriesland, it appears as if encouraging additional users 
to register through an ongoing, widespread and concerted advertising campaign 
was not actually planned for by the district of Friesland’s administration, as the 
following quotation by former press secretary Sönke Klug illustrates:
Ich will ja was erfahren über das Thema Online-Beteiligung und es nützt mir auch 
langfristig nichts, wenn wir jetzt für ganz viel Geld, was wir nicht haben, jetzt Band-
enwerbung bei den Fußballspielen der Kreisligamannschaften schalteten. Denn erstens 
glaube ich […], dass noch gar nicht klar ist einen wie großen Teil der potentiellen In-
teressierten wir möglicherweise schon in der Plattform haben. Ob der Anteil nicht viel-
leicht schon relativ groß ist, obwohl er in absoluten Zahlen relativ gering ist. Und die 
zweite Frage ist auch: selbst wenn es uns gelänge über Werbeversprechen oder irgend-
wo geschicktes Marketing Leute in die Plattform hinein zu holen, sie dazu zu bringen, 
sich einen Account zu besorgen, dann würden wir die Zahlen pushen, es würde aber 
eigentlich gar nichts aussagen über die Bereitschaft und auch Qualität von demokra-
tischem Engagement und würde Karteileichen produzieren. Und Leute dazu zu bringen, 
ist ja schon aus demokratietheoretischer Sicht etwas fragwürdig.105
The thing is, I want to get to know something about the topic of online participation. So 
in this respect there is no point in spending a lot of money, which we do not have, on 
perimeter advertising at local football league games. First, I don’t think it is clear yet 
that we don’t already have a relatively large number of potentially interested citizens 
on the platform already, even if it is quite low in absolute numbers. The second ques-
tion is: even if we would succeed in getting people to join the platform through some 
advertising promises or intelligent marketing, then the numbers would not say anything 
about the willingness and also the quality of democratic engagement, it would merely 
produce inactive members. Moreover, getting people to join is questionable from the 
perspective of democratic theory.
104 Cf. Sönke Klug, personal interview, Jever, 25 August 2015.
105 Cf. Sönke Klug, personal interview, Jever, 25 August 2015.
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I find Klug’s answer rather over-stated. When I asked about the low level of ac-
tivity on LiquidFriesland during the weeks prior to our interview, he immediately 
responded by referring to perimeter board advertising. Moreover, making citizens 
aware of the existence of LiquidFriesland is not the same as persuading them to 
register. While Klug’s answer does appear somewhat questionable, it does explain 
the administration’s general attitude and rather passive approach to advertising 
beyond the launch period.
This and statements from several informal conversations with Friesland citi-
zens not registered on the site reinforces the impression that it was a public rela-
tions coup for the district. The launch of LiquidFriesland attracted nationwide me-
dia attention to the site and indeed to the whole district. Sven Ambrosy implicitly 
suggests this in the following quotation: 
Wenn Sie Kommunalpolitik und Verwaltung in einem ländlichen Raum machen, der 
mit dem Geld auskommen muss, dann kommen Sie relativ schnell auf die Idee, För-
dermöglichkeiten zu eruieren und auszuschöpfen. Unsere Fördermittelquote ist sehr 
ansehnlich, weil unsere Politik, Städte, Gemeinden und Landtag, einer Grundüberzeu-
gung sind: eine gute Idee ist in Friesland nie an Geld gescheitert. Wir müssen eben nur 
gucken, wie wir die Finanzierung intelligent hinbekommen und da muss man sehr inno-
vativ sein. Wenn Sie natürlich 08/15-Projekte machen, kriegen Sie keine Fördergelder. 
Wenn Sie innovative Vorzeigeprojekte haben, die sogar regionale Bedeutung haben, 
dann kriegen Sie Förderung hin. Also: man kann aus einer Not – wenig Finanzen, auch 
eine Tugend machen – sparsam sein und Fördermittel bekommen. Da muss man natür-
lich auch besonders aktiv sein.106
If you are doing local politics and administration in a rural place, which has to make 
ends meet, you relatively quickly come up with the idea of determining and exhausting 
possibilities for funding. Our funding ratio is considerable because our politics, cities, 
municipalities and federal state parliament have one fundamental conviction: in Fries-
land, a good idea never failed because of money. We just have to see that we manage 
intelligent financing, being innovative while doing so. If you are doing run-of-the mill 
projects, you will not get any funds. If you are doing innovative showcase projects that 
may even have regional relevance, then you will receive funding. That is to say: you 
can make a virtue, getting funding, out of a necessity, little finances. Of course you have 
to be especially active.
As the activity on the website dwindled in the years following, press releases and 
other media articles also became increasingly rare. LiquidFriesland’s low pub-
106 Sven Ambrosy, telephone interview, 16 September 2015.
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lic profile decreased ever further. The almost complete lack of promotion from 
the district administration may have been exacerbated by the Nordwest-Zeitung 
(NWZ) daily newspaper’s approach to the site. Asked about possible room for 
improvement regarding LiquidFriesland, Djure Meinen explains
uns müsste es gelingen in den Medien, im Landkreis, stärker wahrgenommen zu 
werden. Was ausgesprochen schwierig ist, besonders hier im Südkreis wo wir nur die 
Nordwest-Zeitung haben, die uns erklärtermaßen nicht mag. […] Also bei der NWZ 
kann man sogar so weit gehen, dass was man sowas wie Sabotage unterstellt. Also, sie 
haben mit schöner Regelmäßigkeit immer dann eigene Umfragen gestartet, wenn in 
LiquidFriesland etwas Spannendes war und sie haben immer dann über LiquidFries-
land berichtet, wenn sie dafür negative Aufhänger finden konnten.107 
We would have to manage to be perceived by the media in the district in a better light, 
which is particularly difficult here in the southern part of the district, where we only 
have the Nordwest-Zeitung, which openly dislikes us. Regarding the NWZ, one could 
go as far as to assume sabotage. Regularly, they started their own surveys when some-
thing exciting was happening on LiquidFriesland. And they always reported about Liq-
uidFriesland when they could find negative leads.
Even LiquidFriesland’s programmers were surprised by NWZ’s portrayal of the site:
Da gibt es aber auch eine Zeitung, die da boykottiert, das finde ich vollkommen absurd. 
Also, das sind so Effekte, da sind wir wirklich wieder überrascht, weil damit hätte ich 
jetzt nie gerechnet, dass so ein etabliertes Medium das regelrecht boykottiert und dann 
witziger Weise Dinge, die im System laufen dann auch noch in die Zeitung reinnehmen. 
[…] Da ist jetzt unsere Vermutung, dass die vierte Gewalt im Staat womöglich Macht-
verlust sieht, selber dieser Spin Doktor nicht mehr sein kann und die Bürger selber 
basisdemokratisch darüber entscheiden, was sie interessiert und was nicht.108
There is even a newspaper that is boycotting – I think that is totally absurd. These are 
affects that we are really surprised about, because nobody would have seen that coming, 
that such an established medium downright boycotts and then even includes the topics 
from the website in their newspaper. It is our assumption that the fourth authority in 
the state possibly fears the loss of power, not being able to be the spin doctor anymore 
and having the citizens at a grassroots level deciding what interests them and what not.
107  Djure Meinen, personal interview, Varel, 16 September 2013.
108 Axel Kistner, personal interview together with Andreas Nitsche, Berlin, 1 November 
2013.
8 Results and Discussion | 135
In light of a lack of funds for ongoing advertising, Róbert Bjarnason points out 
that for Betri Reykjavík, “the thing is that at the periods that we had a lot of ac-
tivities on Betri Reykjavík is when we’ve had some money personally to spend it 
on facebook advertisement and some promotions and things like that”.109 Djure 
Meinen’s appears to make a similar comment about LiquidFriesland: 
man müsste vor allem auch Geld in die Hand nehmen. Und das ist natürlich schwierig, 
weil es schon schwierig ist, die Summen, die im Moment im Raum stehen im Kreistag 
durchzusetzen. Also, da geht es ja jetzt um unter 10.000 Euro im Jahr. Wenn man jetzt 
noch mal sagen würde wir wollen das Projekt jetzt noch mal pushen, wir müssen dafür 
nochmal 20.000 Euro mehr für die Programmierung in einem Jahr […] in die Hand neh-
men, dann wird‘s glaube ich schwierig nochmal eine Mehrheit zu Stande zu kriegen.“110
First and foremost, one needs some money in hand. That is difficult, because it is al-
ready difficult to get the sums that are necessary at the moment through in the district 
assembly. And they are less than 10,000 euros a year. If one would say, we want to push 
the project again, we have to spend another 20,000 euros on programming within one 
year, I doubt we would obtain a majority. 
With such a lack of advertising budgetary strategy, it is unclear why the function 
to collect “social points” was discontinued on Betri Reykjavík, especially since the 
incentive had been successful as a small, free advertising programme. At the same 
time, the discontinuation of social points further intensified the individualisation 
of political participation. Up until 2013, users of Betri Reykjavík had been award-
ed social points for activity on the site. As already pointed out, users were then put 
into three public categories according to the total numbers of their social points. 
Amongst other things, users gained one social point if either endorsers or oppo-
nents of their ideas found their argument helpful, and won an additional social 
point if both endorsers and opponents found the argument helpful (cf. ‘Answers to 
Frequently Asked Questions’), or five social points when somebody they invited 
through a personalised link joined the site. Users could then spend their social 
points on ‘advertisements’, that is adding their idea to a rotating banner at the top 
of the page. Several interviews with participants back in 2012 showed that aiming 
to collect social points had shaped their activity on the site. Per Hansen, for exam-
ple, “invited a bunch” of people to join Betri Reykjavík and “must admit” that he 
traced his number of social points and position in the former rankings: “it makes 
109 Róbert Bjarnason, personal interview V together with Gunnar Grímsson, Reykjavík, 
18 June 2014. 
110 Djure Meinen, personal interview, Varel, 16 September 2013.
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me proud somehow that I’m close the top”.111 Jón Þór Ólafsson also thought that 
“it’s good to have them [social points]. And I did invite people on board to get that. 
I did give an argument for some ideas that I liked, and I tried to do that well, be-
cause when people like your arguments you get also the points, and then you can 
use the points to buy advertisements. That motivation system, it works for me.”112
Guðmundur Kristjánsson, himself a computer engineer, identified the gamifi-
cation of political participation at play here: “I think they have taken it from the 
computer games. […] If you do it a certain way you get a badge. [...] people have 
to get, you know, teammates to win. So, they run the system with something like 
that. It’s just, it makes it a little more fun […] it helps people to get started.”113 
This is exactly what the programmers said they were aiming to do by installing 
this feature. Back in 2012, Róbert Bjarnason explained that “it’s sort of a game 
within the whole project. [...] it’s a system of virtual rewards” through which they 
had hoped to keep users continuously interested and motivated.114 
It becomes apparent that both users and programmers appreciated the features 
of social points and rankings, amongst other things for recruiting additional users 
to the system. It is therefore unclear why both features were discontinued in 2013. 
Even in 2012, Róbert Bjarnason had pointed out that social points and ranking “is 
something to look after in the next version. We want to expand it a bit”.115 When I 
asked him about it in 2014, Róbert Bjarnason said that “in terms of user interface 
we have only been sort of simplifying and the new version which hasn’t been 
deployed yet […] is even simpler, and definitely that is the way to go. And a lot 
unfortunately it means that you remove some of the functionality”.116
Perhaps the users I interviewed were only exceptions to the general disinterest 
in social points and rankings. Indeed, most of the users I interviewed belonged 
to the top-15 in the rankings, meaning that were especially active, so it certainly 
111 Per Hansen, personal interview, Reykjavík, 23 July 2012.
112 Social points ensured the positioning within the “most influential” ranking (duglegasta 
fólkið). The more active a user, the more social points he receives and the higher his 
position in the ranking. Social points could also be exchanged for an advertisement 
highlighting a specific idea that is dear to the user and which was then displayed on the 
top of the starting page; Jón Þór Ólafsson, personal interview, Reykjavík, 20 July 2012.
113 Guðmundur Kristjánsson, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 9 July 2012.
114 Róbert Bjarnason, personal interview I together with Gunnar Grímsson, Reykjavík, 12 
July 2012.
115 Róbert Bjarnason, personal interview I together with Gunnar Grímsson, Reykjavík, 12 
July 2012.
116 Róbert Bjarnason, personal interview V together with Róbert Bjarnason, Reykjavík, 18 
June 2014.
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seems plausible that those at the top of the rankings were those most concerned 
with gaining and holding their position amongst the most influential users. 
Still, the removal of the social points and rankings functions only adds to 
the general impression that the collaborative and deliberative aspects of Betri 
Reykjavík have waned over the years (see chapter 8.3.3 “Trying to improve the 
debate”). As Róbert Bjarnason himself points out in the quote above, increased 
simplicity comes decreased functionality. With the deletion of the “virtual rewards 
system”, a major incentive for users to take the time to express themselves sensi-
bly and convincingly in comments on others’ ideas also vanishes. With the virtual 
rewards system intact, it is likely that one would have to carefully consider one’s 
opinion on a certain issue to be able to write arguments that other users would 
mark as helpful. It is conceivable that the cessation of rewards has also led to 
users paying less attention to ideas before voting on them. Why bother visiting 
the idea’s page, and reading through the idea’s full description and the arguments 
for and against it, when one you could just click the heart or the ban sign on the 
starting page, and move on to the next idea?
In removing the “virtual rewards system” the programmers once again trimmed 
Betri Reykjavík down and reduced its quality as a discussion platform. With the 
removal of the one element oriented especially toward community and supporting 
rational and sensible discussion and deliberation, superfluous “click-and-go” de-
cision-making was further encouraged and facilitated. The programmers provided 
no other justification aside from simplification for removing the rewards systems. 
Of course, there may have been other motives or factors at play. Whatever the 
case, the various decisions taken by programmers and politicians regarding the de-
sign of Betri Reykjavík led to an individualisation of political participation, and it 
morphed over time from a discussion and deliberation platform to a polling venue. 
Betri Reykjavík and Betri Hverfi – one and the same?
Due to this, the significance of contributions through Betri Reykjavík to the polit-
ical decision-making process within the City of Reykjavík appears to have dwin-
dled over the years. Partly, Betri Hverfi, (eng. Better Neighbourhood), the annual 
participatory budgeting, took Betri Reykjavík’s place in citizens’ perception. Since 
its launch in 2012, Betri Hverfi has continuously diverted attention from Betri 
Reykjavík to the extent that even regular Betri Reykjavík users were no longer sure 
what the difference was between the two sites. Users often thought both were one 
tool, or mistook one for the other. In 2014, programmer Róbert Bjarnason said that 
almost all of the city’s budget for online participation measures – both in terms 
of advertising and the implementation of citizens’ ideas – went towards Betri 
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Hverfi.117 In the following section, I show how the complicated communication 
around Betri Reykjavík and the participatory budgeting tool Betri Hverfi further 
solidifies the impression that the public relations strategy was not planned in de-
tail. In the end, this lack of planning means that marketing and advertising appears 
to do more harm than good.
Almost every Betri Reykjavík user I talked to confused it with Betri Hverfi 
or thought that the two were one and the same.118 To illustrate, Dominique most 
definitely thinks of Betri Hverfi when asked if she still uses Betri Reykjavík, as one 
can see from certain signifiers in her answer: “I did it last time. I haven’t done it 
now, as it was in March, the last possibility to express themselves for the districts 
in the city”.119 
The confusion between Betri Reykjavík and Betri Hverfi is problematic for a 
variety of reasons. For one, several users translated the annual three-week period 
in which they could allocate money to different projects in their neighbourhood 
through Betri Hverfi to Betri Reykjavík – that is, they thought it only made sense 
to participate on Betri Reykjavík during those three weeks of the year. Freyja ex-
pressed complete disbelief as she was informed that the city council actually de-
bated the most popular ideas of Betri Reykjavík on a monthly basis: “THAT is 
not explained! [laughs] OKAY! […] And I always thought […] I don’t want to 
spend any time here until just before the election. […] Then I put in the ideas and 
get people to see it, and you know, like it, and so it goes through. Because I did 
think the rest of the year is no use anyway.”120 Here, I suggest that a huge amount 
117 Cf. Róbert Bjarnason, personal interview IV together with Gunnar Grímsson, Reykjavík, 
10 June 2014.
118 Here, recalling brief information on how to distinguish between Betri Reykjavík and 
Betri Hverfi may appear useful. In brief, Betri Reykjavík is a participation platform in 
which every interested party can put in ideas to increase Reykjavík’s status as a city 
worth living. Those ideas can be commented on, and voted for or against by other 
users. Every month, the top (the ideas with the most support from users) ideas across 
all thematic categories (e.g. “construction” or “sport and leisure”) are discussed by the 
city council in terms of their implementability. Each year, ideas concerning specific 
districts are taken from Betri Reykjavík and put into Betri Hverfi, the participatory bud-
geting programme, in which users can distribute a set budget of 450 million Icelandic 
Krónur (around 3.6 million euros) to different projects concerning the district their 
main residence is registered in (cf. Citizens Foundation, ‘Portfolio: My Neighbour-
hood’).
119 Italics added by the author. Dominique Pledel Jónsson, personal interview II, Reykja-
vík, 3 June 2014.
120 Freyja Kristinsdóttir, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 23 June 2014.
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of potential participation fizzles out, because citizens fail to realise the different 
temporal external conditions for the two sites. 
There is not only a lack of clarity regarding the different temporal conditions, 
but also about the geographical localities they target. Since 2014, one has only 
been allowed to participate on the Betri Hverfi subsite in the district of one’s main 
residence. This is what Guðrun criticises: “I think they changed it in a way you 
can only say something about your own neighbourhood. I live in the east side 
and I couldn’t say anything about this area [downtown Reykjavík] even though I 
work here, and I know things about this area. So, if that’s true or if I just messed 
it up somehow, then that’s not a good thing”.121 Unfortunately, this confusion has 
contributed to Guðrun’s retreat from Betri Reykjavík, although she was had been 
an active member, setting in several ideas and frequently commenting and voting 
on other users’ ideas before 2014.
The programmers are aware that there was a high probability that users would 
confuse the sites:
That is a huge problem, that is totally understandable both from our point of view on 
how we did it and especially from the point of view of the citizens in how they perceive 
it. It’s really difficult, I don’t even know what would be the way to sort of distance it. I 
mean, one thing is obviously that a big source of confusion is that when we call out for 
ideas on Better Neighborhoods, we’re using ten different sub-sites of Better Reykjavík. 
So, you are on Better Reykjavík, participating in Better Neighborhoods and it even 
looks like Better Reykjavík because the only thing that changes is the header. And the 
logo of Better Neighborhoods is almost the same as for Better Reykjavík. So just this 
one thing like changing the branding of sort of how it looks will definitely something 
that will be done.122
At the time of writing, nearly five years after this interview took place, only one 
significant change has been made to avoid confusion: Betri Hverfi (eng. Better 
Neighbourhood) had been renamed Hverfið mitt (eng. My Neighbourhood). By 
2014, Betri Reykjavík had ceased to be a high priority for programmers Gunnar 
and Róbert, who stated that they were now deeply immersed in building other 
web projects.
Indeed, the future of Betri Reykjavík had become unclear by the summer of 
2014, especially due to a change in the city government. Jón Gnarr, under whose 
watch Betri Reykjavík had been established, did not run for another term as mayor. 
121 Guðrún Sigurðardóttir, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 30 May 2014.
122 Gunnar Grímsson, personal interview IV together with Róbert Bjarnason, Reykjavík, 
14 June 2014.
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Eventually, his former deputy Dagur B. Eggertsson from the Social Democrats 
lead a coalition with the Green-Leftist Party, the Pirate Party, and the Best Party’s 
heir Bright Future. The new mayor summed up the atmosphere in the following 
way: 
we just had elections and we are using the opportunity to go through how we have been 
doing with Betri Reykjavík and Betri Hverfi […]. And the new coalition is created by 
four parties and so the PIRATES are coming in as a new force. First time in WORLD 
HISTORY I think that they are part of a majority government. We decided that the com-
mittee that has dealt with democratic issues will get a higher profile and more funding 
for them to elaborate on new ideas. We don’t know to a full extent what those new ideas 
will be, but we have decided that this the right point in time to go through and look, 
okay how did Betri Reykjavík meet our expectations and Better Neighbourhoods as well 
and what would be our next steps?123
For example, head of the sports and leisure council in Reykjavík Þórgnýr Tho-
roddsen thought that the confusion between Betri Reykjavík and Betri Hverfi “is 
also a good thing, because that means we could just kill Betri Reykjavík and just 
integrate it into Betri Hverfi, just piece by piece. By just saying, well, we are 
expanding the Betri Hverfi thing”124. Nearly five years later, almost nothing has 
changed. With the administration of the platforms in flux, there has been no iden-
tifiable ongoing or consistent public relations strategy for Betri Reykjavík. The 
confusion between Betri Reykjavík and Betri Hverfi, the hold-up of ideas over 
several months, and the opaque workings of decision-making within the platforms 
in general all adds up to questions and doubt among registered and prospective 
users’ about using Betri Reykjavík. 
Another factor that contributes to the confusion and doubt about Betri Rey-
kjavík, even for several registered users, is the lack of clarity about who actually 
operates the forum: “So the people that work on it [Betri Reykjavík], are they […] 
just a company or are they like the city council? […] Those who control it and sus-
tain it?”.125 Back in 2012, Freyja had been one of the most influential users of Betri 
Reykjavík and was actively submitting ideas, commenting and voting on ideas of 
others about facilities for dogs and owners’ rights. The fact that Freyja, a highly 
involved user, would not know who maintains and implements the platform sur-
prised me. I had assumed that it was clear to users that independent programmers 
operate the platform and the city administrative personnel subsequently processes 
123 Dagur B. Eggertsson, personal interview, Reykjavík, 27 June 2014.
124 Þórgnýr Thoroddsen, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 19 June 2014.
125 Freyja Kristinsdóttir, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 23 June 2014.
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the ideas. However, many interviewees asked me if I knew who ran the platform, 
who would process their ideas once they were submitted, and who decides which 
ideas are listed on the city council’s agenda – in other words, most of the key 
procedures of the platform were unknown to many frequent users. In this light, 
it appears even more astonishing that they did not lose interest sooner, but kept 
on submitting ideas, commenting on others, and voting for or against initiatives, 
when they did not understand to what ends. 
There was a rather opaque and confusing genesis to LiquidFriesland that was 
not successfully solved by public relations until the end. It was clear to all partic-
ipants that the tool was incorporated into the political decision-making processes 
of the district and that Landrat Sven Ambrosy had played the lead role in its estab-
lishment, simply due to his high visibility in the media around the launch of the 
website. In this case, it was the constant association of LiquidFriesland with the 
Pirate Party that caused confusion and conflict: 
Bisschen unglücklich finde ich den Namen, weil bei LiquidFriesland nicht unbedingt 
darauf kommt, dass das so ein Bürgerforum ist. Also, wer nicht ganz jung ist und zu 
den Piraten gehört, und der sich mit den Piraten beschäftigt hat, der kennt diesen Begriff 
eigentlich nicht so ohne weiteres. Mein Sohnemann konnte damit natürlich sofort was 
anfangen, aber ich nicht.126
I think the name is quite unfortunate, because you would not guess from it that Liq-
uidFriesland is a citizens’ forum. Those who are not that young or part of the Pirates 
[party] or have not looked into the Pirates does not know about the term. Of course, my 
son immediately knew what it was about, but not me. 
The “liquid” in LiquidFriesland is borrowed from LiquidFeedback, the name of 
the software it is based on. Programmed by the Association for Interactive De-
mocracy, it was first set up within the German Pirate Party’s decision-making pro-
cesses. In 2012, the programmers of LiquidFeedback cut all ties with the German 
Pirate Party and officially distanced themselves from the ways it has been used by 
the German Pirate Party (cf. Behrens et al., ‘Piratenpartei’).127 Elsewhere, the pro-
126 Susanne Engstler, personal interview, Varel, 8 October 2013.
127 The programmers fundamentally belief that for online voting to be democratic, it has to 
be done with real names and not pseudonyms. The German Pirate Party however have 
not abided by this principle, but still continue to use the free software. For the good of 
all other users of the software and to continue their liberal licensing policies , the pro-
grammers were not able to stop the German Pirate Party from using LiquidFeedback 
(cf. Behrens et al., ‘Piratenpartei’). 
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grammers state that LiquidFeedback is “an independent project” and “NOT affili-
ated to any political party or movement” (capitalisation in the original, Interaktive 
Demokratie e. V. 11). They add that “[i]n particular it has neither been ‘developed 
by/for Pirates/the Pirate Party’ nor ‘advanced/enhanced by/for Pirates/the Pirate 
Party’” (11). The vehemence with which the programmers deny the link between 
their software and the Pirate Party is striking, but it also appears to be a hopeless 
task at least inside Germany. With the launch of LiquidFriesland, many media 
outlets used the apparently attractive image of “pirates”, in the double connotation 
of urban computer nerd and seafarer, taking over the rural maritime region Fries-
land.128 Generally, the association of LiquidFriesland with the Pirate Party led to 
suspicion amongst participants. For example, Peter Lamprecht explained that he 
originally registered in LiquidFriesland out of curiosity, to see what the spin-off 
from the Pirate Party’s way of handling things was all about.129
In this sub-chapter it has become clear that there are different reasons for the 
lack of consistent public relations strategies for Betri Reykjavík and LiquidFries-
land. For Betri Reykjavík, the lack of clarity about its role and the fact that it could 
not become firmly establishment within municipal decision-making processes, an 
issue also caused by a change of government in city hall, hindered the devel-
opment of a coherent public relations strategy. The development of a coherent 
strategy was further inhibited by uncertain financial structures and governmental 
responsibilities difficult to understand. Further, competition between the simi-
larly designed participatory budgeting subsite Betri Hverfi added to a confusion 
amongst Betri Reykjavík users and non-users alike. 
In the case of LiquidFriesland, the administration’s unwillingness to publicize 
the tool beyond the launch, as well as negative press by the district’s main daily 
newspaper lead to confusion around the website. There can be little doubt that this 
confusion was partially responsible for the decrease in popularity amongst users 
and a loss of relevance in political decision-making processes. These cases reveal 
how important a consistent and constant public relations strategy is for the “suc-
cess” of online discussion and participation tools. There must be clarity about the 
operators, workings, rules, goals, and roles in political decision-making processes 
to enable tools like Betri Reykjavík and LiquidFriesland to occupy a relevant and 
sustained role as a mode of political participation.
128 A selection of headlines playing on the image of pirates/the Pirates: „LiquidFries-
land: Friesen auf dem platten Land überholen die Piraten“ (Bewarder), „Piratenideen 
in der Provinz: Alle Friesen an die Laptops!“ (Reinbold), „Neue Fans von „Liquid 
Feedback“: Von den Piraten lernen“ (Erb). 
129 Cf. Peter Lamprecht, personal interview, Varel, 16 September 2013.
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8.3.5 Conclusion
This chapter set out to illuminate the various communication processes that are 
part of the online participation tools Betri Reykjavík and LiquidFriesland. It 
showed that communication within online participation tools, a novel mode of 
political participation, caused challenges both for users as well as administration 
and politicians. Expecting transparency and openness in political decision-making 
processes through their participation in the platforms, users are instead confronted 
with opacity and a lack of political accountability through the various steps their 
suggestions go through. 
To a large degree, this has to do with the fact that administration and politicians 
seem to adhere to established forms of communicating their decisions. In doing 
so, administration and politicians struggle to see things from a user perspective. It 
becomes apparent that online participation is a learning process, not only for users 
navigating the tools, but also for the administrations and politicians responsible 
for receiving, replying to, and possibly implementing the citizens’ input. 
These issues are further complicated by differing expectations and hopes about 
the possible extent of informed communication between the different groups of 
actors. LiquidFriesland and Betri Reykjavík users had hoped for more debate and 
deliberation – ultimately not only with other users but also with administrators 
and politicians –, but neither programmers nor politicians were prepared to com-
mit to that. Rather than facilitating communal interactions, like commenting and 
discussing, the software design emphasized individualised actions like voting and 
the setting in of ideas.
Furthermore, the public relations approaches of both sites’ administrators ap-
pear to lack planning, coherence and funding. Even amongst registered users, there 
was a large degree of confusion about who operated the sites, how they worked, 
what rules there were, what they were established to do, and the different roles in 
political decision-making processes. I believe that well planned and constructed 
communication and public relations strategies are crucial both for the ongoing 
success of online discussion and participation forums, and for their establishment 
in the repertoire of political participation. Politicians and administration have to 
be willing to accommodate changes and the restructuring of both political culture 
and political communication (cf. Rosenzweig and Eith 12) for online participation 
to become firmly established:
Because people just know that’s possible, it changes the way community just thinks and 
because the community does think differently, everything else has to adapt. We’re in 
the middle of that now, we’re not there yet, we haven’t figured out how we’re thinking 
differently or even if it, if it’s still in the process and we haven’t fully realized what this 
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means, and there are a lot of new kind of technologies that will enhance this process. 
So, we don’t know where it’s gonna end, but we’re already that far along that we have 
to start catching up politically, you know, systematically, to that new way of thinking.130
8.4 Political Participation in the Digital Age
After elaborating on information and communication practices as prerequisites 
for political participation, this final analysis chapter concentrates on political par-
ticipation. The chapter starts with an overview of the most prominent modes of 
political participation in participants’ repertoires. Once more, it becomes strik-
ingly apparent that the development of ICTS and the Internet furthers citizens’ 
opportunities to adopt a mix-and-match mentality: in a bricolage fashion, citi-
zens combine modes of political participation across (“physical” and “virtual”) 
spheres according to their respective political objective and to how they perceive 
a mode’s internal and external efficacy. Special focus is also placed on the contin-
uum of online political participation between empowerment of the citizens and the 
simulation of participation, and the participants’ preferences for participation at 
the local political level. Aside from the general analysis of political participation 
repertoires today, a large part of this chapter deals with analysis of participation 
in times of crisis in contrast to participation in times of affluence. Adapted from 
US-American sociologist Harold R. Kerbo’s work, this concept has proven tre-
mendously fruitful in characterising the different notions of political participation 
in the two research fields, and at explaining general societal and political phenom-
ena over the last decade, such as political disinterest. 
8.4.1  Political Participation Repertoires Today:  
A Mix-and-Match Mentality
Going to the polls, sign a petition, be in a flash mob, buy eco-friendly products, 
contact a politician, found a local citizens’ group, take part in political party work, 
demonstrate, support an interest group – as Jan van Deth points out, the list of 
modes of political participation has become extremely long and is growing longer 
(cf. ‘Partizipationsforschung’ 169f.). Like their information practices, people’s 
political participation repertoires appear to be constituted by a selective mix-and-
match mentality. In this chapter, I provide a brief round-up of the most prominent 
modes in interlocutors’ participation repertoires. These are voting, political party 
engagement (including running for an elected office), initiatives/working groups, 
130 Björn Levi Gunnarsson, personal interview, Reykjavík, 4 June 2014.
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demonstrations, petitions, the online participation tools Betri Reykjavík and Liq-
uidFriesland, and the online participatory budgeting tool Betri Hverfi. This chap-
ter focuses on the participants, touches on their overall experiences with these 
different modes of participation, and the ways in which participants incorporate 
a certain mode both into their participation repertoire and their everyday lives.
Just as it is one of several media used by “media omnivores” (Linaa Jensen 1) 
which they combine to form their own “personal news repertoires” (Strömbäck et 
al. 1), the Internet is also one venue where people participate politically, through 
different participation modes, and in doing so, aim to influence political deci-
sion-making processes at various levels. As Stark notes, participants mix-and-
match the modes of political participation that they deem promising in achieving 
their specific goal and in accordance with their personal resources, social sur-
roundings, and individual values (cf. 64). In the manner of a bricolage, partic-
ipants reuse, recombine, and remix modes of participation that they have been 
actively relying on much of their adult lives together with more novel modes of 
participation (which obviously include the myriad online modes now available 
to many). In this way, participants become bricoleurs with highly individualised 
repertoires of participation modes. 
In other words, these modes of online participation do not replace but rather 
supplement other modes. Indeed, much of the “hype” and the fears connected with 
the replacement hypothesis (see chapter 2.2.1 Simply Slacktivism?!) can be refut-
ed by insights into socio-cultural change in Schönberger’s work and the transfor-
mation of everyday life in Damsholt’s and Jespersen’s work. Put simply, these 
scholars conclude that change simply does not happen overnight. Even if it may 
have become technologically possible, established modes of political participation 
will not simply be replaced by online equivalents, or significantly more numbers 
of citizens will participate. Rather, modes of online participation may become part 
of citizens’ repertoires in a fundamentally open and combinatorial process (cf. 
Schönberger 207) – on the premise that they “can be integrated with the constitu-
tive logics of everyday life” (Damsholt and Jespersen 23).
8.4.1.1 Voting
In both Reykjavík and Friesland, voting is (still) the most dominant mode of po-
litical participation, as several interlocutors pointed out. For Landkreis Friesland’s 
former press secretary Sönke Klug, voting still remains a civic duty for most cit-
izens (ger. “eine staatsbürgerliche Pflicht”)131. Hans Meyer similarly argues that 
citizens should remember to show respect: respect for the luck they have in living 
in a democracy in which one can delegate responsibility by giving politicians 
131 Sönke Klug, personal interview, Jever, 25 August 2015.
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a mandate for a certain period of time, and also the luck one has in being able 
to withdraw that mandate.132 For Hörður Torfason, the right to vote “is the most 
precious thing you have as a person.” To honour this, he suggests making voting 
in elections compulsory: “I think we should go and put in LAW, that if you don’t 
vote, you will get a fine. Even if you […] put it [in] empty, that is a way of show-
ing it. But you should be obliged to go there and vote – you belong to society. And 
you can’t just pretend to be neutral, no one is neutral.”133
These observations from my fields correlate with most of the literature. In an 
overview of several European comparative studies, Jan van Deth concludes that 
voting is the prime mode of political participation in Europe (cf. ‘Vergleichende 
Politikwissenschaft’ 173). The high relevance of voting in citizens’ participation 
repertoires finds expression in high voting rates. As can be seen in Figure 10, vot-
ing rates in general parliamentary elections in Iceland have been over or around 
80 percent over the last twenty years, with peaks in 2003 (87.7 percent) and 2009 
(85.1 percent).134 Voting rates in general elections in Germany have been around 
ten percent lower than in Iceland, dropping to their lowest level in 2009 with 70.8 
percent, but going up again to 76.2 percent in the last election in 2017.135
However, local body elections in both fields do not seem to draw as much 
attention as general elections. While voting rates in the municipal elections in the 
Reykjavík Capital Area dropped almost twenty percent (82.6 to 62.9 percent) from 
2002 to 2014,136 voting rates in the district of Friesland appeared to be on the rise. 
132 Cf. Hans Meyer, focus group, Varel, 9 September 2014.
133 Hörður Torfason, personal interview, Reykjavík, 24 June 2014.
134 Statistics are only as good as their cultural contextualisation. While it would go beyond 
the constraints of this chapter to go into details about what might have influenced 
citizens’ decisions (not) to vote in the specific years, these numbers will play a role in 
chapter 3.3, where I deal with the relevance of times of crisis and times of affluence on 
political participation. 
135 Figure compiled by the author using official statistics on general elections in Germa-
ny (Der Bundeswahlleiter), on local elections in the district of Friesland (Landkreis 
Friesland, ‘Wahlen’; Landesbetrieb für Statistik und Kommunikationstechnologie 
Niedersachsen (LSKN) 11), on local elections in the Reykjavík capital area (2002; 
2006; 2010; 2014) and on general parliamentary elections in Iceland (Votes Cast) from 
Statistics Iceland.
136 Unfortunately, there were no coherent numbers to be found on voting in the 2018 
municipal elections in the Reykjavík capital area at the time of writing. Accounts vary 
between 62.7 percent (cf. RÚV) to 67 percent (cf. Ćirić), which would either mean 
that the percentage of voters remained unchanged, or rose by five percent. Due to these 
discrepancies, I decided to exclude the 2018 election in my round-up.
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Fig. 10: Participation in General and Local Elections in Iceland and Germany
Indeed, voting rates in Friesland went up ten percent between 2006 and 2016 (46 
to 56 percent), but were still around 20 percent lower than for general elections. 
Without going into much detail about the reasons for these numbers, I think 
it is safe to say that, at least for some parts of society, local elections appear to be 
seen as less important than general elections. There are numerous and for the most 
part conflicting analyses of the apparent reasons behind decreasing turnout in local 
elections (cf. Altenbockum). In Reykjavík and Friesland, there are two commonly 
cited reasons for this decrease. First, that the quality of life in their municipality 
was so good that people saw no reason to vote. For instance, asked about possible 
reasons for the low voting rates in the municipal elections that had taken place just 
days before, Kristinn Már Ársælsson explained that the turnout for 
the parliament elections are still at a high level. There is a very low decline. There is a 
decline, but it is way smaller as at the municipal level. And the things that they decide 
upon in parliament, are way more influential for our lives. For example, the health care 
system, taxes – these are directly influencing our day-to-day lives or level of quality of 
lives. At the municipal stage, it has been just too long since they implemented day care, 
we have swimming pools in every neighbourhood in Reykjavík, which is ridiculous. 
Just the quality, the level of quality of life in municipalities is properly, their influence 
on our daily lives is just way less.137
137 Kristínn Már Ársælsson, personal interview, Reykjavík, 20 June 2014.
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Second, another common explanation for low turnout in local elections is that 
participants were discontent with their action and impact frames through voting 
at the ballot, and were resorting to other modes of participation, such as the work 
in initiatives or starting petitions. Both these interpretations can, for example, be 
seen in the following quote from former Reykjavík mayor Jón Gnarr, referring to 
his personal life: 
For my parents, who are born around 1920, […] voting was very important to them, 
of almost spiritual importance. It’s like going to vote was like going to church. It’s just 
your responsibility as a healthy human, you vote. And I had these debates when I had 
got the right to vote, I said, ‘Pf, no, I’m not going to vote, I don’t care’. Then they said, 
‘but you have to go. You have to show up, you cannot just be nonchalant’. But then I 
look up at my kids, and I have loads of children, and they are between twenty and thirty, 
they’re not so interested in voting. Because it’s ‘uncool’, it’s ‘boring’, and it ‘doesn’t 
change anything’.138
8.4.1.2 Political Party Engagement
Several participants have been directly involved with electoral politics within po-
litical parties. Several have won mandates on councils or committees. For exam-
ple, a participant in the focus group in Varel had been in the district assembly in 
Friesland for around five years, and had stood (unsuccessfully) for the state parlia-
ment (Landtag) of Lower Saxony, both in 2013 and 2017. After almost 30 years of 
involvement in different political initiatives and as a member of the Green Party, 
a participant in the Jever focus group was elected to the city council of her home-
town Varel in 2016. As was Djure Meinen, whose quote simultaneously points 
out that today, those who decide to engage within a political party are a minority:
[Ich habe] mich immer politisch interessiert und auch politisch geäußert, also letz-
tlich bin ich immer ein politischer Mensch gewesen. Hier in Varel war’s dann plöt-
zlich so, also im Grunde musste man ja nur Piep sagen und im Grunde war man schon 
dabei. Also die Zahl derjenigen, die sich wirklich politisch aktiv engagieren wollen, 
ist wirklich extrem gering. Je kleiner die Partei, desto weniger werden das und bei den 
Grünen musste man eigentlich nur sagen, ich würde gerne bei euch mitarbeiten und am 
liebsten gleich auch mal ein Amt übernehmen und damit ist man dabei. Weswegen ich 
eben auch seit September 2011 im Rat der Stadt Varel bin.139 
138 Jón Gnarr, personal interview, Reykjavík, 9 August 2012.
139 Djure Meinen, personal interview, Varel, 16 September 2013. 
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I have always been politically interested and spoken my mind, so actually I’ve always 
been a political animal. Here in Varel, all you had to do was say one word and you were 
in. The number of people who really want to participate is extremely low. The smaller 
the party, the less people are interested. So with the Green Party all you had to do is say 
I want to take part and also take up a post and you’re in. That is also why I’ve been a 
member of the Varel City Council since September 2011. 
In these cases, holding a mandate is seen as part of political party engagement, 
although most definitions of political participation “explicitly refer to citizens in 
order to differentiate the relevant behaviour from the activities of politicians, civ-
il servants, office-bearers, public officers, journalists, and professional delegates, 
advisors, appointees, lobbyists, and the like” (van Deth, ‘Map’ 354). However, 
none of the participants referred to in this chapter are professional politicians, and 
most are unpaid for their elected position, holding it alongside their regular job.
In Iceland, two participants became members of political parties between field-
work in 2012 and 2014. Both did not only become members, but also actively en-
gaged in party work right away. The software engineer Guðmundur programmed 
a mobile phone app for the Dögun party campaign in preparation for the 2014 
municipal elections. He also agreed to fill the party’s list of potential candidates 
for the city council: “I was asked to be a part of the Dögun party and I did that. I 
was supposed to be tenth or something, […] but they asked me to be higher on the 
list, so I ended up fourth or fifth on the list.” As it was highly unlikely from the 
beginning that Dögun would win many seats – it was a new party standing for the 
first time –, Guðmundur was not elected into city council. Still, he saw the whole 
experience positively, had “a lot of fun”, and in comparison to the interview two 
years earlier, I had the feeling that the joy, affirmation, and self-confidence that 
radiated from him was due to this experience. 140 
Another participant became a member of the Pirate Party. He received a man-
date in the parliamentary elections of 2013 and, after being elected in the 2014 
municipal elections, was appointed head of the sports and leisure council as well 
as vice head of the council for culture and travel. In his account, it becomes visible 
that, at times, all it takes to participate politically are personal connections and 
serendipity:
I was involved in some protests, as a matter of things in the whole Wikileaks thing. 
When she [Birgitta Jónsdóttir] 141, Smári McCarthy and some others started forming the 
140 Guðmundur Kristjánsson, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 22 June 2014.
141 Birgitta Jónsdóttir was parliamentary chairwoman as well as general chairwoman of 
the Icelandic Pirate Party on and off between 2012 until 2017. In 2017, she withdrew 
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Pirate Party, I was invited to those meetings and I never showed up. You know, didn’t 
have time, didn’t have interest, I was like, ‘Baah, political stuff’, didn’t have much in-
terest. Eventually, they finished the preparations and they had the founding meeting and 
I had decided not to go, but I was JUST in the neighbourhood at that time. So I showed 
up for the founding meeting and I realized, ’Wow, there is a bunch of people here I 
know’ and at first, I started hanging out with them just a little bit and before I knew it, 
I was running for parliament last year! And I was just filling in on the list, to be honest. 
I was just like ’Oh, I’m gonna help them out, I’m just filling the list. I’m just gonna be 
on the list somewhere low’. But I got voted into second place in North-East. I had said 
something like that ’Can I take the North-East, my dad lives there, I have some connec-
tion there’. You know. And, ja, then I was like ’That’s pretty cool’, so let’s go all in. And 
done, here I am. That’s a little bit of a change and I was a little bit surprised about that.142
Several other participants have had negative experiences in party politics and have 
since retreated from further engagement. Active participation in a political party is 
challenging and time-consuming work: formal requirements are to be fulfilled, the 
proceedings and structure of committees need to be understood, and one needs a 
thick skin to endure the often personal comments made in debates and committee 
meetings. As Wolfgang Müller said: 
Es schrickt viele ab die sagen, ‚da wie das da läuft in Varel, Da kannst du mal hingehen, 
das ist ein Abenteuer‘. So. Aber nur für Leute die wirklich auch erlebnishungrig sind. 
Alle anderen sagen ‘Das tu ich mir nicht an‘. Und genau das ist der Punkt, da muss 
sich vom Stil was ändern, von der Struktur was ändern. Die Verwaltung muss weni-
ger Macht haben, die Ratsmitglieder müssten tatsächlich einfach auch besser honoriert 
werden und die Zeiten müssten angepasst werden, dass Bürger mal zu einer Ausschuss-
sitzung kommen können. Um 17 Uhr können das die wenigsten, wir müssen immer den 
Laden zu machen, um da hinzugehen beispielsweise.143
The way things are going in [the city council of] Varel scares many people off, saying 
Just go and attend a meeting, quite an adventure. But only for those who really are 
in search of a thrill. Everyone else goes Spare me! And this exactly is the point, the 
from politics, at least for the time being. She is a prominent public figure in Iceland; 
and outside the country, she is mostly known for her involvement with Wikileaks and 
for founding IMMI, the International Modern Media Institute which is “working to-
wards rethinking media regulation, securing free speech and defining new operating 
principles for the global media in the digital age” (cf. IMMI).
142 Þórgnýr Thoroddsen, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 19 June 2014.
143 Wolfgang Müller, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
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conduct needs to change, the structure needs to change. The administration needs to 
have less power, councillors have to be paid better, and times have to be adjusted, so 
that citizens can actually attend the committee meetings. Few have time at five in the 
afternoon. We, for example, have to close our shop each time. 
While a number of participants were actively engaged in political party work, 
political parties across Europe are facing declining membership numbers (cf. Vet-
ter and Kuhn). Like psephology, political party research is a complex research 
area of its own, so I can only be brief here. Niedermeyer points out that there has 
been a huge decline in member numbers for all but two German parties.144 Since 
1990, when West and East Germany were reunified, both the Christlich Demokra-
tische Union (CDU) and Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland SPD (the estab-
lished major parties) have lost around half their members in percentage terms (cf. 
Niedermayer). The decline was even greater in the liberal Freie Demokratische 
Partei FDP (68 percent) and the Left Party Die Linke (79 percent) which are both 
established smaller parties. 
For my research in Friesland, this incongruence suggests two possibilities. 
First, that my sample was disproportionally politically active,145 or second, that 
while the membership numbers of political parties are falling, amongst those cit-
izens that consciously become or remain party members, many are motivated to 
actively shape their membership.
Arriving at a general conclusion is further complicated by the fact that sta-
tistics on party membership in Iceland paint a different picture, where member-
ship numbers in all major parties increased – at least between 1979 until 2010 
(cf. Kristinsson 127).146 Although no newer statistics could not be found, one can 
well assume that overall party membership has continued to grow based on the 
144 Only the Green Party and the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland), a right-wing populist 
party founded in 2013, have recorded an increase in members (cf. Niedermayer).
145 Due to my sampling process, almost all participants were members of LiquidFriesland 
or Betri Reykjavík. This suggests that those citizens who are politically active often 
employ multiple modes of participation. 
146 Unfortunately, newer numbers do not exist, as the author Helgi Gunnar Kristinsson 
pointed out in an email: “The data which I used was basically an estimate of self-
reported membership according to the ICENES. I don’t think I have any more recent 
figures, and, as you know, there are no official statistics”. ICENES stands for Icelandic 
National Election Study, which has been conducted after every general election in Ice-
land by political scientists around Ólafur Þ. Harðarson since 1983. It “is an extensive 
study of the electoral and political behaviour of voters in Iceland. Research topics 
include voting behaviour, attitudes towards political parties and democracy, the most 
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foundation of a number of new political parties in recent years. In comparison to 
Germany, whose federal party system is characterised by stability and low frag-
mentation, the party system in Iceland has become increasingly pluralised into a 
very compartmentalised system – apparently an observation true for most of the 
Scandinavian countries (cf. Alemann 13). Alone in the last municipal elections 
in Reykjavík in 2018, 16 parties stood for election (cf. Fontaine, ‘The Reykjavik 
16’). Moreover, three of the eight parties currently forming the national govern-
ment are newcomers which were founded between three weeks and one year prior 
to elections in autumn 2017 (cf. Fontaine, ‘Elections ’17’).
8.4.1.3 Initiatives / Working Groups
In this sub-chapter I move away from electoral participation to look at working 
groups or citizen initiatives, a mode that several participants were engaged in. In 
2012, Guðmundur described the beginnings of his increasing political interest and 
participation:
Before / in the collapse, I wasn’t very much involved in anything, […] but after that I 
was participating in a group that was looking into the financial system and something 
like that and tried to come up with better solutions than we had, just to see how stupid 
some part of the financial system is. So I got involved in that group, and [...] they just 
had a meeting there and I went there and looked what were they talking about and try to 
get to know somebody and so on. That’s why I also started using Betri Reykjavík, I saw 
something that could go better in the system.147
It was in this working group on financial reforms that Guðmundur met those who 
later founded the political party Dögun, which he later joined: 
I had been involved in this financial reform group. And we made a website and […] and 
I tried to come up with ideas to improve the financial system. […] We had meetings in 
common places, all the groups. So, that was the venue for the starting of the political 
party, Dögun. So I was just a lot around in that meeting place, so I got involved in the 
other / when they were trying to make their mission statement or what you call it. So, 
I just, because I was around a lot, I got to know them, so I just was kind of dragged 
into that also. Because they wanted to get information about what we thought about the 
important political tasks, participation in primaries and other issues on the political 
agenda” (The Social Science Research Institute).
147 Guðmundur Kristjánsson, personal interview, Reykjavík, 9 July 2012.
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financial system, so they wanted to change that also and wanted to see what we had. It 
was […] how I got involved with that party.148 
The following example illustrates perfectly how some working groups/initiatives 
thematically overlap and that being active in one working group can lead to sub-
sequent engagement in another. Dominique Plédel Jónsson, who amongst other 
things is the director of Slow Food Iceland,149 became active in a working group 
on urban agriculture only after she was invited to give an expert talk about Slow 
Food’s stance on it:
I was in a group of people/it was open, not framed or anything, but they wanted to look 
into urban agriculture. And then the group, they asked me to talk about Slow Food and 
the way Slow Food was active in that. Okay, I did it. And then it started. And I took part 
in the demand to the city, to get green space which is unused in town. And to be able 
to grow things, you know. And they had a lot of ideas and discussion and on facebook, 
the group is quite interesting in fact. And you know, people really focusing. And all of 
a sudden, the application was agreed. So, everybody just started and went in this small 
spot, a nice space within the city. The municipality went for it, WITH the people.150
What catches the eye here in these two examples is again the role of social con-
nections and networks in mobilising people for political engagement, but also mo-
tivating already active people to continue to engage politically. These two quotes 
also reveal how the immediate neighbourhood or quarter is a frame of reference 
and action, and has a mobilising effect on participants. In both cases, participants 
were mobilised to participate through another different participation mode by peo-
148 Guðmundur Kristjánsson, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 22 June 2014.
149 According to its international website, Slow Food is a global, grassroots organization, 
founded in 1989 to prevent the disappearance of local food cultures and traditions, counte-
ract the rise of fast life and combat people’s dwindling interest in the food they eat, where 
it comes from and how our food choices affect the world around us. Since its beginnings, 
Slow Food has grown into a global movement involving millions of people in over 160 
countries, working to ensure everyone has access to good, clean and fair food. Slow Food 
believes food is tied to many other aspects of life, including culture, politics, agriculture 
and the environment. Through our food choices we can collectively influence how food is 
cultivated, produced and distributed, and change the world as a result (‘About Us’).
150 Dominique Plédel Jónsson, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 3 June 2014.
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ple they had met in other surroundings (see chapter 8.5 The Role of Geographical 
Proximity in (Online) Political Participation).151
Several participants regularly attended neighbourhood citizen council meetings, 
which are a common form of working group in Iceland. After attending the neigh-
bourhood council, Freyja registered and became highly active on Betri Reykjavík: 
I went to a meeting in my neighbourhood, […] in every neighbourhood there’s a council 
and they were talking about this website now, that was just before Christmas. And I was 
living in Hliðar, which is around Klambratún […]. And they were talking about that 
everyone should go and vote on Betri Reykjavík, because they wanted ideas through for 
this area. And then I suddenly realised, ‘Oh, okay! ‘Because me and a few other dog 
people were wanting to get some dog runs in Reykjavík. So I thought ‘Well, that would 
be a good place to try to get something through’.152
As in a number of other cases, one mode of participation (attending the neigh-
bourhood citizen council meetings) facilitated Freyja’s engagement through an-
other mode (setting in, commenting on and voting on ideas by others on Betri 
Reykjavík). Seeing her ideas on Betri Reykjavík lead to the construction of several 
dog runs across Reykjavík, Freyja became motivated to further expand the modes 
of participation in her repertoire.
While such experiences of success had prompted Freyja and several other in-
terlocutors to further expand their participation, this was not the experience of 
all the participants who had become involved in different initiatives. Those par-
ticipants who had been involved in several different initiatives or had been on 
working groups for a long time tended to be disappointed and disillusioned with 
the lack of attention paid to citizens’ input within established structures of repre-
sentative decision-making processes, as Karin Schmidt’s illustrates:
Wir haben das ja in dieser Agenda 21-Phase auch eben erlebt, sehr stark, das war ja eben 
das Konzept, wo Bürger dann auch auf die Kommunalpolitik einwirken, zusammen mit 
Kommunalpolitikern Arbeitsgruppen bilden und ihre Ideen einfließen lassen. Das Ding 
ist gescheitert! Das hat nicht funktioniert, weil die Kommunalpolitiker sozusagen auf 
151 However, the effects of the financial crisis in 2008–09 and its aftermath were crucial 
to Guðmundur’s initial decision to participate politically. Guðmundur’s case is one of 
many that strengthen the observation that crises have the potential to mobilise people 
not only for immediate actions, but also beyond (cf. chapter 8.4.3.1, Political Par-
ticipation in Times of Crisis).
152 Klambratún is a park near the city centre of Reykjavík; Freyja Kristinsdóttir, personal 
interview I, 17 July 2012.
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ihrem Status beharrt haben, nämlich ‚Wir sind diejenigen, die das […] zu entscheiden 
haben, und Bürger, du kannst dann gerne wieder an die Urne gehen und uns wählen‘.153
In the Agenda 21 era, we had an intense experience of the concept of citizens influenc-
ing local politics, forming working groups together with local politicians, and interpo-
lating their ideas. That thing failed! It didn’t work because the local politicians insisted 
on their status, basically saying ‘We’re those who make the decisions and you, dear 
citizen, are welcome to go back to the ballot box and vote for us’.
8.4.1.4 Demonstration
One participation mode that regularly acts as a starting point for further engage-
ment is attending demonstrations. For example, it has been widely stated that for 
many Icelanders, participating in what came to be known as the Pots-and-Pans 
Revolution was a decisive politicizing moment.154 As Bernburg and Víkingsdóttir 
point out: “[p]ublic participation in the protests was enormous, as was the level 
of support” (82). Studies conducted after the crisis suggest that around 25 percent 
of the inhabitants of the Greater Reykjavík area participated at least once in the 
protests, and 16 percent repeatedly did so (cf. Bernburg 239).155
Indeed, the Pots-and-Pans Revolution was a decisive moment in politicizing 
many of the respondents. Guðmundur, for example, “didn’t care much about 
demonstrations or something before the collapse.”156 Many others were frequent 
participants in the protests, not least because the protests were essentially the only 
venue that one could get information about what was actually happening to and 
in the country. In other words, political participation also became an information 
practice. Hörður Torfason, the main organiser of the weekly protests from October 
2008 until March 2009, recalls:
153 Agenda 21 is a United Nations action plan which aims at leading municipalities and 
regions to sustainability. It resulted from the Earth Summit (UN Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development) held in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil in 1992, and included nu-
merous measures relying heavily on citizen participation (cf. Permien); Karin Schmidt, 
focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
154 Large weekly protests outside Alþingi, the parliament building, began in October 2008. 
Eventually, the government stepped down due to the protests which became known as 
the Pots-and-Pans Revolution because protesters used kitchen utensils to make noise.
155 According to Bernburg’s survey, around 57 percent of the respondents were in favour 
“of the actions of the protesters at the time of the demonstration” (82), another survey 
found support rates of up to 70 percent (Eva Önnudóttir as cited in Bernburg and 
Víkingsdóttir 82)
156 Guðmundur Kristjánsson, personal interview, Reykjavík, 9 July 2012.
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I think it was the Eleventh of October, and at Saturday at 12 o’clock – I chose 12 
o’clock because it’s the lunch hour, and I said to people I will be there like 20 minutes. 
I have two questions, I asked people who came there or passed by, I asked ‘Can you 
tell me what has happened in this country?‘ and ‘Do you have any idea what we can 
do about it?’ People were confused, people were angry; there was a lot of anger. Many 
many many foreign journalists trying to talk to people – it was a chaos. And I was there, 
I made a speech […] about the situation and I asked people to do a talk, step up and talk. 
We just used the benches there in front of parliament. And on Monday, the parliament 
members came out and I asked them, stopped them and asked them, and they said they 
didn’t know, they had absolutely no idea what was going on. To me, that was a shock. 
I mean, these are the people who want to run our society and we trust them to do it and 
they have absolutely no idea what they are doing. I thought this calls for something 
more. So what I decided there and then, was to reach out to people, ask them to help 
me and put up an outdoor meeting. I found out […] people were willing to step up and 
make speeches, trying to explain to people, what was going on. And I rented car and 
sound equipment, I got permissions from police and the city authorities to do things like 
this and just arranging this whole thing.157
At demonstrations, one is likely to come into contact with others and learn more 
information that may lead to further engagement: a leaflet, a speech or a short 
conversation with the person standing next to you may well spark one’s interest 
in finding out more, may well spark the motivation to do more. Reykjavík mayor 
Dagur B. Eggertsson believes that these protests “empowered and increased par-
ticipation, at least in the short term”.158
Participants also consider demonstrations a very effective mode of participation:
Ich wollte […] gerade dran erinnern/am heutigen Tage die Mutter aller Demonstra-
tionen, was die gebracht hat! Hat natürlich einen Hintergrund und zwar in der Ziel-
setzung, die muss natürlich formuliert sein. Nur auf die Straße zu gehen und Radau 
zu machen halte ich auch für verfehlt. Für eine zielgerichtete Demonstration, für eine 
bestimmte zielorientierte Optimierung öffentlich das Wort zu ergreifen und auch ruhig 
mal auf die Straße zu laufen und auch mal Krach zu machen, hat mehr Wirkung als jede 
Petition, jeder Leserbrief oder sonst so etwas.159
I just wanted to say/on this day, the mother of all demonstrations, look what came of it! 
Of course, there was a background and the setting of a goal has to be well formulated, 
157 Hörður Torfason, personal interview, Reykjavík, 24 June 2014. 
158 Dagur B. Eggertsson, personal interview, Reykjavík, 27 June 2014.
159 Jürgen Schneider, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
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of course. Just being out on the streets, making a racket – I don’t see any use in that. 
Beginning to speak publicly for a goal-driven demonstration, for a distinct goal-orient-
ed optimisation, whilst walking the streets and making some noise, has more profound 
effects than every petition, every letter to the editor, or what not.160
8.4.1.5 Petitions
Petitions were another mode of participation popular with interlocutors. As the 
following quotes imply, they normally signed petitions online today. According 
to Karin Schmidt, the Internet makes taking part in petitions much easier, and 
that she subsequently signs more than she used to.161 To further facilitate the ease 
of taking part in petitions, some participants of the Varel focus group mentioned 
having subscribed to openPetition, a free platform that supports people in starting, 
disseminating, and handing over online petitions to decision-makers from politics, 
industry and commerce, as well as society (cf. ‘Über uns’).
In Iceland, Dominique points out that the planned felling of an old tree in the 
city centre became the focus of a heated public debate only after a petition against 
it was started on the petition platform Change.org:
Now [after the crash] I feel like that people have the feeling that their opinion counts. And 
when you realize it, then you move. There is a sweet, but very limited question which is in 
the papers today, which is very typically of that. There is an old tree in Grettisgata, beau-
tiful, hundred years old, and […] it was [...], I think the day before Christmas, something 
of that kind, when nobody reads the paper, when they announced that the tree was to be 
uprooted and two houses moved to build a hotel, one more [sighs]. But the people of the 
streets [near the tree], when they realized it, started a petition and […] straight away, it 
filled up and everybody on the street, everybody around wrote their names. That’s some-
thing you wouldn’t have seen in, well four years ago, let’s say. Because then, it was the 
decision from the top and down, and you would be angry, send a letter to the papers, that’s 
it. Now, you have really people reacting and taking charge in reaction and that is a very 
little example, but it’s very typical, I think.162
Dominique initiated her account with her perception of people’s understanding 
of their own efficacy increasing in the aftermath of the financial crisis: people en-
gaged more because they felt their voices and actions could impact decision-mak-
ing processes. Due to the simple numerical requirements regarding citizens’ peti-
160 On 9 October 1989, the largest of the “Monday Demonstrations” took place in Leipzig, 
leading to the fall of the Berlin Wall only a few weeks later (cf. Curry). 
161 Cf. Karin Schmidt, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
162 Dominique Plédel Jónsson, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 3 June 2014.
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tions to make it on the decision makers’ agenda163, as well as the ease and speed 
of signing petitions on the Internet, petitions are a participation mode that has the 
potential to profoundly influence citizens’ internal efficacy.
8.4.1.6  Online Participation Tools:  
LiquidFriesland and Betri Reykjavík
The primary advantage of modes of online participation appear to be that they are 
neither time nor location bound. One can participate from the comfort of one’s 
own home, day or night. This opens up new opportunities for participation, espe-
cially for sections of the population that were hitherto excluded from political par-
ticipation processes (cf. Coleman), such as people working shifts or long hours, at 
home caretakers unable to leave family members that need to be looked after, and 
physically and mentally challenged citizens or others for whom it is difficult if not 
impossible to attend committee meetings.
Karin Schmidt appreciated LiquidFriesland for just that,
es ist etwas was mir leichter fällt, weil ich kann es zuhause von meinem PC ausmachen. 
Ich muss nicht irgendwo hinfahren, ich muss mich vielleicht mit Leuten nicht ausein-
andersetzen, mit denen ich mich gar nicht auseinandersetzen möchte und ich kann es 
zu den Zeiten machen wo ich es will/kann vielleicht auch nochmal zusätzliche Infor-
mationen bekommen. Ich kann dort, wenn man es sich durchliest was ist tatsächlich so 
bei uns im Kreis los/Das mache ich zum Beispiel regelmäßig mal, dass ich da einfach 
mal durchgehe und blick, Ach, der denkt darüber nach, der denkt darüber nach und 
bekomme so Anregungen. Das kann ich eben ganz bequem von zu Hause aus machen 
ohne wie früher eben halt Ausschüssen beisitzen zu müssen. Und ich weiß eben nicht, 
ob ich persönlich mir jede Ausschusssitzung antun würde. Aber diese Möglichkeiten, 
die man heute hat […], das finde ich ganz spannend.164
It’s easier for me, because I can do it from my PC at home. I don’t have to drive some-
where, I don’t have to argue with somebody I don’t want to argue with, and I can do it 
at those times that suit me/might get additional information. When I go through it, I can 
read about what is going on in our council, which I do from time to time, to go through 
it [LiquidFriesland, JTK] and notice who thinks about what, and get inspired by that. 
That I can do from home without partaking in committee meetings as I did in the past. 
163 For example, a petition to the German Bundestag must have at least 50,000 signatories 
within four weeks after receipt to be publicly debated by the petition committee of the 
Bundestag (cf. Deutscher Bundestag).
164 Karin Schmidt, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
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I doubt that I would do that to myself today. But these opportunities that one has today 
are very exciting to me.
For Karin Schmidt, who has participated in local politics for over 20 years – as a 
member of various initiatives and working groups, and most recently as councillor 
for the Green Party –, the increased use of online participation tools would be a 
welcome alternative to the occasionally hostile atmosphere in decision-making 
processes:
Man muss halt immer auch sehr viel Geduld haben und einen Biss haben um in so 
einem Gremium bestehen zu können und da finde ich müsste man anfangen und sagen, 
so wir müssen irgendwie eine andere Form finden. Und von daher hätte ich dieses Liq-
uidFriesland in Varel wirklich gerne auf der Kommunalebene, da hätte man ganz viele 
kleine sachliche Anträge einbringen können ohne diesen ganzen Beleidigungsmüll 
drumherum. Sondern, dass man wirklich auf der Sachebene ist, nicht anfängt so das 
Persönliche/und wo man eben auch eine Sammlung dieser Sachfragen, die leider in 
diesem politischen Prozess sehr häufig untergehen, hat.165
You do have to be very patient and be determined to persist on such committees, and I 
think we should begin to look for another way to do this. And because of that, I would 
really like to have LiquidFriesland on a municipal level here in Varel, where one could 
have tabled a lot of small, objective motions without all the insults, but really be on a 
factual level without all the personal matters, where one could have all the factual issues 
that unfortunately often get lost within the political process.
Moreover, citing the potential of the “hive mind” effect, many participants ap-
preciate the opportunity to discuss and deliberate with fellow citizens, even if it is 
only to a limited extent. Guðrún points out, “there are a million ideas out there and 
the people of the city council only have a small portion […] of it, but the people 
know what is going on in their immediate area and how to put that into the open, 
that this is the way to do that.”166 Helmut Weber has a similar perspective: 
[ich] fand ich ja dieses Portal LiquidFriesland ganz gut, weil jeder Bürger die Möglich-
keit hat, dort etwas reinzustellen, eine Sachkenntnis oder Kompetenz, die er vielleicht 
hat, zu formulieren und so auch der Politik oder den politischen Vertretern eine Unter-
stützung zu geben. Das ist oftmals vielleicht ja ein Aspekt oder das ist etwas was uns 
als Bürger bewegt um dort eben andere Momente reinzubringen und tatsächlich auch 
165 Karin Schmidt, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
166 Guðrún Sigurðardóttir, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 9 July 2012.
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vielleicht so ein Stimmungsbild, ein Meinungsbild zu geben was die politische Arbeit 
von anderen oder politischen Vertretern auch unterstützen kann. Oder eben halt das man 
das ein bisschen weiter fasst, dass man das Knowhow, das man in einem Landkreis, in 
einer Kommune hat, tatsächlich auch nutzt […] und das fand ich an dem Portal eigen-
tlich ganz schön.167
I liked the portal LiquidFriesland because every citizen has the chance to put something 
forward, an expertise or competence that he might have in there, and so can support the 
policies or the political representatives to get to know what’s on the citizens’ minds. To 
create a representation of public opinion, that might support the political work of others 
or political representative. In a broader perspective, to collect and use all the know-how 
that exists in the council, in the municipality – that is what I liked about the portal.
As pointed out in depth in chapter 2.2.1 Simply Slacktivism?!, the mobilisation 
hypothesis was prominent in the early days of research into Internet and politics. 
While proponents were optimistic that the Internet would help mobilise and politi-
cise previously disengaged parts of society, data to support the hypothesis has only 
ever been found beyond concretely limited research fields and/or for low numbers 
of participants (e.g. Bengtsson and Serup Christensen; Feezell et al.; Saglie and 
Vabo; Xenos and Moy).
While not one participant in this study was completely politically disengaged 
before starting to use an online participation tool, engagement within online par-
ticipation tools and the internal political efficacy participants drew from it further 
encouraged them to broaden their participation repertoire and to engage and par-
ticipate politically beyond voting at the ballot. As Peter Lamprecht said:
[i]ch habe mich vorher nicht engagiert und wenn man das abstimmen oder mal eine 
Initiative bei LiquidFriesland zu starten, als politisches Engagement ansieht, dann hat 
das bei mir dazu geführt, dass man sich politisch engagiert. Und insofern glaube ich 
schon, dass es eine zusätzliche Möglichkeit ist/sie werden sicherlich nicht die alleini-
ge bleiben können, aber es ist sicherlich ein zusätzliches Angebot und dafür finde ich 
es sehr sinnvoll. Weil, ich hätte jetzt auch nicht den Nerv und auch keine Zeit, in ir-
gendwelchen Ausschüssen da rumzukaspern, aber wenn ich auf diese Art und Weise 
zumindest meine Punkte vielleicht anbringen kann mit der entsprechenden Anzahl an 
Unterstützern, dann ist das ja schon mal ein Schritt in die richtige Richtung. Das […] 
gibt mir ganz andere Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten als wenn ich nur weiß, dass ich jeden 
zweiten Dienstagabend 19.30 hier im Kreistag antanzen [kann].168
167 Helmut Weber, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014. 
168 Peter Lamprecht, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
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I wasn’t politically engaged before, and if you take the voting as well as the starting of 
initiatives on LiquidFriesland as political participation, very well, then this led to me 
participating. In this respect, I do think it is an additional opportunity, it will certainly 
not be the only one, but it is certainly a very useful additional opportunity. Because I 
wouldn’t have the time and wouldn’t be up to clowning around in committee meetings 
when I can bring across my issues with a fair number of endorsers, that is a step in the 
right direction. It gives me far more opportunities for action than showing up in city 
council every second Tuesday evening at 7.30pm.
Likewise, it was only through Betri Reykjavík that Guðmundur started to become 
more interested and engaged in politics:
if you wouldn’t have this website then I wouldn’t know where/how to get my ideas or 
you know my things that I would like the city to notice. So I wouldn’t do it if I just had 
to write an email to somebody that I don’t know who is or where is or how to find the 
email address and then the email would just be received and then deleted [laughs]. And 
at Betri Reykjavík, it’s still in there.169 
Here, Guðmundur is also making a reference to the accountability that online partic-
ipation tools like Betri Reykjavík and LiquidFriesland convey – and that many other 
participation modes do not. Everything is in writing and can be tracked: “[o]ne thing 
that is good about Betri Reykjavík compared to earlier attempts of getting feedback 
from the public is that you see what’s going on, how things are followed through”.170
8.4.1.7 Online Participatory Budgeting Tool: Betri Hverfi 
The online participatory budget Betri Hverfi has been taking place annually since 
2011. Each year, around 450 Million Icelandic Krónur (more than 3.6 Million 
Euro) “is allocated by citizens each year to implement crowdsourced ideas from 
the citizens to improve the various neighbourhoods of Reykjavík. To date, 608 
ideas have been approved (2012–2017)” (Citizens Foundation, ‘Portfolio: My 
Neighbourhood’). As Gunnar Grímsson told me in 2012, Betri Hverfi 
actually came from the city. They have this annual neighbourhood pot which is dealt 
out every year. Usually, it has been the neighbourhood boards that have taken charge of 
how they got divided. So somebody […] came up with the idea ‘Why don’t we put this 
into Betri Reykjavík’? There was a threefold process actually: the ideas were called for 
on Betri Reykjavík, we’ve created a special part of Betri Reykjavík just for Better Neigh-
169 Guðmundur Kristjánsson, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 9 July 2012.
170 Per Hansen, personal interview, Reykjavík, 23 July 2012.
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bourhoods and the ideas came in from there. […] And then the plan was to take […] 
the top ones and evaluate them, but what turned out was that all of them went through 
evaluation. […] And then after the evaluation there was this electronic voting, which 
was a totally separate system, a new voting system.171
Within this voting system, citizens could then prioritise the ideas according to 
their preferences (like for example facilities for children, facilities for dogs, facili-
ties for athletes); and indeed, the majority of accepted ideas have been implement-
ed within the same year.
The idea of incorporating residents into opaque budgeting process typically 
reserved for parliamentary elites was first carried out in the Brazilian town of Por-
to Alègre in 1989 (cf. Neunecker 204). Since then, it has enjoyed great popularity 
across the world. Users of Betri Hverfi hold the online participatory budget in high 
regard for two main reasons. First, it enables participation at the micro level: one 
can only take part for the district that is one’s main place of residence. That way, 
participants can actively take part in shaping their immediate neighbourhood and 
surroundings and thus contribute to improving the lives of their family, friends 
and neighbours. Here, participants seem especially motivated to participate on 
the local political level rather than the state or national political levels (see for 
more detail chapter 3.4, The Role of Geographical Proximity in (Online) Political 
Participation). Part of this motivation springs from the visibility of changes imple-
mented through Betri Hverfi, like new bike lanes, benches, or trees. Second, the 
three-step process as described above by Gunnar Grímsson, including deadlines 
by which certain tasks have to be completed, is expressed and communicated 
much more clearly than on Betri Reykjavík. 
Contrasting participants’ statements from 2012 and 2014, it becomes clear that 
participants’ engagement with Betri Reykjavík had decreased while their engage-
ment with Betri Hverfi had increased. Whereas Betri Hverfi was rarely mentioned 
by participants in 2012, by 2014, the terms Betri Reykjavík and Betri Hverfi had 
often become used synonymously to describe Betri Hverfi. As shown in chapter 
2.3, since its launch in 2011, Betri Hverfi has continuously diverted attention and 
resources away from Betri Reykjavík, with participants often unaware that Betri 
Reykjavík and Betri Hverfi were two different tools. 
171 Gunnar Grímsson, personal interview II together with Róbert Bjarnason, Reykjavík, 
24 July 2012.
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8.4.1.8 Conclusion
This chapter focused on the participants, touching on their overall experiences 
with the most prominent modes of participation in their respective fields, Rey-
kjavík and Friesland. It provided insight into the ways in which participants in-
clude those modes in their participation repertoire and in their everyday lives. The 
persistence of established political participation modes like voting or party work 
in participants’ participation repertoires was also highlighted. Comparing Icelan-
dic participants’ accounts of their repertoires of participation in 2012 and 2014 
revealed increased politicisation through the expansion in their modes of political 
participation. The participants did not, in fact, exclusively extend their repertories 
by ‘simple’, ‘clicktivist’ modes, but also by ‘costly’ modes such as taking up an 
electoral mandate (cf. Gladwell as cited in Baringhorst, ‘Online-Aktivismus’ 79).
The finding that all these modes of participation are practised in a fundamen-
tally open and combinatorial process (cf. Schönberger 207) invalidates popular 
assumptions about the Internet, in particular, as responsible for an apparent degen-
eration of participation cultures and the political landscape in general (cf. Fox). 
Rather, as Stark argues, participants self-determinedly mix-and-match political 
participation modes that they deem promising in achieving the specific goal they 
are pursuing, in accordance with their personal resources, social surroundings, and 
individual values (cf. 64).
8.4.2 (Online) Participation: Enabled or Simulated?
This sub-chapter gathers together several discourses on the effectiveness of online 
participation modes. The attributions academics have found for those are highly 
heterogenous, ranging from enabling citizens to participate (more effectively) to 
stimulating citizens’ participation in political decision-making processes and thus 
have a stabilising effect on existing representative power relations. Two practical 
examples from the fields, that is the scope of ideas put forward on the platforms 
Betri Reykjavík and LiquidFriesland, and the general observation that online par-
ticipation tools increasingly simplify and reduce their (perceived) aspirations from 
representing public political deliberation to dealing with complaints about broken 
local infrastructure, illustrate this continuum.
As I have pointed out, despite its prominence, there has been little evidence to 
support the mobilisation hypothesis, except in concretely limited research fields 
and/or for low numbers of participants (e.g. Bengtsson and Serup Christensen; 
Feezell et al.; Saglie and Vabo; Xenos and Moy). By contrast, however, there has 
been strong evidence for the general empowerment effect of digital infrastructures, 
both on already active citizens’ political participation and on social movements 
(cf. Castells; cf. Escher, ‘Beteiligung via Internet’; cf. Theocharis). According to 
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Klaus Schönberger, the potential to enable is inherent in online communication 
modes, since those contribute to the widening of possibilities for agency and an in-
creased visibility of participants/activists through the simultaneity of persistence 
and recombination of existent social practices (cf. as cited Näser-Lather 1f.).
In the preceding chapter, I outlined the main ways in which the use of online 
participation tools had helped participants feel empowered. German political sci-
entist Tobias Escher argues that Internet usage increases political interests as well 
as internal political efficacy (cf. ‘Mobilisierung’ 461). As Freyja points out, she 
felt empowered and encouraged that the ideas she had put into Betri Reykjavík had 
hit a nerve with a number of other users: “You feel real progress, [like you are] 
doing something that matters.”172 It was not only Freyja’s internal political effica-
cy that was strengthened by this experience, but also her feeling of professional 
competence in discussions about her ideas: 
The few comments that came against it, there were not many, there were much more for, 
and the few comments that were against it, they were not very critical, they were very 
easy to fight against, to prove your point. It is really common. When people don’t like 
dogs or are scared of dogs they put something irrational down and often you know, they 
probably haven’t thought it through or something. I’m a veterinarian and I’m also a dog 
trainer, so its maybe easier for me to formulate a good response. 173
However, on the whole, neither tool was initiated with any real, larger claim about 
implementing deliberative and participatory strands into decision-making process-
es, but to assure them that the respective administration was aware of the need to 
include them more in decision-making processes, and to show that the municipality 
was up-to-date and does offer online participation. As Thomas Fischer notes:
Manchmal möchte ich ganz ketzerisch annehmen, dass so etwas wie dieses Liquid-
Friesland jetzt, dass es genau wieder diese schlechte Politik legitimieren soll, weil ‚Da 
machen die Leute ja auch mit und die dürfen ja auch mitreden, ne?’ Über Krähen, über 
weiß nicht; kommt da ein kleiner oder großer Kreisel hin; wird das Haus rot oder grün; 
darf das Abfalldings jetzt auch mittwochnachmittags aufhaben anstatt donnerstags – 
können wir alle super mitreden. […] Soll das nicht dazu dienen eben die Herrschaft 
dieser gewählten Kaste zu legitimieren oder wozu ist das eigentlich gut? Nur mal so.174
172 Freyja Kristinsdóttir, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 17 July 2012.
173 Freyja Kristinsdóttir, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 17 July 2012.
174 Thomas Fischer, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
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Sometimes I want to heretically assume that something like LiquidFriesland is sup-
posed to legitimate exactly today’s bad politics, because ‘People do have a say and 
are allowed to take part, don’t they?’ About crows and what not; whether a little or big 
roundabout should be installed; whether the house should be painted red or green; if the 
dump thingy is supposed to be open Wednesday afternoons instead of Thursdays – we 
surely all have to say something about that. Isn’t that supposed to legitimate the power 
relations of the elected caste or what is it for? Just saying.
This apparent pseudo-participation, that is the attempt to cultivate an impression 
of openness while rulers are careful to retain decision-making in their own hands, 
reproduces and reinforces the status quo of power relations (cf. Heery and Noon). 
In this context, Jenkins and Itō criticises the “general rhetoric of participation”, 
which often involves “‘opportunities’ for participation which do little to shift the 
balance of power, diversify the culture, or achieve any of the other democratizing 
effects I hoped for a decade ago when I wrote about a move towards a more par-
ticipatory culture” (36). 
This approach to pseudo-participation certainly has consequences for the de-
sign of municipal online participation tools, as Wright and Street point out: “[o]n 
the specific issue of public participation, councils have tended to commission sites 
that maintain existing institutional and cultural practices” (858). As discussed at 
length in chapter 2, Communication within Online Participation Tools, this results 
in the design of linear tools which offer little space for deliberation and discussion 
between users, but instead favour autotelic “clicktivist” actions such as liking, 
sharing, or voting up or down ideas. 
In addition, the predisposition toward creating online participation tools which 
reproduce existing power relations also plays a significant role in limiting the 
scope of ideas that are put in and discussed on both Betri Reykjavík and Liquid-
Friesland. For example, Birgitta Jónsdóttir regularly participated when Betri Rey-
kjavík first went online, but she eventually stopped because she “felt the decisions 
being made there were minor stuff. Whereas with bigger stuff which people really 
wanted and were engaged in, and wanted to take further, it was very difficult to 
take it further. But we have now permissions to have chickens in the city!”175 She 
feels that Betri Reykjavík 
is sort of fake democracy, because we don’t get to participate in the stuff that really mat-
ters. For example, when they were merging the schools, why couldn’t we vote on that, 
you know? That kind of stuff is very important, and it would have actually forced them 
to be in much more collaboration with the people in the communities. And let’s say, if it 
175 Birgitta Jónsdóttir, personal interview, Reykjavík, 18 June 2014.
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would have been too expensive to run a school in a community we would have maybe 
been able to demand budgets from other projects for it. We should be able to have more 
influence on how the money is spent.176
Asked about the limited scope of the ideas discussed on LiquidFriesland, the press 
secretary of the district answered that 
Wir haben ja ungefähr 200 Vorlagen insgesamt im Jahr […] und nur ein kleiner Teil 
davon, aus unserer Sicht, ist irgendwo von so einem Interesse oder auch so greifbar 
oder auch von solch großer Relevanz, dass es sich lohnen würde, den dort diskutieren 
zu lassen. Denn der Gedanke dabei war ja nicht so eine Art Ersatzkreistag zu machen. 
Es gibt ja die gewählten Kreistagsabgeordneten, die sich durch alle diese 200 Vorlagen 
durcharbeiten, das ist halt auch mit viel Klein-Klein und auch Mühe verbunden.177
We have around 200 motions in a year […] and in our view, only a small part of that is 
interesting, comprehensible, and relevant enough that mooting them in LiquidFriesland 
would have paid off. Because the thought was not to establish a deputy district council. 
Elected district councillors do exist that work through all of those 200 motions, and 
these come with countless detail and effort.
Moreover, he argued that (online) participatory budgeting tools simulate engage-
ment and participation in decision-making processes, as the following quotation 
from Sönke Klug illustrates:
Also, wir halten […] Bürgerhaushalte hier für eine ziemlich gemeine Geschichte. Es ist 
natürlich unheimlich ambitioniert gestartet, Porto Àlegre und so weiter. […] Worüber kön-
nen Leute abstimmen? Freiwillige Leistungen. Stellen wir mal die ganzen freiwilligen 
Leistungen ins Netz. Praktisch fragen wir den Bürger: ‚Wir müssen sparen, was davon 
wollt ihr streichen?‘ Und das ist gemein. Weil das ist eigentlich Aufgabe der Verwaltung 
und Aufgabe des Kämmerers im Besonderen, Sparvorschläge zu unterbreiten […]. Aber 
dem Bürger jetzt zu sagen, ihr dürft euch beteiligen und das was ihr machen dürft, ist euch 
selber das Zeug wegstreichen, das wird niemand machen. Die Leute werden also/oder aber 
nach Interessenlage bekriegen. Also die Leute, die nicht ins Hallenbad gehen, die werden 
sagen, ‚Ja, streicht doch das Hallenbad.‘ Und die Leute die in die Bibliothek gerne gehen, 
die werden sagen, ‚Ja, die müssen wir unbedingt behalten, aber meinetwegen kann das 
Freibad weg‘. Der Nutzen einer solchen Aktion erschließt sich mir nicht unmittelbar.178
176 Birgitta Jónsdóttir, personal interview, Reykjavík, 18 June 2014.
177 Sönke Klug, personal interview, Jever, 25 August 2015.
178 Sönke Klug, personal interview, Jever, 25 August 2015.
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So, we actually think participatory budgeting is quite mean. Of course, it started out re-
ally ambitiously in Porto Àlegre and so on. But what are people voting on? Voluntary 
services. So we put all the voluntary services in the web. Effectively, we are asking the 
citizens: ‘We have to economize, what do you want to cut?’ And that is mean. Because it 
is actually the tasks of the administration and especially the treasurer, to make cost-saving 
proposals. […] But telling the citizens that they are now allowed to participate and what 
they are allowed to participate in is to cut themselves services – nobody will do that. The 
people will be warring with one another according to their preferences. So the people 
who don’t go the indoor pool will say, ‘Cut the pool.’ Those who like to go to the library 
will say ‘Absolutely must the library be kept, but go and close the outdoor pool, from my 
perspective’. The value of such campaigning does not immediately reveal itself to me.
All of these reasons illustrate difficulties in establishing and maintaining online 
deliberation. The effects of simulated participation and the consequential limited 
thematic scope of the discussion certainly contributed to an almost total lack of 
users on LiquidFriesland towards the end and to Betri Reykjavík’s inability to 
attract more regular input from citizens.
8.3.2.1 Regression and Simplification of Online Participation Tools
A consequence of the questionable efficacy and relevance of online participation 
tools, also illustrated in the limited scope of initiatives, is the regression and sim-
plification of online participation tools like Betri Reykjavík and LiquidFriesland. 
In this sub-chapter, I will illustrate this regression and simplification by looking 
at the updated version of LiquidFriesland as well as the Icelandic online tool Bor-
garlandið (literally ‘The City Land’). 
In the format of my research topic, LiquidFriesland was discontinued in Spring 
2016. In December 2016, the URL www.liquidfriesland.de resumed working, but 
the new site bore almost no resemblance to the earlier version (see Figure 11, 
164). Users could no longer register, nor deliberate in any form or communicate 
in any way with other users. Today LiquidFriesland can best be described as an 
open report-mapping software tool on which users can submit a form with sug-
gestions or ideas to the council’s committee (see Figure 12, 165). Those are either 
answered directly within a few days, or after being discussed at the appropriate 
committee’s next meeting (see Figure 13, 166).
In the new version, the complexity of LiquidFriesland was greatly reduced. 
While the district’s press secretary said there were no concrete plans to simplify 
LiquidFriesland to this extent, in August 2015, he contemplated a scenario which 
was strikingly similar to what later eventuated:
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Fig. 11: Starting Page of the New Version of LiquidFriesland179
aus der Erfahrung, die wir mit LiquidFriesland gemacht haben, müsste man wahr-
scheinlich dann sagen/das Potential nach dieser Welle ersten Interesses, das Potential 
ist nicht so groß als dass es das rechtfertigen würde, als dass man so eine komplexe 
Möglichkeit wie LiquidFriesland zur Verfügung stellt, schätze ich. Wahrscheinlich 
müsste man sagen, wir werden versuchen müssen mit dem gleichen öffentlichen Ef-
fekt, also das man sozusagen den gleichen öffentlichen Zugang zu diesen Themen hat, 
aber mit weniger Komplexität irgendwo, diese Ideen einzufangen. Also, denn diese 
ganzen Möglichkeiten, die sie haben, der Interaktion, des Aufstellens von Alternativen 
– dahinter steckt komplexe Software. Sie müssen das auf einem Server betreiben, das 
179 Screenshot taken on 23 August 2018 at https://www.liquidfriesland.de.
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Fig. 12: Form to Submit a Suggestion in the New Version of LiquidFriesland180  
ist alles nicht zum Nulltarif zu haben. Möglicherweise müsste man dann mit der Ein- 
schränkung leben müssen, dass man dann sagt, wenn nicht so viel kommt an Ideen, 
sondern nur hier mal was, da mal was, dann wird man möglicherweise damit leben 
müssen, dass man mit diesen Ideen nicht so komplex spielen kann als Nutzer wie man 
das eigentlich wollte, aber sich dafür eben auch die Kostenseite angucken müssen.181
From the experiences we have had with LiquidFriesland, one would have to say that af-
ter the initial wave of interest, the further potential of the site was insufficient to justify 
offering such a complex opportunity. One would have to say that we should try to collect
180 Form to Submit a Suggestion to the District Administration in the New LiquidFries-
land. Screenshot taken on 23 August 2018 at https://www.liquidfriesland.de/tipps/
tipp_abgeben.html.
181 Sönke Klug, personal interview, Jever, 25 August 2015.
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Fig. 13: Completed Suggestion in the New Version of LiquidFriesland182 
ideas to the same public effect, but with less complexity. All those features you have 
now, the interaction, drawing up alternatives – there’s complex software behind it. We 
have to run it on a server; all that isn’t free. When the trend continues that there aren’t that 
many ideas put in, one possibly would have to live with the restriction that users cannot 
play around as complexly as one would like to, but we have to keep an eye on the costs.
182 Completed Suggestion in the new LiquidFriesland with Description and Picture of 
the Problem Submitted by a Citizen and Commentary by the District Administration. 
Screenshot taken on 23 August 2018 at https://www.liquidfriesland.de/tipps/tipps/ 
tippdetails.html?tid=900000103.
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Fig. 14: Starting Page of Borgarlandið183 
The regression and simplification of online participation is also visible in Bor-
garlandið, another report-mapping software tool (see Figure 14) that some Betri 
Reykjavík users had switched to between my research stays in Iceland in 2012 
and 2014. In Borgarlandið, citizens can briefly explain what they would like to 
see improved in Reykjavík, mark it on a map, and receive a hands-on reply with-
in a few days. For instance, Guðrún Sigurðardóttir preferred Borgarlandið over 
Betri Reykjavík in 2014 because it went straight to the point: “There are all kind 
of things you can put in there. That tree needs trimming, wash the windows, just 
about everything. That is a really good thing. […] It is just: pavement needs fixing 
– it’s exactly there. You can put it on a map or just write a description. And it goes 
straight to the department. Easiest way to get small things done”.184 
Of course, suggestions that can be submitted over such a website are located 
on another level than the ideas that originally came in through Betri Reykjavík. 
Suggestions differ heavily both in the complexity of expression and in the 
complexity of their implementation: too few park benches, broken streetlights, or 
overgrown grass is easier to fix than protecting an inner-city lot from development 
(cf. Allen) or reforming unemployment benefits (cf. magnús). In short, it is evident 
that the former suggestions require significantly less deliberation and debate than 
the latter do.
183 Screenshot taken on 25 August 2018 at https://reykjavik.is/abendingar.
184 Guðrún Sigurðardóttir, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 30 May 2014.
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These examples illustrate several obstacles to online participation, both regarding 
the facilitation of online participation tools and their impact. While most partici-
pants – at least that I spoke to – want online tools that enable them to discuss and 
deliberate on political matters, and which facilitate involvement in decision-mak-
ing processes, the current software does not offer that. It is likely that innovations 
in software design that would enable such debate and participation are not promot-
ed by administration and politicians, who may be more interested in consolidating 
the status quo of power relations. Report-mapping software tools like the second 
version of LiquidFriesland and Borgarlandið, which cannot, even with the best 
will in the world, be described as political participation tools, are the consequence 
of this tension between citizens’ and politicians’ demands and motivations. 
8.4.3  Political Participation in Times of Crisis  
and in Times of Affluence
Another perspective on (online) political participation is the differentiation be-
tween times of crisis and times of affluence, as adapted from Harold R. Kerbo’s 
work on social movements. Kerbo stresses that there are “differing socioeconom-
ic conditions from which social movements are spawned. Depending on these 
conditions, the mix of conceptual tools needed in order to understand a social 
movement adequately may differ” (653). To Kerbo, times of crisis are charac-
terised by “life-disrupting situations, including (but not limited to) widespread 
unemployment, food shortages, and major social dislocation” (653). In times of 
affluence, people “have their basic needs of life met, or even in abundance” (654). 
These “differing socioeconomic conditions” – the moment of crisis in Iceland and 
its absence in Germany – help explain the differences in general participatory be-
haviour in Iceland and Germany, as well as the different development trajectories 
of LiquidFriesland and Betri Reykjavík. 
8.4.3.1 Political Participation in Times of Crisis
Today, few scholars would argue that political participation can be investigated 
without looking at the context of social, political and economic conditions in a 
society (cf. Almond and Verba; cf. Brady et al.; cf. Verba, Schlozman, et al.). 
Whether a society is in a state of crisis or in a state of affluence has a significant 
influence on the actual forms that political participation takes. In times of crisis, 
people appear more easily motivated to participate politically, and do so in addi-
tional modes than they might make use of in times of affluence. In this chapter, 
I argue that the primary reason for this increased participation is that people see 
themselves as more affected by the outcome of political decision-making process-
es on the daily-life level of their existence in times of crisis than in affluence; or, in 
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other words, there is more at stake in times of crisis. Before going into detail about 
these claims, and in order to provide context about the conditions in which partici-
pants were acting, this sub-chapter will provide a brief summary of the events that 
led to the crisis in Iceland and its consequences for society.
To be able to comprehend and contextualise the events that led to the crisis in 
2008–09, it is crucial to take a brief look at the modern history of the Republic of 
Iceland,185 which can be roughly divided into two periods: before 1940, and after 
1940. The Icelandic historian Guðmundur Gylfi Magnússon points out that “[u]
p to 1940 Iceland is best viewed as an essentially agrarian and to some extent an 
insular society.” Illustrating his point, Magnússon marks pre-1940 society as “[...] 
grounded on the traditional peasant values of thrift and financial restraint” (238). 
This is accompanied by a conservative attitude towards society and culture. The 
situation started to change in 1940, when Iceland was occupied first by British, 
then by US-American forces seeking to secure allied control over the North Atlan-
tic during the Second World War. Until their withdrawal in 2006, the presence of 
US–American troops had a lasting influence on Icelandic culture. Simultaneously 
to the presence of US-American troops, “the traditional values of agricultural so-
ciety […] continued to play an important part in people’s lives and perceptions” 
(ibid.). After the Second World War, a combination of three factors triggered a pe-
riod of extended growth: first, Iceland received money through the Marshall-Plan 
for the establishment of the US/NATO military basis; second, demand for Ice-
land’s most important export product, fish, was high, and third, Icelandic society 
remained small, but became increasingly well-educated with a deep-seated sense 
of national identity (cf. Wade and Sigurgeirsdóttir, ‘Reykjavík-Gang’).
With growing prosperity, Iceland established a welfare state oriented along the 
lines of the Scandinavian tax-financed model. During the 1980s, both the average 
income and income distribution in Iceland were on a par with the Scandinavian 
countries. However, state regulation and clientelism were much more pronounced, 
with the political and economic sector both controlled and tied up by a local ol-
igopoly. This elite consisted of about a dozen families. This power bloc, known 
in the vernacular as “the Octopus”, effectively controlled everything: banks and 
insurances, transportation and fisheries, the delivery of the NATO-bases and the 
import sector, and the political class, with most leading politicians also directly 
connected with “the Octopus”. The oligarchs and their nepotistic web essentially 
had the same power as the clan chiefs of the earlier Iceland (cf. Wade and Sigur-
185 In substance, the summary of the modern history of Iceland and the happenings of the 
financial crisis is adopted from my unpublished master’s thesis “Decision-Making in 
Digital Democracy. Assessing the Online Participation Tool Betri Reykjavík”, accepted 
by the Faculty of Humanities of the Georg-August-Universität Göttingen in 2012.
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geirsdóttir, ‘Reykjavík-Gang’). They controlled the (centre)-right Sjálfstæðisflok-
kur (Independence Party), which held power over the media and were responsible 
for making high-level appointments within the bureaucracy, the police force and 
the judicial system. The political scientists Robert Wade and Silla Sigurgeirsdóttir 
report that when a normal citizen wanted a loan for a new car or foreign currency 
for a trip abroad, they had to approach party officials first. The authors argue that 
this situation led to a wild entanglement of mistrust, cajolery and blackmail, ap-
parently characterised by a culture of brute masculinity.186
From the late 1970s onwards, a group of business and law students calling 
themselves “the Locomotive” wanted to develop their careers by propagating rad-
ical market ideas without being dependent on the patronage of “the octopus”. 
Probably the most prominent member of “the locomotive” is Davið Oddsson, who 
has had an astonishing career – he has been mayor of Reykjavík, Iceland’s longest 
serving prime minister, and chair of the board of governors of the Central Bank 
of Iceland (see also chapter 1.3 Filtering, Sorting, Contextualising). In the boom 
years at the start of the 21st century, Icelandic businessmen started to expand into 
international financial markets. These businessmen would later go down in history 
as Útrásavíkingar or Outvasion Vikings, as businessmen setting out to conquer the 
world with Viking-like ambition. A new atmosphere started to pervade Iceland 
and a time of apparent greed, consumerism and recklessness began. The Icelandic 
population became enslaved by a collective frenzy of consumerism on credit (cf. 
Puhl 114). According to an international study in 2006, Icelanders were the hap-
piest people in the world (cf. Wade and Sigurgeirsdóttir, ‘Lessons from Iceland’). 
In his book Boomerang. Travels in the New Third World, the financial journalist 
Michael Lewis describes how, almost overnight, the majority of a generation of 
men did not go fishing any more, but invested in apartments in Beverly Hills, in 
English football clubs, Danish airlines, Norwegian banks, Indian power stations. 
Lewis argues that they proceeded in a way that reminded him of deep-sea fishing: 
fishing in every weather until the boat sinks (cf. as cited in Hüetlin 125).
186 Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this book to take a detailed look at gender 
relations during the Icelandic crisis. Cynthia Enloe’s volume Seriously! Investigating 
Crashes and Crises as if Women Mattered provides excellent food for thought on the 
matter, especially the chapter ‘DSK, Vikings and the Smartest Guys. Masculinities in 
the Banking Crash of 2008’ (cf. 49–85). Moreover, Kristín Loftsdóttir’s and Helga 
Björnsdóttir’s 2015 article ‘Risk taking business Vikings: Gendered dynamics in Ice-
landic banks and financial companies’ offers more in-depth information on the Ice-
landic case, although the entire paper (except the abstract) is written in Icelandic (cf. 
231f.).
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Earlier statements from Iceland’s president, Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, illus-
trate this point well. The speech he delivered to British businessmen in 2005, 
the hey-day of the Icelandic boom, can be seen as the epitome for this kind of 
self-regard and arrogance. In it, Grímsson lists the reasons for “Iceland’s success 
story” (3) which include “a strong work ethic […] a heritage from the old society 
of farmers and fishermen,” “personal trust” and “old-fashioned entrepreneurship” 
(4). For Grímsson, these characteristics, together with “the heritage of discovery 
and exploration fostered by the medieval Viking sagas”, had led Icelanders to in-
terpret “modern business ventures as an extension of the Viking spirit” (5).
Several participants that I interviewed had their own interpretations about how 
this consumerist mentality had developed. For Norwegian immigrant Per Hansen, 
Icelanders 
are newly rich. There’s still [...] euphoria, because they now have the money which 
they didn’t have when their grandparents or great-grandparents were growing up. They 
might have been living in houses made from turf and then came a lot of money from the 
Americans during the war and fisheries. And I guess there has been a general increasing 
in Western Europe as well. I think this is part of the reason for this mentality.187
Guðmundur Gylfi Magnússon compares the developments described above to 
“[...] something out of a fairy-tale” (256). And like a fairy-tale, it turned out to 
be too good to be true. Iceland, once one of the poorest countries in Europe, had 
embarked “on what has been described as ‘one of the purest experiments in fi-
nancial deregulation ever conducted’” (Addley). The British journalist Esther 
Addley continues: “Successive politicians privatised Iceland’s natural resources 
and dismantled its regulatory mechanisms, sparking an economic bonanza for its 
bankers and mixing for its citizens the now-familiar toxic cocktail of bountiful 
credit, flaccid financial oversight and an unspoken collective agreement not to ask 
too many questions but just keep on spending”. In the end, Iceland’s “three main 
banks, controlled by a tiny elite cabal, had a paper value of more than 10 times the 
country’s GDP” (Addley).188 
Following the bankruptcy of the US-American bank Lehman Brothers in Sep-
tember 2008, foreign investors in Icelandic banks withdrew their money over-
night. The value of Iceland’s currency, the Icelandic Króna, crashed. Suddenly 
187 Per Hansen, personal interview, Reykjavík, 23 July 2012.
188 With a focus on macroeconomy and financial markets, Benediktsdóttir et al. provide a 
detailed account of how the crash came about (cf. 183ff.). 
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everything was far more expensive.189 A huge chunk of the Icelandic population 
lost their savings, jobs, and homes, either because they were unable to pay high 
rents or because they had to sell their property. Even at the end of 2009, it was still 
impossible to obtain Euros or US Dollars in Iceland except at the international 
airport, where an outbound flight ticket was needed to prove one was leaving the 
country.190 
In the blink of an eye, Icelanders had to realise they were “not necessarily 
the best in the world”, as the title of an article by Kristín Loftsdóttir suggested 
(1). Aside from the measurable economic effects of the crash such as debt per 
capita, the crisis had a massive impact on the collective national identity. During 
the boom years prior the crisis, the economic adventure Icelandic businesspeople 
had embarked on “was seen as a joint project of Icelanders, reflecting the national 
Icelandic character as such, rather than the success of a few individuals” (Lofts-
dóttir 7). And as a consequence, many felt the crisis as the failure of the collective 
Icelandic nation, and not merely that of a few bankers and politicians. 
Crisis as Disruption of the Quotidian
Having provided the historical background, I now turn to look at the crisis pe-
riod itself. For the majority of the Icelandic population, the crash was experi-
enced as a crisis because it was a disruption of the quotidian, that is, of “all the 
taken-for-granted aspects of everyday life; more specifically, […] daily practices 
and routines that comprise habitual social action, alongside the natural attitude of 
routinized expectations and the suspension of doubt about the organization of the 
social world and one’s role within it” (Buechler 59).
The fallout from the crisis was not limited to those gambling with Iceland’s na-
tional economy, it was so severe that it affected the entire population. As Bernburg 
and Víkingsdóttir point out, such an event can open up radical new possibilities:
Stable routines of everyday life render most people unreflective in their perception of 
reality, which are, thus, based largely on taken-for-granted assumptions (for example, 
‘banks are trustworthy’; ‘government acts in the public’s interest’). But, events that 
disrupt or threaten routine life, ‘the taken-for-granted substrate of everyday life’, can 
undermine the habitual acceptance by individuals of their situations. When such disrup-
189 This was the case for Icelanders at least. As an exchange student coming from the 
Eurozone, I ‘benefited’ from the weak króna in Reykjavík in 2009. In the end, life in 
Iceland was much more affordable than I had envisioned it to be when applying for the 
semester abroad. These exchange rates may have already triggered the tourist boom 
that was about to come (cf. ‘Währungsverfall’).
190 As I experienced on 22 December 2009.
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tion is experienced collectively, as can occur in a crisis, an opening emerges for re-in-
terpretation of shared meanings, beliefs, and identities, thus facilitating the emergence 
of radical or activist frames. (85)
So personally affected by the crisis – their standard of living decreased, their 
everyday sense-making practices disrupted –, large parts of society were also mo-
tivated to become active and to demand change. In social movement literature, 
this effect is often explained through relative deprivation theory, which “implies 
that when crises end long periods of rising prosperity, feelings of shattered expec-
tations and blocked goals (relative deprivation) may lead individuals to experi-
ence injustice and frustration, mobilizing them to participate in rebellious action” 
(Davies as cited in Bernburg 232). In several other countries hit hard by the crisis, 
a new wave of politicised protesters and social movements emerged, particularly 
in Spain (cf. Calvo; cf. Romanos) and in Greece (cf. Rüdig and Karyotis). In some 
countries, “the level of public participation in some of these protests has threat-
ened public order and political stabilities” (Bernburg 231); and in Iceland, daily 
protests on Austurvöllur (the square in front of parliament) during the winter of 
2008–09 culminated in the overthrow of the national government. 
Many Icelanders were shocked and felt disbelief once the extent of the negli-
gence of bankers, the inertia of political decision-makers, and the immense cro-
nyism underlying society became public. As prominent Icelandic chronical and 
journalist Alda Sigmundsdóttir notes: “[i]t was a collapse of the people’s trust in 
its country’s politicians, institutions and financial system. It revealed to the vast 
majority of us that we’d had no idea of the extent of the political corruption and 
neglect that had lurked beneath the surface of our society for decades”. Bernburg 
and Víkingsdóttir point out that “framing the crisis as a ‘moral shock’, made it 
possible to appeal to values of justice, and associate protest participation with 
moral duty” (94). In that way, the crisis motivated many previously disengaged 
citizens to participate politically, such as by demonstrating in the Pots-and-Pans 
Revolution. Dominique Plédel Jónsson succinctly summed up the lack of political 
participation prior to the crisis: “activism is not an Icelandic trait”.191 Guðmundur 
Kristjánsson was also surprised by the high turnout at weekly demonstrations in 
front of Alþingi, the parliament building, but he also felt that the Icelandic protests 
were somewhat innocent in comparison to those elsewhere: 
it was a little strange when everybody went to protest when the banks fell and see all the 
people protesting. But it […] wasn’t no/like you sort of see it from abroad, that they are 
burning cars and just do a lot of damage, but it wasn‘t much done here. It was only one 
191 Dominique Plédel Jónsson, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 17 July 2012.
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bench or one tree or something that burnt or something and they had to clean the Alþingi 
house because it was covered in eggs, that was all the damage, you know, all the force 
from the protest.192
Crisis as Liminal Phase
In the following, I draw on French ethnologist Arnold van Gennep’s and British 
ethnologist Victor Turner’s work regarding liminal phases to further analyse this 
state of crisis. As cited above, in times of crisis “an opening emerges for re-inter-
pretation of shared meanings, beliefs, and identities, thus facilitating the emer-
gence of radical or activist frames” (Bernburg and Víkingsdóttir 85). In a way 
then, a crisis can be understood as a liminal phase in the life of an individual, but 
also in the condition of a nation state. 
The concept of the liminal phase goes back to Arnold van Gennep’s Rites of 
Passage (1909). According to van Gennep, there are three phases ”which accom-
pany every change of place, state, social position and age”: “separation, margin 
(or limen, signifying ‘threshold’ in Latin), and aggregation” (Turner 94). In Ice-
land, the first phase corresponds to the boom-years in the lead up to the crash, 
which can well be described as a “detachment of the individual or group either 
from an earlier fixed point in the social structure, from a set of cultural conditions 
(a ‘state’), or from both” (Turner 94). 193 The second or liminal phase was the 
crash itself, as well as its immediate aftermath. The third phase describes the rein-
tegration and ‘normalisation‘ in a newly negotiated state of societal being, which 
arguably has been the case in Iceland since around 2010.
Snow et al. conclude that people become active once their everyday lives have 
been shaken. However, there is another dimension to social mobilization other 
than (the fear of) loss. Turner thinks that in times of liminality, in threshold situa-
tions, a more open society exists, and in it, a wider range of socially acceptable be-
haviours may appear: “the characteristics of the ritual subject […] are ambiguous; 
he passes through a cultural realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past 
or coming state […] signifying the detachment of the individual or group either 
from an earlier fixed point in the social structure, from a set of cultural conditions 
(a ‘state‘), or from both” (94). In liminal times of crisis, when ”an opening emerg-
es for re-interpretation of shared meanings, beliefs, and identities” (Bernburg and 
Víkingsdóttir 85), people find it more probable that their engagement does make a 
192 Guðmundur Kristjánsson, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 22 June 2014.
193 The idea of interpreting the financial crisis through Arnold van Gennep’s Rites de Pas-
sage and Victor Turner’s thoughts on the liminal phase was initially articulated in my 
unpublished master’s thesis (2012). This section here is both a refined and extended 
version of my earlier work. 
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significant difference, that they can change something. In this way, their sense of 
internal efficacy increases, as Guðrún illustrates: 
See, the Icelandic soul, I think that is the word for it, from the eighties was ‘Do this, 
do that, that’s it’. And I think we are, like all these demonstrations are proving, we are 
discovering we HAVE a voice. And we CAN say, we can let them know, when they 
cross the line. So I think that‘s/it‘s going into the right direction. It will gonna take a 
period, a few more years, but I think they are gonna pay more attention to the people 
than they have.194
It appears as if a process of emancipation has begun in the wake of the crisis, with 
people finding their voice and speaking back to politicians and other elites who, 
for example, had seen “modern business ventures as an extension of the Viking 
spirit” (Grímsson 5). The fact that this statement about normal Icelandic life in 
2005 – about the quotidian – comes from the former president exemplifies the 
intimidating confusion created and the interpretational sovereignty that prevailed. 
Guðrún’s quote, however, illustrates how the crisis led many citizens to question 
the joint failure of political and economic elites, made people ill-content to remain 
obedient to those elites, and empowered them to claim their own right to speak up 
and to political power. 
Intensified Sense of Community Created by Crisis
In the liminal phase, this emancipation can be interpreted as one element in the 
process of finding society’s new position; as one new common denominator in the 
state of ‘Communitas’, signifying the society which will come into being within 
the search for new horizons (cf. Kaschuba 191). Citizens’ new found willingness 
to not only fundamentally question what political and banking elites were doing 
and saying, but also to listen to other theories and advice empowered them with 
knowledge and helped them envisage a more active role in society. If before the 
crash, the majority just tended to mind their own business and pursue their own 
(materialistic) goals, then after the crash, when these goals had become out-of-
reach in any case, there was a wave of people opening up to others and recalling 
community; and this community was consolidated by the shared experience of the 
crisis and its effects, including unemployment, lost savings, and lost homes. This 
consolidation of community not only helped console those in it, but also helped 
them summon strength and motivated them to improve their lives and the life of 
the community, which they had come to see as inextricably intertwined with.
194 Guðrún Sigurðardóttir, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 30 May 2014.
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In the aftermath of the crisis, Dominique says that this sense of community 
could be seen in the residential neighbourhood meetings, which more people at-
tended, and in the streets and parks: “all these people, they walk around the lake or 
on Sundays on bikes [...] and they were talking together. If you stop, sit down on 
a bench, someone sits at your side and discusses and so. It has been really opening 
speech, at least.”195 But she did not “know how it is in other areas of Reykjavík, 
because this is quite limited, you really belong to Arbær, you have this feeling 
towards it. But five years ago, everybody was just in his own corner, you would 
just say Hi and no discussion on a Sunday.”
The idea for Betri Reykjavík itself was also born out of this time of “intense 
comradeship and egalitarianism” between people in transition (Turner 95), being 
part of a new vision for the state of communitas. Engaging online at Betri Rey-
kjavík was envisioned as strengthening the renewed feeling of community and so-
cial cohesion, strengthened by the “need for many individuals to make sense of the 
crisis” (Bernburg and Víkingsdóttir 86). In other words, the Internet, and especial-
ly Social Media, facilitated this process of community building and maintenance.
First and foremost, the communities that come into being through Betri Rey-
kjavík seem more stable than Howard Rheingold’s canonical definition of “virtual 
communities”. To him, a virtual community is a group of people that knows and 
communicates with each other, shares knowledge and information, and is one in 
which members, who meet and communicate primarily via computer networks, 
also care for each other as human beings, at least to a certain degree. However, 
the communities that come into being through Betri Reykjavík and Betri Hverfi 
are not solely virtual or confined to online space since, in most cases, they refer to 
geographically located spaces within the greater city of Reykjavík, the immediate 
mundane environments of the users. In that way, participation in Betri Reykjavík 
is not possible without encouraging offline engagement and producing an offline 
community, and it is not based on shared interests alone but also on local closeness 
(cf. Döring 369).
Several users illustrate this point. For Dominique in particular, participation 
through Betri Reykjavík means “a start to get out of your own little shell, or lit-
tle house or little flat or little car and going to participate in the meetings in the 
suburbs or in your area”.196 She continues “you know, that’s the thing that Betri 
Reykjavík did. It got the people closer”. In 2011, online political participation 
was indeed able to strengthen solidarity between citizens. As Wellman and Hay-
thornthwaite argue, “the Internet is not destroying community but it is responding 
to, resonating with, and extending the types of community that have already be-
195 Dominique Plédel Jónsson, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 17 July 2012.
196 Dominique Plédel Jónsson, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 17 July 2012.
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come prevalent in the developed Western world: for local and distant ties, strong 
and weak ties, kin and friends” (Wellman and Haythornthwaite 4). In other words, 
online communities do not repress local social networks of families, colleagues, 
neighbours or friends, but rather, those groups make use of online communities 
and integrate them into their everyday life, since these online communities make 
everyday life easier in the conditions of mobile globality which they also promote 
at the same time (cf. Deterding et al. 129). 
Aside from Dominique, Guðmundur, Freyja, and Þórgnýr also found that the 
communal exchange of ideas and discussion in their everyday offline lives in-
creased after the crisis; and they attributed this to citizens’ activity on Betri Rey-
kjavík. In their research, Italian sociologists Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani 
support this conclusion, that “virtual networks operate at their best when they are 
backed by real social linkages in specifically localized communities” (133). 
Many interviewees affirmed this argument, saying that the close-knit commu-
nity within Reykjavík, and indeed in the whole of Iceland, was one of the main 
reasons that a digital participation tool like Betri Reykjavík worked so well there. 
Icelandic society has a tradition of being relatively open, almost everybody seems 
to know everybody, and is often related to them within a few degrees of separa-
tion. I believe it says a lot about a society when everyone is called by their first 
names, even the prime minister, president, and the head of the church.197 In his 
environment, it seems reasonable that it is easier to convince others and to make 
things move if other users are acquaintances, and not merely cyber-personalities 
with fake usernames (cf. Döring 369). For Þórgnýr, the smaller the society and the 
country is, the “freer you are, the easier is it for you to influence.“198 
Crisis and Innovation
This small and friendly structure of Icelandic society, and more so in its enhanced 
and empowered version after the crash, also allowed for increased creativity and 
innovation. In referring to innovation here, I understand it as “the invention and 
implementation of new things, knowledges [sic] and practices; innovations come 
about when unprecedented solutions to either known or new problems are devised 
and then put to work” (Welz, ‘Cultural Swirl’ 256). Gisela Welz argues that the 
conditions under which crisis lead to productivity and the generation of something 
197 The practice of calling everyone by their first names obviously has a lot to do with 
Icelandic naming conventions. Surnames are a rare occurrence, as “Icelanders use the 
patronymic system, where son, ‘son’ or dóttir, ‘daughter’ is attached to the genitive 
form of the father’s or, less commonly, the mother’s, first name” (Parnell and O’Carroll 
338). Telephone books are subsequently also structured by first names. 
198 Þórgnýr Thoroddsen, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 20 July 2012.
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new, rather than to a collapse of meaning and sense making, are especially inter-
esting for cultural anthropologists (cf. ‘Wandel der Kulturen’ 133).
Welz refers to the German sociologist Hans Joas who argues that people devel-
op increased inventive capabilities and creativity when mundane routines fail on 
the resistance of the (social and material) environment (cf. ‘Wandel der Kulturen’ 
132). Indeed, the ongoing popularity and relevance of Betri Reykjavík and Betri 
Hverfi are prime examples of the increased inventive capabilities and creativity 
induced by crisis in Iceland. But there are countless more, including a myriad 
of newly established working groups, the national forum in 2010,199 the crowd-
sourcing of a new constitution200, and the intensification of the tourist industry as 
Iceland’s prime source of revenue.201 
In this sub-chapter, I focus on the establishment of working groups and on Be-
tri Reykjavík and Betri Hverfi as examples of innovations coming out of a time of 
199 In 2010, around 950 Icelanders came together to deliberate on the future of country 
and reflect on what they wanted to see form the basis of Iceland’s new constitution. For 
more information, see www.thjodfundur2010.is (last accessed 17 August 2018).
200 As Iceland-based journalist Paul Fontaine points out, “Iceland’s original constitution 
is more or less borrowed from the Danes. In the wake of the 2008 economic collapse, 
a public outcry to change the very structure of Iceland’s socio-political system led 
to an initiative to write a new constitution. This led to the formation of a Constitu-
tional Council. The council – comprised of 25 men and women from around Iceland, 
and appointed by then Prime Minister Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir for the task – got to 
work on writing a new constitution for Iceland” (‘Constitution’). The American legal 
scholar Lawrence Lessig emphasizes that the crowdsourced “process for drafting this 
constitution is the most democratic process we’ve seen in the history of constitutions 
anywhere. We’ve never seen something like this. This process involved an incredibly 
intelligent mix between grassroots, citizen-driven input, expert-crafting direction, 
and an actual deliberative process for drafting the constitution that wasn’t controlled 
by insiders” (para.2). For more in-depth information on the Icelandic experiment of 
crowdsourcing a new constitution, see Jón Ólafsson’s 2016 article ‘The Constituent 
Assembly. A Study in Failure’ (cf. 252ff.).
201 Tourism has increased steadily since the crash and in 2016 amounted to 8.1 percent of 
the GDP (cf. Statistics Iceland, GDP). The number of employees in activities related to 
tourism (such as accommodation, travel agencies or tour operators) more than doubled 
from 14,600 in June 2008 to 30,700 in 2018 (cf. Statistics Iceland, Employees). To 
encourage year-round tourism, image building relied on Iceland’s natural attractions, 
Viking history, and quirky culture (cf. A. Árnason et al.; cf. Grétarsdóttir et al.; cf. 
Kjartansdóttir and Schram; cf. Lund, Loftsdóttir, et al.; cf. Lund, Kjartansdóttir, et al.; 
cf. Schram, ‘Borealism’; cf. Schram, ‘Wild Wild North’).
8 Results and Discussion | 183
crisis. As I have shown, the crisis not only increased participation amongst people 
already interested in politics, but also prompted many who had previously been 
disengaged to participate. In short, in times of crisis, more people become more 
politically active in more different modes. In Iceland, numerous working groups 
and initiatives were formed to discuss and deliberate on the country’s economic, 
social, and cultural future. As Reykjavík mayor Dagur B. Eggertsson pointed out, 
“everywhere in society people were creating their own think-tanks and deliberat-
ing on what to do now, how to move forward and what needed to be done and how 
new Iceland should look like, it was basically everywhere. All the universities, all 
the, ya, just everyone”.202
As already touched upon, Guðmundur initially became active in a financial 
reform group, which sparked further participation in Betri Reykjavík and Dögun, a 
political party.203 Another participant, Kristínn Már Ársælsson founded alda – the 
association for sustainability and democracy,
a think and do tank, a hope and think and do tank […] in 2009 after the financial crisis. 
The government fell and right after the national elections, it was clear that it would be 
a leftwing coalition. I myself and a bunch of other people were immediately aware that 
they were not gonna make any structural changes to either our economic system or our 
democratic system, even so they were the first leftwing government and it was just after 
the crash, their main emphasis was on rebuilding the economy, not restructuring or 
changing it in any way. SO we thought, I thought there was a real need for some sort of 
organisation to put out ideas, emancipatory ideas about changing both the democratic 
system and the economic one. […] So I just got contacted a lot of people who I knew 
were dissatisfied and were interested in finding usable solutions. The main concept be-
hind that was to create an organisation that would find models, institutional models that 
had been tried and tested somewhere that could deepen democracy or increase equality 
which would change our economic system in a way that would be more sustainable and 
more equitable and more democratic.204
Betri Reykjavík and Betri Hverfi were also founded in reaction to the crisis. In 
order to counteract the corruption and nepotism revealed in Icelandic economy 
and politics, Gunnar and Róbert originally wanted to facilitate an open contact and 
discussion forum for political parties and their potential voters in the run-up to the 
2010 municipal elections. Today, the freeware Your Priorities that is behind Betri 
Reykjavík is used in over 20 countries to help “citizens get their voices heard and 
202 Dagur B. Eggertsson, personal interview, Reykjavík, 27 June 2014.
203 Cf. Guðmundur Kristjánsson, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 9 July 2012.
204 Kristínn Már Ársælsson, personal interview, Reykjavík, 20 June 2014.
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to encourage citizens participation in governance” (Citizens Foundation, ‘Home’). 
The software has been awarded multiple awards in the e-Democracy and social 
innovations sectors (cf. Citizens Foundation, ‘About’).
Another element that seems to contribute towards Reykjavík’s readiness to 
innovate is locality. For Welz, “cities are most prone to be culturally productive in 
periods of social transformations – transformations that bring together within one 
place social actors and groups from a variety of origins, some far-flung and widely 
separated” (‘Cultural Swirl’ 262). That place was Austurvöllur, the square in front 
of the parliament building Altþingi, where protesters, journalists, artists, politi-
cians, scholars and scientists met, discussed and deliberated for several months. 
However, a space does not have to exist geographically to bring innovation. 
The Internet, and especially Social Media, work together with geographically 
located spaces to create such condensed places which “enable cultures to mix 
and people of various backgrounds to mingle and freely communicate with each 
other”, and therefore belong to “the privileged locations and epochs of cultural 
innovations” (Welz, ‘Cultural Swirl’ 262f.). The Internet does not only enable 
communication between people, it also brings people with similar interests togeth-
er to form a community who had previously been isolated for various reasons (cf. 
Passig and Lobo 125). As Hannerz points out, “the concentration of people in a 
limited space is important to cultural process not only because it provides critical 
masses for varied developments, but also because it offers forever new occasions 
for serendipity” (203). The response to the crisis that centred in Austurvöllur did 
so in collaboration with Social Media, and became the innovative cultural swirl 
that lead to new general elections, to an attempt to crowdsource a new constitu-
tion, to the formation of the Citizens’ Foundation and the consequent development 
of Betri Reykjavík and Betri Hverfi. Furthermore, Lemi Baruh and Hayley Watson 
point out that 
[i]n the midst of a political crisis, new media technologies enhance individuals’ abilities 
to network and offer new opportunities for citizens to organise, engage, and coordinate 
action as social activists. With the help of online networks, activists can locally and glob-
ally push grassroots ideas, organise and coordinate action (such as during the Occupy 
movements), and, crucially, through acts of citizen journalism, get their voices heard by 
the wider public. (250)
These catalysing effects Social Media has had for change and innovation are not 
unique to Iceland. In various countries hit hard by the 2008–09 financial crisis, 
Social Media played a fundamental role in mobilisation, information, and commu-
nication. As Yannis Theocharis points out for Greece,
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[m]any of the people who later became organisers of solidarity initiatives and leaders of 
civic innovations visited the protests and met like-minded people with whom they kept 
in touch via social media. These communication channels gave them the opportunity to 
discuss their ideas publicly, find an audience using networks of friends or unknown oth-
ers with whom they created loose online ties during the Aganaktismenoi mobilisations, 
and build new solidarity networks. (244)
It appears reasonable to argue that this condition of people meeting in condensed 
spaces, either out in the streets or online, is met much more by Reykjavík and 
Betri Reykjavík, than by the district of Friesland and LiquidFriesland. This is rein-
forced by statistics: Reykjavík has 462 inhabitants per square kilometre (cf. Vísin-
davefurinn; cf. Statistics Iceland, Population), while the district of Friesland has 
162 inhabitants per square kilometre (cf. Landkreis Friesland, ‘Zahlen’). Moreo-
ver, the number of registered and especially of active users speak for Reykjavík as 
enabling an innovative cultural swirl: more than 14,000 users were registered with 
Betri Reykjavík at the time it was still possible to check on this number (2013) and 
several new ideas were set in on a weekly basis. In contrast, no new ideas were 
posted on LiquidFriesland in the months leading up to its shutdown; and in the 
months before that, there were only around ten regular, active users. 
All in all, the crisis seems to have enhanced certain dispositions in Reykjavík 
society which favoured participation and innovation. If both come together, as in 
the case of the online participation tool Betri Reykjavík or the online participatory 
budgeting tool Betri Hverfi, the prospects for sustained implementation appear 
good. As I have shown, the crisis disrupted the quotidian lives of Icelanders with 
thousands losing their jobs, savings, and homes. Thus, it sparked increased polit-
ical interest and participation as suddenly, something substantial was at stake. In 
the liminal phase of crash and aftermath, a wider range of behaviour became so-
cially acceptable, such as protesting in the Pots-and-Pans Revolution. The success 
that this wave of political participation brought – including the resignation of a 
government which Icelanders held primarily responsible for the crisis – empow-
ered and emancipated large parts of society. With new confidence, efficacy, and 
social cohesion, many citizens began looking for and offering solutions to help the 
society out of crisis.
8.4.3.2 Political Participation in Times of Affluence
In Friesland, the innovative online participation tool LiquidFriesland failed be-
cause it did not become established in the Frisian’s participation repertoire. One 
of the reasons for this failure were the “times of affluence”. Kerbo describes social 
movements in such times as “collective action in which the major participants are 
not motivated by immediate life-threatening situations of political or economic 
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crisis, but rather, have their basic needs of life met, or even in abundance” (654). 
While the crisis was the defining moment for the establishment of Betri Reykjavík 
and for participation in Iceland, such crisis was absent in Friesland. The financial 
crisis 2008–09 did not hit the German state and population nearly as hard as it 
did the Icelandic state and people. Of course, several “crises” have since skittered 
about the discourse regarding democracy: from the crisis of the political party 
system, the crisis of the welfare state, the Euro crisis, the refugee crisis, and the 
ever-present crisis of democracy. In short, the term “crisis” is overused in the po-
litical and social sciences , as well as in the media and politics itself (cf. Merkel 7).
Despite the occurrence of certain “crises” in Germany, none of those had such 
fundamental and palpable effects on the population as the 2008–09 financial cri-
sis had on the Icelandic citizens, which could be classified as a “moral shock”. 
For James M. Jasper, these shocks ”generate a visceral unease strong enough to 
generate mobilization even in the absence of pre-existing networks. Individuals 
are moved emotionally by an act that violates conceptions of morality and those 
emotions explain social movement participation” (cf. as cited in Simmons 521). 
In other words, mobilisation depends on the “depth of participants’ political griev-
ances” (Portos and Masullo 202). 
The political grievances of citizens of the district of Friesland were relatively 
shallow. In times of affluence, it is because citizens’ basic needs “have been met 
that they have surplus resources such as time, money, and even energy to devote 
to social movement activity” (Kerbo 654). However, the issues at stake in these 
times “may be less personal and less severe, thus requiring more movement re-
sources and encouragement to motivate their social movement activity” (661). 
Strain theory, a prominent mobilization theory from social movement re-
search, also appears adaptable to explain mobilization not only in exceptional 
times, but also in calmer, affluent times.205 Although other researchers have not 
suggested adapting strain theory to explain social movement activity in times of 
affluence, it is possible to do so by conceptually expanding the term strain to 
205 One of the oldest and most prominent ideas in research on social movements, strain 
theory argues “that movements have their origins in troublesome, unsettling social 
conditions, traditionally conceptualized as ‘strains’” (Snow et al. 1). This remained 
the prime view on mobilisation for collective action for decades, but had fallen out of 
fashion by the late 1970s. Snow et al. however argue that the abandonment of strain 
theory was empirically premature. With a focus on the quotidian, the authors offer a 
fresh and fruitful look at the link between strain and the emergence of social move-
ments. The authors argue that “the kind of breakdown most likely to be associated with 
movement emergence is that which penetrates and disrupts, or threatens to disrupt, 
taken-for-granted, everyday routines and expectancies” (2).
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include unpleasant and improvable social or political situations. Although these 
social situations do not threaten people’s existence, they still substantially affect 
their “taken-for-granted, everyday routines and expectancies” (Snow et al. 2).
This can be seen in the cases of Icelandic research participants Per and Einar, 
who both see cycling primarily as a mode of transportation rather than a leisure 
activity: “I use mine [his bike] for commuting, I go ten kilometres back and forth, 
twenty kilometres a day. And it is just my way of travel”.206 Political engagement 
for the construction of new bike paths, the instalment of traffic signal systems fa-
vouring cyclists, and the ban of cars from the inner city, potentially leads to a sub-
stantial improvement in their everyday lives and those of their peers in the cycling 
community. Therefore, the strain of having to share a path with pedestrians, hav-
ing to cycle on the streets without marked cycling lanes or on badly maintained 
paths on their daily commute, sparks both their interest in researching possibilities 
for improvement and becoming active and setting ideas into Betri Reykjavík, com-
menting on similar suggestions, and/or voting on these. Per has also been on the 
board of the Icelandic Cyclists’ association for many years.
When defined this broadly, strain theory also works well at explaining peo-
ples’ motives for participating on LiquidFriesland. Citizens that start initiatives as 
diverse as suggesting that bike paths signposts be cleaned207, lacking road mark-
ings be retouched208, or that a school be expanded to a sixth form college209 do 
so because they experience the absence of these structures as disadvantages, as 
strains in their everyday life which threaten “to disrupt, taken-for-granted, every-
day routines and expectancies” (Snow et al. 2). For example, small retailers Karin 
Schmidt and Wolfgang Müller, fearing losses in sales, protested the planned con-
struction of a shopping centre in their town, both in on-site demonstrations and on 
LiquidFriesland.210 
However, for most Frisian citizens, the extent to which their lives could be 
improved through engagement on LiquidFriesland appeared insufficient to put up 
with the inconveniences and crudities of the tool (as explained in chapter 2, Com-
munication within Online Participation Tools). Rather, a number of the citizens 
who used LiquidFriesland did so for reasons that cannot be identified as political 
206 Einar Magnússon, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 6 June 2014.
207 “Beschilderung der Radwege reinigen”, Initiative i111, Bürgerverfahren ‘85 in the first 
version of LiquidFriesland, last accessed 16 June 2015.
208 “Nachbesserung fehlender Straßenmarkierungen”, Initiative i96, in the first version of 
LiquidFriesland, last accessed 6 August 2014.
209 “Erweiterung der IGS Friesland um einen Sekundarbereich II”, Initiative i31 in the 
first version of LiquidFriesland, last accessed 6 August 2014.
210 Karin Schmidt and Wolfgang Müller, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
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per se. According to my participants, many registered simply out of curiosity,211 
because they had a strong affinity for all things technological and Internet-con-
cerned,212 or had time on their hands213. Clearly, any correlation with political in-
terest or engagement is lacking here. For many of my interlocutors, the feeling of 
solidarity with and sense of obligation to acquainted leaders in local politics and 
administration,214 often seen as characteristic of small communities, seems to have 
been sufficient motivation to register with LiquidFriesland.
As I have outlined above, Betri Reykjavík came into being because of a moral 
shock in times of crisis within a fragmented society in a threshold state. The initial 
aim of Betri Reykjavík was to provide a space for every political party running in the 
2010 municipal elections to hold discussions with potential voters, to promote their 
ideas, and to develop their agendas out in the open instead of behind closed doors.
The thirst for transparency and fundamental change that was central to the 
creation of Betri Reykjavík, was absent in that of LiquidFriesland (cf. Killian et 
al.). LiquidFriesland was implanted top-down into a stable society “with estab-
lished, unquestioned structures, norms, and values” (ibid.), because the Landrat 
Sven Ambrosy thought it would be nice to offer an additional way for citizens to 
communicate with the administration; and at that, drawing great media attention 
to the district of Friesland. 
Political Disinterest as Sign of Affluence?
Aside from the relatively shallow political grievances of Friesland’s citizens and 
the insufficient mobilisation and resources on the part of the administration, it 
appears likely that political disinterest played a role in LiquidFriesland’s failure. 
In the literature, political disinterest is often associated with dissatisfaction, voter 
apathy, and cynicism (cf. Kersting, ‘Online Participation’ 271). The main line of 
reasoning in these articles is that citizens lose interest in politics and stop partici-
pating politically because they feel that their interests and realities are insufficient-
ly represented by elected politicians and governments (cf. van Deth, ‘Politisches 
Interesse’). My research participants however suggested a different reading of 
political disinterest in times of affluence. This becomes especially understandable 
in Krístinn’s line of reasoning, as he makes clear that political disinterest is not 
necessarily to be seen as something negative:
211 For example Helmut Weber, focus group, Jever, 9 October 2014.
212 For example Peter Lamprecht, personal interview, Jever, 16 September 2013.
213 Pensioners and people on parental leave stated that they had time on their hands, for 
example Heinz Schulz and Anna Wagner-Becker from the focus group in Varel, 9 Sep-
tember 2014.
214 For example Susanne Engstler, personal interview, 8 October 2013.
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one measurement of a healthy society could be political disinterest. Disinterest in poli-
tics does not necessarily mean that there is something wrong with the political system, 
it could simply mean that people are already satisfied. So they don’t see the need to be 
interested in the political sphere or decision-making, they just go ‘Life is great, I don’t 
have to spend my life on politics, that’s great .’
We need to find a way to incorporate that into our system in the future. Because one of 
the reasons there is a declining interest in political parties and declining vote, is simply 
because of the level of affluence in the western world. Our life, our quality of life is 
at a level where what the politicians are doing doesn’t really affect our quality of life 
that much anymore. They’re tweaking something here and they are tweaking some-
thing there, doesn’t really matter what they are doing. My quality of life is not going to 
change whether this one is in power or that one.215 
Interestingly, Friesland’s Landrat Sven Ambrosy takes the same line:
wann beteiligt man sich und wann beteiligt man sich nicht? Wenn ich unheimlich en-
gagiert bin in einer Sache, dann beteilige ich mich. […] Wenn eine Unzufriedenheit 
mit Politik da ist, dann ist eine hohe politische Aktivität zu verzeichnen. Das ist ja auch 
richtig so in der Demokratie. Wenn aber eine hohe Zufriedenheit da ist, dann beteiligen 
sich weniger. Wenn die Bevölkerung schweigt, sich nicht beteiligt, ist das dann ein 
ganz schlimmes Zeichen für den Zustand der Demokratie oder sogar vielleicht ein sehr 
gutes? Weil die die sich nicht öffentlich äußern sagen: ‚Läuft doch‘. Ich würde mal 
sagen hier in Friesland, es läuft, es gibt eine hohe Grundzufriedenheit. Und wenn nicht, 
dann hat man Beteiligungsmöglichkeiten.216
when does one get active and when does one not? When I’m very committed to an 
issue, then I get active. […] When there is political discontent, there are reports of high 
political activity. And that is what democracy is about. But when there is high level of 
content, less people are politically active. When the population keeps quiet – is that a 
terrible sign for the state of democracy or perhaps a very good sign? Because those 
citizens that aren’t active publicly say: ‘Everything is going well’. Here in Friesland, 
I’d say everything is going well, generally, people are very content. And if not, there are 
opportunities for participation.
As both quotations from the fields show, the weakening of representative democ-
racy does not necessarily indicate that the idea of democracy as such is in danger. 
It could also mean that citizens orient towards strengthening participatory and 
215 Kristínn Már Ársælsson, personal interview, Reykjavík, 20 June 2014.
216 Sven Ambrosy, phone interview, 22 September 2015.
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deliberative aspects of democracy, as is the case for Iceland and what Kristínn was 
hinting at. Or political disinterest could simply mean that citizens are relatively 
satisfied with the status quo. For Friesland’s press secretary Klug, this is a legit-
imate position to say ‘I only participate in the elections because I feel that is my 
civil duty, but right now I would rather like to mow the lawn or lay on the couch 
and watch sport on TV instead of participating through LiquidFriesland’.217 
8.4.3.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I illustrated how the concept of times of crisis and times of afflu-
ence are one way of interpreting different levels of participation in my research 
fields. While this interpretation has been heavily influenced by my research (fields 
and questions), the concept of times of crisis and of affluence is nevertheless trans-
ferable to other political participation frameworks. The key point here seems to 
be that the the more significantly their everyday life has been disrupted, more 
profound a citizen’s personal (political) grievances, the easier it is for them to 
become engaged in or to deepen their engagement in politics. Or, from a top-down 
perspective: in order to mobilise affluent citizens with secure livelihoods, signif-
icantly more resources are required, and participation levels are more difficult to 
maintain. 
8.5  The Role of Geographical Proximity  
in (Online) Political Participation
In this chapter, it will become clear that some modes of political participation 
appear better suited for influencing national or state levels and other modes ap-
pear better suited for influencing on the local municipal level. This connects well 
with the initial analysis of people’s political participation repertoires as processes 
of negotiation, of mixing and matching (see chapter 8.4.1 Political Participation 
Repertoires Today). 
At the national political level, people seem to prefer established modes of par-
ticipation such as electoral voting, whereas at the local level, they appear to prefer 
other modes. A clear example of this is Hörður Torfason, the founder and main organ-
iser of the Pots-and-Pans Revolution and of Samtökin’78, Iceland’s national queer 
organisation. Aside from being a singer and songwriter, Hörður is also a political 
activist by profession. In chapter 8.4.1, Political Participation Repertoires Today, I 
cited Hörður’s demand for compulsory voting. Somewhat surprisingly, he still ad-
mitted that 
217 Cf. Sönke Klug, personal interview, 25 August 2015. 
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honestly, when the elections were coming up, I just went away. […] I didn’t wanna be 
here. Because people have this tendency of filling papers and everything with filth about 
people and I don’t like that. I don’t like to read bad things about other people, I really 
don‘t. […] SO when elections are coming up, all these debates, I avoid it. I don‘t wanna 
fill myself with this rubbish. So, I stepped away.218
Fig. 15: Starting Page of Betra Ísland219
However, at the local level of politics, people seem to prefer more direct, partici-
patory, and deliberative modes of political participation. As pointed out in chapter 
2.3, another example for this preference are Betri Reykjavík and Betri Hverfi, the 
online participatory budgeting tool which enables participation only in the district 
in which one lives – so, at the micro level. Through it, participants can actively 
take part in shaping their immediate neighbourhood and surroundings, and thus 
contribute to improving the lives of family, friends and neighbours.
218 Hörður Torfason, personal interview, Reykjavík, 24 June 2014.
219 The small black frame on the right side indicates the original Betra Ísland, while the 
other tiles lead to participatory budgeting sites of municipalities such as Stykkishól-
mur. Screenshot taken on 24 August 2018 at https://www.betraisland.is.
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The national version of Betri Reykjavík, Betra Ísland, is significantly less pop-
ular than the local platforms. In 2012, Dominique said she had not “gone into that 
[Betra Ísland]. I stayed to Reykjavík. It’s something, it has to be something so close 
that the people really get involved with it/to touch you personally. And when you 
think of Betra Ísland, […] nothing has been really happening, it’s been in between. 
So, I’m not sure it can work at a country’s scale, I’m not sure.”220 The last idea was 
added in March 2019, so nothing new was added for over six months. However, 
several municipalities other than Reykjavík have used Betra Ísland as a platform to 
host their annual online participatory budgets, as Figure 15, 187, illustrates.
In Iceland, the preference for more direct, participatory, and deliberative 
modes of political participation on the local level can at least partially be attrib-
uted to the effects of the national crisis. The citizens’ increased reversion to local 
communities and their immediate surroundings, as both spaces of action and ref-
erence areas in their daily lives, may also serve as an explanation for increased 
interest in participating in municipal decision-making processes. Generally, most 
of the interviewees felt that there had been a general increase in interest in their 
local area. Long-term political activist Jón Þór remarked that “people are more 
interested in their smaller neighbourhood than in the bigger Reykjavík area”.221 
Moreover, Þórgnýr contemplates “that people that live in the same street or the 
same cluster of houses should be more active. I’ve been thinking a lot about this, 
but have never been active, to get the neighbours together and just take charge of 
our street a little bit and maybe send suggestions [to Betri Reykjavík, JTK] or stuff 
like that.”222 Einar thinks that this is exactly the way to get people motivated over 
the long term: they have to be involved with decision-making related to their im-
mediate surroundings, their neighbourhood. By conducting the Betri Hverfi pro-
ject, the municipality seems to be meeting exactly this need: “it [Betri Hverfi] was 
really to your close environments, to what in your, let’s say, 500m or 200m radius, 
what is there the things you would like to see.” 223
According to the British economic geographer Peter Dicken, the size of a po-
litical unit is indeed relevant for citizens’ levels of political engagement. Gener-
ally, “the key localizing force derives from the essential ‘socialness’ of human 
activities and the fact that such socialness is facilitated and enhanced by geograph-
ical proximity. Such untraded interdependencies are essentially socio-cultural“ (as 
cited in van Deth, ‘Politisches Interesse’ 273). 
220 Dominique Plédel Jónsson, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 17 July 2012.
221 Jón Þór Ólafsson, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 20 July 2012.
222 Þórgnýr Thoroddsen, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 20 July 2012.
223 Einar Magnússon, personal interview II, Reykjavík, 6 June 2014.
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Auch ohne übertriebene Romantisierung des Lebens in kleinen Kommunen ist klar, 
dass die räumliche Nähe („geographical proximity“) vielerlei direkte soziale Kontakte 
ermöglicht: Man trifft sich beim Bäcker, kennt sich von der Schule, sieht sich im Verein 
und erfährt direkt von Familienglück und Trauerfällen. Wer so zusammenlebt, wird 
auch die kommunalpolitischen Probleme eher als gemeinsame nachbarschaftliche Auf-
gaben und Herausforderungen betrachten als dies in größeren Kommunen der Fall ist. 
(ibid.)
Even without exaggeratedly romanticising life in small municipalities it is clear that 
geographical proximity enables all kinds of direct social contacts: you run into each 
other at the bakery, know each other from school, see each other in associations, as well 
as directly hear about domestic bliss and bereavement. Those who live together like this 
are also more likely to see problems relating to municipal politics as joint communal 
tasks and challenges than people living in bigger municipalities. 
Indeed, the proximity factor also seems to be at play in online participation. The 
high degree of importance interviewees attribute to the local level becomes visible 
in their voting behaviour within Betri Reykjavík, as Guðrún’s statement illustrates: 
“I see a topic...and I don’t like it, but I don’t not like it enough to oppose on it. 
Maybe that’s something not in my neighbourhood and I don’t care about it and I 
don’t want it, and maybe if it would be close to my home, I would oppose to it. 
But I don’t like to be against something.”224 In order to engage with an idea and to 
be willing to spend time and energy on it, “it has to be something so close that the 
people really get involved with it, it has to touch YOU personally.”225 Again, this 
stresses the local character of Betri Reykjavík, which is much more rooted in and 
intertwined with the everyday lives of citizens than LiquidFriesland is.
While the kind of geographical proximity described by van Deth clearly exists 
for users of Betri Reykjavík, it does so only superfluously for the users of Liquid-
Friesland, as the district is not the local frame of reference for citizens, the mu-
nicipality is. LiquidFriesland’s catchment area is mostly rural, with 98.000 people 
living scattered about an area of about 608 square kilometres, including the East 
Friesian Island of Wangerooge. The district is at the politically intermediate level, 
a level which seems almost harder to grasp than the national level, at least con-
cerning its jurisdiction and responsibilities. Indeed, interlocutor Peter Lamprecht 
makes clear that the local level is that at which one can most easily understand the 
politics: people in Varel know about what is going on in Varel, and the people in 
Jever are hopefully informed about what is happening in Jever. But beyond that, 
224 Guðrún Sigurðardóttir, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 9 July 2012.
225 Dominique Plédel Jónsson, personal interview I, Reykjavík, 17 July 2012.
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it becomes relatively unclear for many citizens whether the district, municipal, or 
state government is responsible for a certain issue.226
As discussed in detail in chapter 2.1, a common reason for the council reject-
ing suggestions and ideas put through LiquidFriesland was that they were outside 
the district’s jurisdiction. As such, it comes as little surprise that users like Christa 
Hoffmann demanded local versions of LiquidFriesland. For Hoffmann, the topics 
that the district is responsible for are not those which are directly relevant to the 
population, and she is convinced that many more citizens would participate if a 
tool like LiquidFriesland was made available at the municipal level.227
It is not only their “expertise” in their neighbourhoods which encourages citi-
zens to participate, but also the ease they have imagining how and what could be 
changed there. The impression that their engagement could also benefit others in 
their neighbourhood – family, friends, neighbours, the community – appears to 
help mobilise and motivate them. My research has shown that people are especial-
ly interested and more likely to participate when an issue or topic directly affects 
the daily lives of themselves, or those close to them. For example, parents like 
Guðmundur Kristjánsson or Anna Wagner-Becker are often interested in issues re-
lated to day-care and schooling; people that bike to work daily, like Per and Einar, 
support the improvement of bike path networks; and fearing losses in sales, small 
retailers like Karin Schmidt and Wolfgang Müller protest the planned construction 
of a shopping centre in their town. On a national level, many Icelanders became 
active in protesting against the government and the financial system after the fi-
nancial crash of 2008–09, because they were facing large debts, unemployment, 
and the loss of their savings and even their homes. In every single interview about 
their interest in certain civic or political issues, participants pointed out directly or 
indirectly how those issues were relevant in their daily lives. 
Conversely, users found it hard to engage in discussion (on the online plat-
forms) about topics that did not personally affect them (anymore). For instance, 
Ursula Thoms’s children have left school and are now at university, so she found 
it difficult to take part in a debate about school restructuring.228 In online participa-
tion, people are able to contribute to discussions on topics directly related to their 
daily lives in their immediate surroundings. This is in stark contrast to traditional 
electoral participation, where citizens only role is to vote on general policy direc-
tions every four or five years. 
In the end, the preference for the local level as the frame for online participa-
tion tools featured heavily in participants’ accounts. On the basis of this observa-
226 Cf. Peter Lamprecht, personal interview, Jever, 16 September 2013.
227 Christa Hoffmann, focus group, Varel, 9 September 2014.
228 Cf. Ursula Thoms, personal interview, Varel, 9 October 2013.
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tion, three things in particular become clear. First, the preference for the local level 
stresses geographical proximity as the base of general sociality. For participants, 
their immediate surroundings, their neighbourhood, their quarter is their frame 
of reference and of action. Second, the preference for the local level shows how 
inseparably interwoven the online and offline layers of everyday life are. Users are 
active in and for their immediate living surroundings by online and offline means: 
they are not either online or offline, nor are they either active in virtual life or real 
life – they are both. This evidence yet again refutes claims that political participa-
tion by online means is somehow, per definition, inferior to political participation 
in the real world, as terms like clicktivism or slacktivism have come to suggest. 
Third, the preference for the local level as the frame of direct, participatory, online 
modes of political participation is one explanation for the varying success of Betri 
Reykjavík and LiquidFriesland; that is, the registration of as many citizens as pos-
sible and the vivid usage of the tools, as well as the establishment of the tools both 
in political participation repertoires of citizens and in decision-making processes. 
8.6 Conclusion
This chapter started out by providing an overview of the most common modes 
of political participation amongst participants, contextualising these modes both 
within participants’ participation repertories and within their everyday lives. It 
became apparent that participants mix-and-match modes, based on a modes per-
ceived political efficacy and their own political objectives. 
I then outlined three perspectives that emerged from the data to explain (on-
line) political participation. First, I looked at (online) participation tools as a con-
tinuum, ranging from enabling participation to simulating it. Whether (potential) 
users see an online tool as enabling them to have a real voice and influence in 
decision-making processes, or whether they see it as only simulating participation 
and the ideas they put forward have little relevance in the political process and the 
quality of life for citizens in a municipality has far-reaching consequences. For 
many (potential) users, LiquidFriesland appears to have simply been added onto 
the political process without any principal and permanent changes being made. 
Moreover, from my interviews and impressions, it seems as if it was primarily 
introduced in order to prove the innovativeness, modernity, and readiness for the 
future of the current administration, and particularly Landrat Sven Ambrosy, as 
the agent of change.
Second, the concept of times of crisis and affluence proves helpful in explain-
ing multi-layered differences in political participation in Iceland and Germany. 
The financial crisis in Iceland appeared to be a fundamental disruption of the quo-
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tidian, to “all the taken-for-granted aspects of everyday life; more specifically, 
[…] daily practices and routines that comprise habitual social action, alongside 
the natural attitude of routinized expectations and the suspension of doubt about 
the organization of the social world and one’s role within it” (Buechler 59). In 
contrast, Frisian participants were not in “immediate life-threatening situations of 
political or economic crisis, but rather, have their basic needs of life met, or even 
in abundance” (654). In the end, the extent of personal grievances appears to be a 
central to mobilising – or not mobilising – people for political action and partici-
pation. The crisis also appears to have led to increased and lasting participation in 
Iceland, through Betri Reykjavík and other modes. Indeed, Betri Reykjavík itself is 
one outcome of the innovative potential of crisis. 
Third, this chapter looked at the relevance of geographical proximity to the 
modes of political participation. Participants prefer different modes depending on 
the political and geographical level they are participating at. Whereas representa-
tive modes like voting at the ballot have strong support on the nation state level, 
participants prefer more direct and participatory modes of engagement on a more 
local level. In this sense, it comes as no surprise that LiquidFriesland, which is 
directed at the district level, failed to become a lasting part of decision-making pro-
cesses. This is especially the case since the use of the tool becomes unclear because 
of the uncertainty regarding the jurisdiction of the district: many ideas suggested 
by users fell to the jurisdiction of either the municipality or the federal state.
In summary, this chapter adopted three perspectives to make sense of partici-
pants’ repertoires and patterns of political participation, showing the complexity 
of political participation today. In regard to the main research question of this 
thesis, namely “how are people’s repertoires and patterns of political participa-
tion influenced by the opportunities the Internet generally and digital democracy 
in particular entail?”, it becomes clear that citizens typically adopted a mix-and-
match strategy. In a bricolage fashion, they combined modes of political partici-
pation across physical and virtual spheres according to their respective political 
objectives as well as different modes perceived internal efficacy. However, my 
findings suggest that in these fields, both the efficacy of ICTs and their potential 
to facilitate change toward more direct and participatory democratic structures are 
limited as was shown in the last sub-chapters.
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9 Conclusion
In this book, I set out to study political participation in the digital age. More pre-
cisely, I investigated the influence of ICTs, and particularly the Internet, on cit-
izens’ political participation repertories. It concluded that the Internet enriches 
participants’ political participation repertoires by opening up new and flexible 
participation modes that are predominantly participatory or directly democratic 
in nature. Examples for these new political participation modes are online partici-
pation tools integrated in decision-making processes, such as Betri Reykjavík and 
LiquidFriesland, as well as the online participatory budgeting tool Betri Hverfi. 
I then investigated the influence of these ICTs on citizens’ political participa-
tion practices. My findings suggest that ICTs have been largely responsible for a 
shift in citizens’ participation practices from being general, linear, high-thresh-
old, temporally constricted, and dependent on physical presence to topic-centred, 
anachronistic, low-threshold, temporally discontinuous, and independent from 
physical presence. With this multi-dimensional flexibility, it appears that citizens 
can now participate politically more often. The assumption that political partici-
pation becomes a more mundane part of people’s lives through the opportunities 
ICTs bring appears to be justified, at least to a certain degree.
Moreover, seeing their submissions online, seeing politicians and administra-
tion dealing with them and implementing them appears to increase citizens sense 
of internal political efficacy, which again motivates them to engage further. The 
data does not in any way support the normative view that online participation is 
mere clicktivism or slacktivism (cf. Eisel). Instead, modes of online participation 
actually appear to trigger other forms of political participation, such as party po-
litical engagement or even candidacy for a political office. 
Moreover, political participation practices in times of crisis and in times of af-
fluence develop rather differently. The 2008–09 financial crisis, which the major-
ity of Icelanders appeared to experience as “a disruption of the quotidian” (Snow 
et al.), mobilised many to take up various modes of political participation which 
even went beyond both the thematic and temporal scope of the crisis. In times 
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of affluence, when “participants are not motivated by immediate life-threatening 
situations of political or economic crisis, but rather, have their basic needs of life 
met, or even in abundance” (Kerbo 654), greater incentives are needed to mobilise 
citizens. This is also illustrated by the different participation levels in Betri Rey-
kjavík and LiquidFriesland, and the eventual shut-down of the latter in 2016 due 
to a complete lack of participation. 
Regarding the specific online participation tools Betri Reykjavík or Liquid-
Friesland, the actual uses of those tools and sense-making processes on behalf of 
their users were investigated. In the second analysis chapter, this is combined with 
the study of the interfaces, that is the communication and interaction between the 
three primary groups of actors: users/citizens, programmers, and politicians and 
administration. My research revealed conflicts and irritations at play here, such as 
the opacity of communication in online participation tools, or the different groups’ 
diverging understandings of the scope and function of online participation tools. 
While citizens expect these online tools to offer a place and way to discuss and 
deliberate, my and other research suggests that politicians and administrations 
“tended to commission sites that maintain existing institutional and cultural prac-
tices” (Wright and Street 858). This becomes visible, for example, in the software 
design of both tools favouring individual clicktivist actions, while simultaneously 
inhibiting discussion and deliberation. 
The research also found a substantial transformation in participants’ informa-
tion practices through ICTs. This is line with Strömbäck et al.’s findings that to-
day, individuals’ information gathering practices have developed into “personal 
news repertoires” (1) which are multi-method, combining different media formats 
and media outlets for each of the formats. In this process, filtering, sorting, and 
contextualising information become a regular part of citizens’ new skill-sets in in-
formation practice. This (in)competent mixing and matching has a significant role 
in participation practices as well, suggesting that through the use of ICTs, people 
may become better informed and thus more likely to engage politically. 
This research has a number of implications which have a wide-ranging im-
pact. First, the competent application of a mix-and-match approach to information 
seeking and consumption in “contemporary, high choice, hybrid and fragmented 
media environments” (cf. Chadwick in Strömbäck et al. 3) emphasises the Inter-
net, and especially Social Media, as information sources that need to be taken se-
riously. Political and civic educators, as well as municipal administrations, should 
make wise use of Social Media, not only to reach out to young citizens but indeed 
to citizens across all age groups. 
The research findings should also be of special importance to programmers of 
online participation tools. As “Software is Politics”, software programming and 
design play a vital role in the extent to which the promises of digital democracy 
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(cf. Linden) are actually fulfilled. At the same time, an online participation tool 
is only as participatory as its political and administrative commissioners want it 
to be. As such, my findings also speak directly to politicians and administrations 
who would like to implement an online participation tool. They need to be clear 
about the scope of citizen participation they wish to enable and with it, the degree 
to which they are prepared to restructure both the political culture and political 
communication (cf. Rosenzweig and Eith 12).
The fact that the multiplication and diversification of political participation 
modes over the last 25 years has been fundamentally powered by the development 
of ICTs should make those who proclaim widespread political apathy wonder. My 
research supports Jan van Deth’s view that election turnout is not the only way to 
measure political participation in a democracy (cf. ‘Map’). Rather, diverse online 
modes of political participation are here to stay, and these need to be considered 
in assessing the state of democracy today, whether it be by opinion-making schol-
ars and journalists, or politicians and administrators. Adopting a more operation-
al, open interpretation of political participation, as van Deth and others suggest, 
is fundamental because “[…] those with the most restrictive and conventional 
conceptions of political participation identify a strong and consistent pattern of 
declining political participation and engagement over time, whilst those with a 
more inclusive conception discern instead a change in the mode of political par-
ticipation” (Hay 23).
For future research in this area, I would recommend expanding and diversi-
fying the sample and sampling process. It would be worthwhile to examine these 
research questions with interlocutors who have less experience using online par-
ticipation tools, so as to rule out over-exuberance about the potential of ICTs for 
political participation. It would also be worthwhile incorporating more citizens 
under 40 in the study, as they were the noticeable exception within this study’s 
sample, where most participants were in their 50s or 60s. Finally, I have no doubt 
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